A Dynamic Contest Model of Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets


Book Description

In this article, we analyze the dynamic competition between two platform firms (A&B) in two-sided markets with network externalities. In Period 1, platform A or B wins the contest in a first stage and can serve the two-sided market monopolistically in a second stage. In Period 2, the two platforms carry over previous investments to a subsequent contest in a first stage, and the winner (A or B) serves the market monopolistically in a second stage. We show that a head start of one platform does not guarantee future success. The combination of cost advantages and network externalities affects the platforms' success. Moreover, a market dominance of a platform does not necessarily result in higher profits.







The Economics of Platforms


Book Description

Digital platforms controlled by Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, Tencent and Uber have transformed not only the ways we do business, but also the very nature of people's everyday lives. It is of vital importance that we understand the economic principles governing how these platforms operate. This book explains the driving forces behind any platform business with a focus on network effects. The authors use short case studies and real-world applications to explain key concepts such as how platforms manage network effects and which price and non-price strategies they choose. This self-contained text is the first to offer a systematic and formalized account of what platforms are and how they operate, concisely incorporating path-breaking insights in economics over the last twenty years.




Competition in Two-Sided Platform Markets with Direct Network Effect


Book Description

In light of recent trends in social networking services that encourage users of platforms to “share,” “recommend,” and “do activities” with others, this work analyzes platform competition in two-sided markets that exhibit direct (or within-) network effect in addition to conventional cross-network effect. Introduction of direct network effect to one group (buyer-side) in a two-sided market generates two counter-acting effects: demand-augmenting effect and demand-sensitizing effect. The former allows platforms to raise buyer-side price, thereby increasing the sum of prices charged to buyers and sellers, whereas the latter causes platforms to lower them. I show that demand-augmenting effect dominates demand-sensitizing effect under the monopoly platform, whereas introducing competition between platforms under sufficient direct network effect relatively strengthens the demand- sensitizing effect, which lowers the price charged to buyers.




Dynamic Platform Competition in a Two-Sided Market


Book Description

We empirically study a dynamic platform competition in the online daily deals promotion industry characterized by intense rivalry between two leading promotion sites, Groupon and LivingSocial, that broker between local merchants and local consumers. We find that, for a comparable deal, the incumbent Groupon enjoys a significant advantage in performance measured in the number of coupon sales, which appears largely attributable to its greater network size in the consumer side. Yet LivingSocial successfully enters and quickly increases penetration in this market. We find no evidence that LivingSocial offers consumers more favorable terms on their deals than Groupon. Instead, on the merchant side, we find that LivingSocial poach merchants from Groupon, aided by the publicly available information on individual merchants and deal performance. Poached deals generate greater and more predictable coupon sales than the deals developed internally. While information-based poaching provides a foothold for the entrant in overcoming the initial size disadvantage, over time it turns into a competition-intensifying channel, as Groupon reacts by the same poaching strategy. Our study shows how platforms compete dynamically in a two-sided market with open information structure, thereby complements prior theoretical developments for multi-sided markets.







Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets


Book Description

In this article, we construct a model to study competing payment networks, where networks offer differentiated products in terms of benefits to consumers and merchants. We study market equilibria for a variety of market structures: duopolistic competition and cartel, symmetric and asymmetric networks, and alternative assumptions about multihoming and consumer preferences. We find that competition unambiguously increases consumer and merchant welfare. We extend this analysis to competition among payment networks providing different payment instruments and find similar results.




Rochet and Tirole on Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets


Book Description

This is a ready-to-read version of my previous paper 'Deciphering the Two-Sided Market Model of Rochet and Tirole'. It blows away the smokescreen of logical disorder, incoherent language and mathematical sophistication of the original article by rephrasing the model in clear language, spelling out the underlying assumptions explicitly and analyzing their implications. It turns out that the model captures a reality much narrower than pretended by the authors and that the findings are surprisingly unsurprising. They are supposed to be typical for two-sided markets, but the outcomes are not really different from what is found for complementary products in ordinary markets. Moreover, the key insights, claimed to be derived from those findings, are unrelated to them. Although the story told around the model is quite interesting by itself, there is hardly any value added in the modeling exercise.




Two-sided Markets and Their Relevance for Competition Policy


Book Description

Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: Good, Ruhr-University of Bochum, course: MA (ECUE), language: English, abstract: Two-sided markets consist of two or more exclusive groups, present simultaneously on a single platform. They both need each other. In order to succeed the platform provider must ensure active participation of both groups. In the beginning these bazaars face chicken-and-egg problem, which should be solved, sometimes even by providing free chicken. These markets include some of the most important industries in new economy such as mobile telephony companies, free TV services, OS suppliers, software providers, gaming companies, credit card companies, auction sites etc. Ebay and amazon are good examples of two-sided markets. In such two-sided markets buyers and sellers first trade with the intermediary/ies so as to gain access to the functionalities of a platform and then trade with each other under oligopolistic conditions. In chapter 1 of this paper an attempt has been made to describe finer nuances of two-sided markets. Thereafter I proceed to discuss the various dynamics of two-sided markets in chapter 2. Two-sided firms differ from traditional industries and they follow totally different business economics. Marginal cost does not help them in deciding optimal price. Pricing policies and other business strategies must be formulated in such a way that it should ensure active interaction of both groups. Pricing strategy should get both sides on board and should also solve chicken-and-egg problem. Chapter 3 describes the pricing policy adopted by two-sided markets. Chapter 4 deals with relevance of two-sided markets for competition policy. Competition Authorities do not need different set of rules to regulate these industries. However Competition Authorities must consider various economic principles that influence pricing and investment decisions in two-sided markets. Chapter 5




Industry 4.0


Book Description

This book reflects the futuristic scientific view of the consequences of transition to Industry 4.0 for climate change. The authors present a systemic overview of the current negative consequences of digitization for the environment, new outlines of the energy sphere in Industry 4.0 and the change of the environment pollution level in Industry 4.0. The book also analyses the ecological consequences of growth and development of Industry 4.0, and considers Industry 4.0 as an alternative to fighting climate change. The book presents a view on fighting climate change in Industry 4.0 from the positions of shifting the global community’s attention from environment protection to formation of the digital economy. A logical continuation of this book is a view from the opposite side, which would allow reflecting the contribution of Industry 4.0 into fighting climate change and the perspectives of harmonization of these top-priority directions of the global economy’s development. This book will be of interest to academics and practitioners interested in climate change and development of Industry 4.0, as well contributing to a national economic policy for fighting climate change and corporate strategies of sustainable development in Industry 4.0.