Aligning Ends, Ways, and Means


Book Description

After four decades of relative stability in national security strategy, American behavior has been erratic in search of a new and sustainable role on the world stage. Rather than facing an ideologically driven great power alliance, the new threat appears to be emanating from failed or failing states. And rather than preparing to deter, and if necessary, defeat, a military super power the United States has entered into long, costly, and uncertain nation building efforts that are falling out of favor with the American public facing a deep recession. Nation building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed an imbalance in the capabilities of the departments and agencies and an inability to achieve a unity of effort, a whole of government effort. High level commissions recommend a reallocation of resources to achieve a new balance in the instruments of power and major reorganizations to affect a better orchestration of the instruments. Others are completely redefining national security. Traditionally, threats to national security were military problems with military solutions. What were considered issues of foreign policy -- including pandemics and environmental degradation -- are increasingly cast as national security matters. They are not military problems with military solutions. A national security strategy aligns ends, ways, and means. Finding a new alignment must take place in an environment of a deep and wide recession, partisan gridlock, and uncertainty about the very meaning of national security. This book presents the reader with the information necessary to engage in an informed debate on national security strategy and the system that supports it.




The Sovereignty Solution


Book Description

The Sovereignty Solution is not an Establishment national security strategy. Instead, it describes what the U.S. could actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building. Currently there is no coherent plan that addresses questions like: If terrorists were to strike Chicago tomorrow, what would we do? When Chicago is burning, whom would we target? How would we respond? There is nothing in place and no strategy on the horizon to either reassure the American public or warn the world: attack us, and this is what you can expect. In this book, a Naval Postgraduate School professor and her Special Forces coauthors offer a radical yet commonsensical approach to recalibrating global security. Their book discusses what the United States could actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building. Two tracks to their strategy are presented: strengthening state responsibility abroad and strengthening the social fabric at home. The authors’ goal is to provoke a serious debate that addresses the gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived. Without leaning left or right, they hope to draw many people into the debate and force Washington to rethink what it sends service men and women abroad to do.




Who Wins?


Book Description

Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force.




Harsh Lessons


Book Description

The recent Afghanistan and Iraq wars were very controversial. The conflicts’ casualties, intractability and the apparent failure of the US and its allies to achieve their objectives mean that many see the wars as failures. This resulted in a loss of confidence in the West of the utility of force as an instrument of state power. Both wars have been well described by journalists. There is no shortage of memoirs. But there is little discussion of how the conduct of these wars and capabilities of the forces involved changed and evolved, and of the implications of these developments for future warfare. This book gives readers a clear understanding of the military character dynamics of both wars and how these changed between 2001 and 2014. This includes the strategy, operations, tactics and technology of the forces of the US and its allies, Afghan and Iraqi government forces as well as insurgents and militias, showing how they evolved over time. Many of these developments have wider relevance to future conflicts. The book identifies those that are of potential wider application to US, NATO and other western forces, to insurgents, as well as to forces of states that might choose to confront the west militarily.




Lessons Encountered


Book Description

It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surgers themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decisionmaking, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, disects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries.




Parameters


Book Description




The New Makers of Modern Strategy


Book Description

The essential resource on military and political strategy and the making of the modern world The New Makers of Modern Strategy is the next generation of the definitive work on strategy and the key figures who have shaped the theory and practice of war and statecraft throughout the centuries. Featuring entirely new entries by a who’s who of world-class scholars, this new edition provides global, comparative perspectives on strategic thought from antiquity to today, surveying both classical and current themes of strategy while devoting greater attention to the Cold War and post-9/11 eras. The contributors evaluate the timeless requirements of effective strategy while tracing the revolutionary changes that challenge the makers of strategy in the contemporary world. Amid intensifying global disorder, the study of strategy and its history has never been more relevant. The New Makers of Modern Strategy draws vital lessons from history’s most influential strategists, from Thucydides and Sun Zi to Clausewitz, Napoleon, Churchill, Mao, Ben-Gurion, Andrew Marshall, Xi Jinping, and Qassem Soleimani. With contributions by Dmitry Adamsky, John Bew, Tami Davis Biddle, Hal Brands, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Elizabeth Economy, Charles Edel, Eric S. Edelman, Andrew Ehrhardt, Lawrence Freedman, John Lewis Gaddis, Francis J. Gavin, Christopher J. Griffin, Ahmed S. Hashim, Eric Helleiner, Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, Seth G. Jones, Robert Kagan, Jonathan Kirshner, Matthew Kroenig, James Lacey, Guy Laron, Michael V. Leggiere, Margaret MacMillan, Tanvi Madan, Thomas G. Mahnken, Carter Malkasian, Daniel Marston, John H. Maurer, Walter Russell Mead, Michael Cotey Morgan, Mark Moyar, Williamson Murray, S.C.M. Paine, Sergey Radchenko, Iskander Rehman, Thomas Rid, Joshua Rovner, Priya Satia, Kori Schake, Matt J. Schumann, Brendan Simms, Jason K. Stearns, Hew Strachan, Sue Mi Terry, and Toshi Yoshihara.




Thinkers and Practitioners


Book Description




Leadership and Policy Innovation--from Clinton to Bush


Book Description

Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Joseph Cerami's book is an essential resource for students and researchers in search for a coherent picture of policy innovation and leadership of U.S. and U.N. efforts to design and implement Weapons of Mass Destruction policy initiatives.




On Theories of Victory, Red and Blue


Book Description

While the United States and its allies put their military focus on the post-9/11 challenges of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China put their military focus onto the United States and the risks of regional wars that they came to believe they might have to fight against the United States. Their first priority was to put their intellectual houses in order-that is, to adapt military thought and strategic planning to the new problem. The result is a set of ideas about how to bring the United States and its allies to a "culminating point" where they choose to no longer run the costs and risks of continued war. This is the "red theory of victory." Beginning in the second presidential term of Obama administration, the U.S. military focus began to shift, driven by rising Russian and Chinese military assertiveness and outspoken opposition to the regional security orders on their peripheries. But U.S. military thought has been slow to catch up. As a recent bipartisan congressional commission concluded, the U.S. intellectual house is dangerously out of order for this new strategic problem. There is no Blue theory of victory. Such a theory should explain how the United States and its allies can strip away the confidence of leaders in Moscow and Beijing (and Pyongyang) in their "escalation calculus"-that is, that they will judge the costs too high, the benefits to low, and the risks incalculable. To develop, improve, and implement the needed new concepts requires a broad campaign of activities by the United States and full partnership with its allies.




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