Aspect-Oriented Security Hardening of UML Design Models


Book Description

This book comprehensively presents a novel approach to the systematic security hardening of software design models expressed in the standard UML language. It combines model-driven engineering and the aspect-oriented paradigm to integrate security practices into the early phases of the software development process. To this end, a UML profile has been developed for the specification of security hardening aspects on UML diagrams. In addition, a weaving framework, with the underlying theoretical foundations, has been designed for the systematic injection of security aspects into UML models. The work is organized as follows: chapter 1 presents an introduction to software security, model-driven engineering, UML and aspect-oriented technologies. Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview of UML language and the main concepts of aspect-oriented modeling (AOM) respectively. Chapter 4 explores the area of model-driven architecture with a focus on model transformations. The main approaches that are adopted in the literature for security specification and hardening are presented in chapter 5. After these more general presentations, chapter 6 introduces the AOM profile for security aspects specification. Afterwards, chapter 7 details the design and the implementation of the security weaving framework, including several real-life case studies to illustrate its applicability. Chapter 8 elaborates an operational semantics for the matching/weaving processes in activity diagrams, while chapters 9 and 10 present a denotational semantics for aspect matching and weaving in executable models following a continuation-passing style. Finally, a summary and evaluation of the work presented are provided in chapter 11. The book will benefit researchers in academia and industry as well as students interested in learning about recent research advances in the field of software security engineering.










New Trends in Software Methodologies, Tools and Techniques


Book Description

"Papers presented at the Eighth International Conference on New Trends in Software Methodologies, Tools and Techniques, (SoMeT 09) held in Prague, Czech Republic ... from September 23rd to 25th 2009."--P. v.







Graph Transformation, Specifications, and Nets


Book Description

This volume pays tribute to the scientific achievements of Hartmut Ehrig, who passed away in March 2016. The contributions represent a selection from a symposium, held in October 2016 at TU Berlin, commemorating Hartmut’ s life and work as well as other invited papers in the areas he was active in. These areas include Graph Transformation, Model Transformation, Concurrency Theory, in particular Petri Nets, Algebraic Specification, and Category Theory in Computer Science.




Aspect-oriented Security Engineering


Book Description

Engineering secure systems is an error-prone process, where any decision margin potentially favors critical implementation faults. To this end, formal security models serve as an abstract basis for verifying security properties. Unfortunately, the potential for human error in engineering and analyzing such models is still considerable. This work seeks to mitigate this problem. We identified semantic gaps between security requirements, informal security policies, and security models as a major source of error. Our goal is then based on this observation: to support error-minimizing design decisions by bridging such gaps. Due to the broad range of security-critical application domains, no single modeling framework may achieve this. We therefore adopt the idea of aspect-oriented software development to tailor the formal part of a security engineering process towards security requirements of the system. Our method, termed aspect-oriented security engineering, is based on the idea of keeping each step in this process well-defined, small, and monotonic in terms of the degree of formalism. Our practical results focus on two use cases: first, model engineering for operating systems and middleware security policies; second, model analysis of runtime properties related to potential privilege escalation. We eventually combine both use cases to present a model-based reengineering approach for the access control system of Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).