Escalation Management in the Russia-Georgia Conflict


Book Description

"In August 2008, long-standing Russia-Georgia tensions erupted into armed hostility and disproportionate counter aggression in large part due to a failure of United States' escalation management strategy in the region. The U.S. failed to effectively manage the crisis is several ways. It inadvertently escalated the crisis by not anticipating Russian reactions to Kosovo independence and NATO enlargement with respect to Russia's desire to maintain its sphere of influence. Furthermore, the U.S. failed to deter Russian escalation and military buildup immediately preceding the war by sending diplomatic signals with no reinforcing military posture. Finally, the U.S. failed to deter Georgia (its ally in the conflict) from being baited into initiating military action. This paper provides a short overview of the run up to the conflict and briefly explains key ideas and terms in the escalation management model as described by Morgan et al in Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. Subsequently, the paper analyzes facts and U.S. decision making during the crisis using the escalation management model. For each tenant of the model applied to key events leading up to and during the fighting, the paper highlights strategic missteps, their consequences and potential alternative courses of action. Because it enjoys the clarity of hindsight, the purpose of the paper is not to assign blame. Rather, the goal is to highlight how escalation management model can be used to better control similar situations in the future."--Abstract.




The Guns of August 2008


Book Description

In the summer of 2008, a conflict that appeared to have begun in the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia rapidly escalated to become the most significant crisis in European security in a decade. The implications of the Russian-Georgian war will be understood differently depending on one's narrative of what transpired and perspective on the broader context. This book is designed to present the facts about the events of August 2008 along with comprehensive coverage of the background to those events. It brings together a wealth of expertise on the South Caucasus and Russian foreign policy, with contributions by Russian, Georgian, European, and American experts on the region.




Georgian Lessons


Book Description

Russia's invasion, occupation, and partition of Georgia in August 2008 initially sent shock waves throughout Europe and NATO and appeared to signal a new confrontational phase in Moscow s relations with the West. This volume places the conflict in the context of Russia's broader objectives, its internal weaknesses, the limitations of EU and NATO policies, and America s security priorities. First, the Georgian conflict underscored Moscow's determination to reclaim an extensive zone of dominance corresponding with the former Soviet territories. Second, it displayed a shrewd calculation by the Kremlin about the fractured and ineffective Western response, and Moscow continues to test the Obama administration's rapprochement in pursuing its expansionist ambitions. Third, the 2008 conflict had a lasting impact on the Central-East European and post-Soviet states most exposed to pressures from Moscow. While the former demanded more tangible security guarantees from NATO, the latter either sought accommodation with Russia or intensified their protective strategies. Additionally, beneath the veneer of success, the conduct of the war, the economic recession, escalating separatist sentiments, and faltering attempts by Moscow to make the country more globally competitive revealed Russia's long-term weaknesses in the midst of its attempted neo-imperial restoration. The study concludes with succinct recommendations on how the transatlantic alliance can more effectively handle Russian ambitions and prepare itself to deter or manage future crises




The Russian Military and the Georgia War


Book Description

In this monograph, the authors state that Russia planned the war against Georgia in August 2008 aiming for the annexation of Abkhazia, weakening the Saakashvili regime, and prevention of NATO enlargement. According to them, while Russia won the campaign, it also exposed its own military as badly needing reform. The war also demonstrated weaknesses of the NATO and the European Union security systems.




The Great Power (mis)management


Book Description

Drawing on the empirical case of the RussianOCoGeorgian war of 2008, this book explores the theoretical underpinnings of the idea of 'great power management' first articulated within the English School of International Relations. The contributors to the volume approach this idea from a variety of theoretical perspectives, ranging from policy-analysis to critical theory."




The Russian Military and the Georgia War


Book Description

In this monograph, the authors state that Russia planned the war against Georgia in August 2008 aiming for the annexation of Abkhazia, weakening the Saakashvili regime, and prevention of NATO enlargement. According to them, while Russia won the campaign, it also exposed its own military as badly needing reform. The war also demonstrated weaknesses of the NATO and the European Union security systems.




The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications


Book Description

In August 2008, the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia broke out on the territory of Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian-planned military campaign lasted 5 days until the parties reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on August 12. The European Union (EU), led by the French presidency, mediated the ceasefire. After signing the agreement, Russia pulled most of its troops out of uncontested Georgian territories, but established buffer zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On August 26, 2008, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, making them a part of what President Dmitry Medvedev called Moscow's "zone of privileged interests," and since then deploying five military bases on occupied Georgian territory. In their monograph, Dr. Ariel Cohen and Colonel Robert Hamilton show how Russia won the war against Georgia by analyzing the goals of war, which include the annexation of Abkhazia, the weakening or toppling the Saakashvili regime, and the prevention of NATO enlargement in the Caucasus. The war demonstrated that Russia's military is in need of significant reforms and it indicated which of those reforms are currently being implemented. Finally, the war highlighted weaknesses of the NATO and EU security system as it pertains to Eastern Europe and specifically to the countries of the former Soviet Union.




Russia and Georgia


Book Description

In the early 1990s, Georgia and its breakaway South Ossetia region had agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire that provided for Russian "peacekeepers" to be stationed in the region. Moscow extended citizenship and passports to most ethnic Ossetians. Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, "forcing" Georgia to send in troops. This book provides a post-conflict assessment of the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008, with a focus on the implications for U.S. interests and the organisational change in the Russian airborne forces.




Deterrence and Escalation in Competition with Russia


Book Description

In this report, the authors seek to understand how the United States might use its military posture in Europe?particularly focusing on ground forces?as part of a strategy to deter Russian malign activities in the competition space.




The Russian-Georgian War


Book Description