Essays on Game Theory


Book Description

'This short volume is very welcome . . . Most importantly, on pages 32-33, the volume reprints as an appendix to the journal article based on Nash's Princeton doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games a section of the thesis on "motivation and interpretation" that was omitted from the article. An editorial note remarks mildly that "The missing section is of considerable interest". This section, not available in any other published source, makes the present volume indispensable for research libraries . . . Nash's Essays on Game Theory, dating from his years as a Princeton graduate student . . . has a lasting impact on economics and related fields unmatched by any series of articles written in such a brief time . . . To economists, his name will always bring to mind his game theory papers of the early 1950s. It is good to have these conveniently reprinted in this volume.' - Robert W. Dimand, The Economic Journal 'The news that John Nash was to share the 1994 Nobel Prize for Economics with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten was doubly welcome. It signalled not only that the brilliant achievements of his youth were to be recognized in a manner consistent with their significance, but that the long illness that clouded his later years had fallen into remission. I hope that this collection of his economic papers will serve as another reminder that John Nash has rejoined the intellectual community to which he has contributed so much.' - From the introduction by Ken Binmore Essays on Game Theory is a unique collection of seven of John Nash's essays which highlight his pioneering contribution to game theory in economics. Featuring a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the field of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, this book will be an indispensable reference for scholars and will be welcomed by those with an interest in game theory and its applications to the social sciences.




Essays in Game Theory


Book Description

This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.




Games, Rationality and Behaviour


Book Description

Behavioural game theory is the most important recent development of standard game theory, and its applications regard several fields of research, ranging from economic theory to sociology and political science. Behavioural game theory aims to provide a behavioural and psychological approach to game theory modelling, in order to identify more robust equilibrium outcomes and more realistic behavioural assumptions. This book explores the key topics in detail, covering issues such as players' heterogeneity, social preferences, reciprocity, learning and information, and punishment in public good games. It provides a state-of-the-art analysis of the progress and methodology of behavioural game theory, as well as exploring the interdisciplinary aspects of the subject, and is an extremely valuable resource for academics and scholars with an interest in the area. Book jacket.




Game Theory and Fisheries


Book Description

Today, there is a growing sense of urgency among fisheries scientists regarding the management of fish stocks, particularly among those who predict the imminent collapse of the fishing industry due to stock depletion. This book takes a game theoretic approach to discussing potential solutions to the problem of fish stock depletion. Acknowledging the classification of fish stocks as destructible renewable resources, these essays are concerned with the question of how much of the stock should be consumed today and how much should be left in place for the future. The book targets both economists and students of economics who are familiar with the tools of their trade but not necessarily familiar with game theory in the context of fisheries management. Importantly, the goal is not to give a summary evaluation of the current views of the ‘appropriate’ response to immediate policy questions, but rather to describe the ways in which the problems at hand can be productively formulated and approached using game theory and couched on real world fisheries. Game Theory and Fisheries consists of twelve previously published but updated articles in fisheries management, a number of which address a gap in the fisheries literature by modelling and analysing the exploitation of fishery resources in a two-agent fishery, in both cooperative and non-cooperative environments. The author’s work ultimately illustrates that the analysis of strategic interaction between those with access to shared fishery resources will be incomplete without the use of game theory.




The Strategy of Conflict


Book Description

Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.




Mathematical Economics and Game Theory


Book Description




The Essential John Nash


Book Description

When John Nash won the Nobel prize in economics in 1994, many people were surprised to learn that he was alive and well. Since then, Sylvia Nasar's celebrated biography A Beautiful Mind, the basis of a new major motion picture, has revealed the man. The Essential John Nash reveals his work--in his own words. This book presents, for the first time, the full range of Nash's diverse contributions not only to game theory, for which he received the Nobel, but to pure mathematics--from Riemannian geometry and partial differential equations--in which he commands even greater acclaim among academics. Included are nine of Nash's most influential papers, most of them written over the decade beginning in 1949. From 1959 until his astonishing remission three decades later, the man behind the concepts "Nash equilibrium" and "Nash bargaining"--concepts that today pervade not only economics but nuclear strategy and contract talks in major league sports--had lived in the shadow of a condition diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia. In the introduction to this book, Nasar recounts how Nash had, by the age of thirty, gone from being a wunderkind at Princeton and a rising mathematical star at MIT to the depths of mental illness. In his preface, Harold Kuhn offers personal insights on his longtime friend and colleague; and in introductions to several of Nash's papers, he provides scholarly context. In an afterword, Nash describes his current work, and he discusses an error in one of his papers. A photo essay chronicles Nash's career from his student days in Princeton to the present. Also included are Nash's Nobel citation and autobiography. The Essential John Nash makes it plain why one of Nash's colleagues termed his style of intellectual inquiry as "like lightning striking." All those inspired by Nash's dazzling ideas will welcome this unprecedented opportunity to trace these ideas back to the exceptional mind they came from.




Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games


Book Description

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.




Understanding Strategic Interaction


Book Description

Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.




Game Theory for Political Scientists


Book Description

Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.




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