Evaluation of the Health and Safety Risks of the New USAMRIID High-Containment Facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland


Book Description

The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Frederick, Maryland, is designed to handle pathogens that cause serious or potentially lethal diseases, which require the research performed on them be contained to specialized laboratories. In 2007 a decision was made to expand those facilities causing concern among area residents that public health and safety risks, and strategies to mitigate those concerns were not adequately considered in the decision to go forward with the expansion. In Evaluation of the Health and Safety Risks of the New USAMRIID High Containment Facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland a group of experts in areas including biosafety, infectious diseases, industrial hygiene, environmental engineering, risk assessment and epidemiology, explored whether measures were being taken to ensure prevention and mitigation of risk to the health and safety of workers and the public. They also assessed whether the procedures and regulations employed meet accepted standards of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health. Evaluation of the Health and Safety Risks of the New USAMRIID High Containment Facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland evaluates the health and safety aspects of the environmental impact statement developed to support the construction of the new laboratories and explores the institute's operating requirements, medical and emergency management response plans and communication and cooperation with the public. The book recommends that USAMRIID continue to set high standards for advancing security, operational, and biosurety measures, and that additional measures be taken to provide assurance that experienced medical professionals are readily available to consult on unusual infectious diseases. It also suggests that USAMRIID expand its two-way communications with the public.




Pandora's Gamble


Book Description

Named to Kirkus Reviews’ Best Books of 2023 A ‘remarkable book.’ – The New York Times This fearless, deeply reported book about laboratory accidents asks the haunting question some elite scientists don’t want the public to entertain: Did the COVID-19 pandemic start with a lab leak in Wuhan, China? This is an obvious question. Yet there’s been an extraordinary effort by government officials in China, as well as leading scientific experts in the United States and around the world, to shut down any investigation or discussion of the lab leak theory. In private, however, some of the world’s elite scientists have seen a lab accident as a very real and horrifying possibility. They know what the public doesn’t. Lab accidents happen with shocking frequency. Even at the world’s best-run labs. That’s among the revelations from Alison Young, the award-winning investigative reporter who has spent nearly 15 years uncovering shocking safety breaches at prestigious U.S. laboratories for USA Today and other respected news outlets. In Pandora’s Gamble, Young goes deep into the troubling history -- and enormous risks -- of leaks and accidents at scientific labs. She takes readers on a riveting journey around the world to some of the worst lab mishaps in history, including the largely unknown stories of the lab workers at the U.S. Army’s Camp Detrick who suffered devastating infections at alarming rates during World War II. And her groundbreaking reporting exposes for the first time disturbing new details about recent accidents at prestigious laboratories – and the alarming gaps in government oversight that put all of us at risk. Sourced through meticulous reporting and exclusive interviews with key players including Dr. Anthony Fauci, former CDC Director Tom Frieden and others, Young’s examination reveals that the only thing rare about lab accidents is the public rarely finds out about them. Because when accidents happen, powerful people and institutions often work hard to keep the information secret.




Germs Gone Wild


Book Description

A shocking exposé of the reckless proliferation of bio-weapon research and the threat this poses to everyday Americans. Battling a new generation of corporate giants and uncovering threats right in our own backyard, Kenneth King’s Germs Gone Wild reveals the massive expansion of America's bio-defense research labs and the culture of deception surrounding hundreds of facilities that have opened since 9/11. King experienced the menace of bio-defense research firsthand when local government and business leaders tried to lure a new facility to his hometown in Kentucky. Researching the safety claims, he not only found many of them to be completely false, but was also horrified by the lack of oversight and the recklessness with which these labs genetically modified pathogens like smallpox, Ebola, and influenza without a care for what happened to the public if there was ever a “leak.” And yet the greed that drove the development of these labs has effectively counteracted any cautionary checks by the government and universities. All have been seduced by the economic gains and corporate stipends that come with compliance and turning a blind eye. But now, the reality of these labs and the germs they manipulate will finally be brought to light, as King examines the controversies surrounding plants from Maryland to Boston and Utah, to the Department of Homeland Security’s dubious National Bio-and-Agro-Facility (NBAF) project, and the precautions—or lack thereof—being taken to protect us all from a deadly pandemic.




Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories


Book Description

During July 10-13, 2011, 68 participants from 32 countries gathered in Istanbul, Turkey for a workshop organized by the United States National Research Council on Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-containment Biological Laboratories. The United States Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program sponsored the workshop, which was held in partnership with the Turkish Academy of Sciences. The international workshop examined biosafety and biosecurity issues related to the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of high-containment biological laboratories- equivalent to United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention biological safety level 3 or 4 labs. Although these laboratories are needed to characterize highly dangerous human and animal pathogens, assist in disease surveillance, and produce vaccines, they are complex systems with inherent risks. Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories summarizes the workshop discussion, which included the following topics: Technological options to meet diagnostic, research, and other goals; Laboratory construction and commissioning; Operational maintenance to provide sustainable capabilities, safety, and security; and Measures for encouraging a culture of responsible conduct. Workshop attendees described the history and current challenges they face in their individual laboratories. Speakers recounted steps they were taking to improve safety and security, from running training programs to implementing a variety of personnel reliability measures. Many also spoke about physical security, access controls, and monitoring pathogen inventories. Workshop participants also identified tensions in the field and suggested possible areas for action.




Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals


Book Description

Extremely hazardous substances can be released accidentally as a result of chemical spills, industrial explosions, fires, or accidents involving railroad cars and trucks transporting EHSs. Workers and residents in communities surrounding industrial facilities where these substances are manufactured, used, or stored and in communities along the nation's railways and highways are potentially at risk of being exposed to airborne EHSs during accidental releases or intentional releases by terrorists. Pursuant to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified approximately 400 EHSs on the basis of acute lethality data in rodents. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals, Volume 20 reviews and updates the technical support document on acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs) for selected chloroformates. This update focuses on establishing AEGL-3 values for n-propyl chloroformate and isopropyl chloroformate, but will also consider whether any new data are available that would affect the proposed values for the other 10 chloroformates. AEGLs represent threshold exposure limits (exposure levels below which adverse health effects are not likely to occur) for the general public and are applicable to emergency exposures ranging from 10 minutes (min) to 8 h. Three levels - AEGL-1, AEGL-2, and AEGL-3 - are developed for each of five exposure periods (10 min, 30 min, 1 h, 4 h, and 8 h) and are distinguished by varying degrees of severity of toxic effects. This report will inform planning, response, and prevention in the community, the workplace, transportation, the military, and the remediation of Superfund sites.




Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals


Book Description

Extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) can be released accidentally as a result of chemical spills, industrial explosions, fires, or accidents involving railroad cars and trucks transporting EHSs. Workers and residents in communities surrounding industrial facilities where EHSs are manufactured, used, or stored and in communities along the nation's railways and highways are potentially at risk of being exposed to airborne EHSs during accidental releases or intentional releases by terrorists. Using the 1993 and 2001 NRC guidelines reports, the National Advisory Committee - consisting of members from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, other federal and state governments, the chemical industry, academia, and other organizations form the private sector has developed Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) for more than 270 EHSs. In 1998, the EPA and DOD requested that the NRC independently reviewed the AEGLs developed by the NAC. In response to that request, the NRC organized within its Committee on Toxicology the Committee on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels, which prepared this report, Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals: Volume 12. This report explains the scientifically valid conclusions that are based on the data reviewed by NAC and consistent with the NRC guideline reports and provides comments and recommendations for how AEGL could be improved.




Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals


Book Description

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals, Volume 15 identifies, reviews, and interprets relevant toxicologic and other scientific data for ethyl mercaptan, methyl mercaptan, phenyl mercaptan, tert-octyl mercaptan, lewisite, methyl isothiocyanate, and selected monoisocyanates in order to develop acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs) for these high-priority, acutely toxic chemicals. AEGLs represent threshold exposure limits (exposure levels below which adverse health effects are not likely to occur) for the general public and are applicable to emergency exposures ranging from 10 minutes (min) to 8 h. Three level--AEGL-1, AEGL-2, and AEGL-3--are developed for each of five exposure periods (10 min, 30 min, 1 h, 4 h, and 8 h) and are distinguished by varying degrees of severity of toxic effects. This report will inform planning, response, and prevention in the community, the workplace, transportation, the military, and the remediation of Superfund sites.




Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas


Book Description

Congress requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produce a site-specific biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment (SSRA) of the proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas. The laboratory would study dangerous foreign animal diseases-including the highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which affects cattle, pigs, deer, and other cloven-hoofed animals-and diseases deadly to humans that can be transmitted between animals and people. Congress also asked the Research Council to review the validity and adequacy of the document. Until these studies are complete, Congress has withheld funds to build the NBAF. Upon review of the DHS assessment, the National Research Council found "several major shortcomings." Based on the DHS risk assessment, there is nearly a 70 percent chance over the 50-year lifetime of the facility that a release of FMD could result in an infection outside the laboratory, impacting the economy by estimates of $9 billion to $50 billion. The present Research Council report says the risks and costs of a pathogen being accidently released from the facility could be significantly higher. The committee found that the SSRA has many legitimate conclusions, but it was concerned that the assessment does not fully account for how a Biosafety-Level 3 Agriculture and Biosafety-Level 4 Pathogen facility would operate or how pathogens might be accidently released. In particular, the SSRA does not include important operation risks and mitigation issues, such as the risk associated with the daily cleaning of large animal rooms. It also fails to address risks that would likely increase the chances of an FMD leak or of the disease's spread after a leak, including the NBAF's close proximity to the Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine clinics and KSU football stadium or personnel moving among KSU facilities.




Review of the Department of Defense Enhanced Particulate Matter Surveillance Program Report


Book Description

Soldiers deployed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War were exposed to high concentrations of particulate matter (PM) and other airborne pollutants. Their exposures were largely the result of daily windblown dust, dust storms, and smoke from oil fires. On returning from deployment, many veterans complained of persistent respiratory symptoms. With the renewed activity in the Middle East over the last few years, deployed military personnel are again exposed to dust storms and daily windblown dust in addition to other types of PM, such as diesel exhaust and particles from open-pit burning. On the basis of the high concentrations observed and concerns about the potential health effects, DOD designed and implemented a study to characterize and quantify the PM in the ambient environment at 15 sites in the Middle East. The endeavor is known as the DOD Enhanced Particulate Matter Surveillance Program (EPMSP). The U.S. Army asked the National Research Council to review the EPMSP report. In response, the present evaluation considers the potential acute and chronic health implications on the basis of information presented in the report. It also considers epidemiologic and health-surveillance data collected by the USACHPPM, to assess potential health implications for deployed personnel, and recommends methods for reducing or characterizing health risks.




Biosecurity


Book Description

Learn how to assess and prevent biosecurity threats to protect public health and national security With contributions from experts in all facets of biosecurity, this book explains the fundamental elements of biosecurity as well as the related concepts of biosafety and biosurety, detailing how all three concepts fit within the framework of biodefense. Readers are then given the tools needed to assess and prevent biosecurity threats and vulnerabilities. The book explores the nature of biosecurity threats to research laboratories as well as to agriculture, food, and mass transit. Moreover, readers will learn how to apply principles of biosecurity to assess epidemics and protect public health. Biosecurity takes a detailed look at today's biosecurity policy, explaining how it is likely to evolve given current and potential threats to national security. The authors stress the importance of education and advocacy, helping readers develop effective programs to build public awareness and preparedness. The book also presents a novel tool to assess the effectiveness of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity programs. Biosecurity is divided into four parts: Part I: An Introduction to Biosecurity Part II: Elements of Biosecurity Part III: Biosecurity in Various Sectors Part IV: Biosecurity Policy, Bioterrorism, and the Future This book will instill a deep understanding of what biosecurity is and what it is not. It urges readers to think about the importance of biosecurity as it relates to national security, safety, and health. By exposing major flaws in global biosecurity thinking, Biosecurity sets forth a clear pathway to correct those errors and build stronger biosecurity programs.