Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-agent Model
Author : Ernst Fehr
Publisher :
Page : 24 pages
File Size : 22,91 MB
Release : 2004
Category : Fairness
ISBN :
Author : Ernst Fehr
Publisher :
Page : 24 pages
File Size : 22,91 MB
Release : 2004
Category : Fairness
ISBN :
Author : Bengt Holmstrom
Publisher :
Page : 60 pages
File Size : 42,76 MB
Release : 1990
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Bengt Holmström
Publisher :
Page : 47 pages
File Size : 25,3 MB
Release : 1990
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
Page : 726 pages
File Size : 41,87 MB
Release : 2003
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN :
The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. This anthology brings together every major paper in the field.
Author : Kohei Daido
Publisher :
Page : 26 pages
File Size : 47,5 MB
Release : 2008
Category :
ISBN :
This paper studies the optimal contracts in a multitask model when a principal-agent relationship is long-term. If some outcomes are unverifiable, then the contracts have to satisfy the self-enforcing condition. I characterize the optimal contract in terms of the discount rate, the cost substitutes, and the weight of the unverifiable outcomes relative to the principal's payoff. Then, as the discount rate increases, the incentive to verifiable outcome (formal incentive) changes discontinuously and non-monotonically while the incentive to the unverifiable outcome (relational incentive) changes discontinuously but monotonically.
Author : Ernst Fehr
Publisher :
Page : 56 pages
File Size : 17,55 MB
Release : 2001
Category : Fairness
ISBN :
Author : Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Publisher : Springer
Page : 211 pages
File Size : 25,60 MB
Release : 2019-02-19
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 3658241330
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Author : M. Robinson
Publisher : Springer
Page : 544 pages
File Size : 28,12 MB
Release : 2007-08-30
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1137001526
This book examines the theory and practice of performance budgeting, which aims make government more effective by linking the funding of government agencies to the results they deliver. Combining thematic studies and case studies, it clearly presents the diverse range of contemporary performance budgeting models and examines their effectiveness.
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 421 pages
File Size : 31,10 MB
Release : 2002
Category : Economics
ISBN : 9787510050503
Author : Zhu Han
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 509 pages
File Size : 34,9 MB
Release : 2019-06-27
Category : Technology & Engineering
ISBN : 1108278701
Discover the very latest game-theoretic approaches for designing, modeling, and optimizing emerging wireless communication networks and systems with this unique text. Providing a unified and comprehensive treatment throughout, it explains basic concepts and theories for designing novel distributed wireless networking mechanisms, describes emerging game-theoretic tools from an engineering perspective, and provides an extensive overview of recent applications. A wealth of new tools is covered - including matching theory and games with bounded rationality - and tutorial chapters show how to use these tools to solve current and future wireless networking problems in areas such as 5G networks, network virtualization, software defined networks, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, context-aware networks, green communications, and security. This is an ideal resource for telecommunications engineers, and researchers in industry and academia who are working on the design of efficient, scalable, and robust communication protocols for future wireless networks, as well as graduate students in these fields.