Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures


Book Description

The Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) is a commercial contract extensively used in oil and gas joint ventures, where one co-venturer manages the venture under the supervision of the other co-venturers. The English courts have yet to pronounce whether a joint operating agreement establishes a fiduciary relationship between its co-venturers and whether fiduciary duties are created by it. As UK oil exploration companies move to operate outside the North Sea and enter into more contracts with companies from civil law jurisdictions (with expectations of good faith on the part of their co-contracting parties) and as an increasing number of independent oil companies participate in exploration and development, the standards of conduct of co-venturers becomes increasingly important. This book reviews whether a joint operating agreement, as an example of a joint venture, is a fiduciary relationship, and whether fiduciary duties may apply to resource companies as co-venturers. The book argues that the Operator owes fiduciary duties to the co-venturers and that the co-venturers owe fiduciary duties among themselves. These fiduciary duties impose high standards of conduct on the co-venturers. This book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area of energy and natural resources law as well as equity lawyers and anyone interested in joint ventures.




Partnerships, Joint Ventures & Strategic Alliances


Book Description

Helps you dissect any proposed transaction, spot the issues that need to be addressed, and achieve a successful outcome. This book includes discussions on: building a successful partnership, joint venture and strategic alliance; choice of entity considerations; fiduciary duties; tax and regulatory issues; and the role of lawyers.




The Fiduciary Duties of Joint Venture Parties - When Do They Arise and What Do They Comprise?


Book Description

Joint Ventures are often used by parties in commercial enterprises where parties seek to achieve a common goal. One issue which is increasingly contentious is the extent to which, if any, joint venture parties owe each other fiduciary obligations. This paper refutes, as a dangerous heresy, the idea that joint venture relationships are discrete legal relationships that are inherently fiduciary in nature. The majority of self-styled "joint ventures" are, invariably, nothing more in legal terms than contracts. Ifparties are going to be bound by fiduciary duties, over and above the contractual duties they owe each other, this will only be so by virtue of the particular arrangement they have entered into which, on a thorough examination of the facts, is found to require each party to give unstinting loyalty to the other. Recent Australian case law bears this out.




Does the operator in a Joint Operating Agreement owe a fiduciary duty to non-operators?


Book Description

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2009 im Fachbereich Politik - Internationale Politik - Region: USA, University of Abertay Dundee (Centre for energy, petroleum and mineral law and policy), Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: The classification of the operator's relationship with the non-operators in a Joint Operating Agreement is an issue that deserves some scrutiny. Is the operator a fiduciary or not? In an attempt to answer this question, this paper will take a case study of the United States model Joint Operating Agreement forms and undertake an analysis of judicial interpretations and approaches to the provisions in the Model Forms regarding the duties and liabilities of operators. Both Common Law and Equity have classically imposed fiduciary duties on trustees and agents. The courts, as we shall see, have, however rendered different connotations in ascertaining the operator's duties despite the clear language used in the Model Forms exempting the operator from fiduciary obligations. The conclusion at the end will highlight the position of the law in other jurisdictions outside the USA.



















The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States


Book Description

The evolution of partnership forms is stimulated by powerful economic forces that can lead to widespread prosperity and wealth creation for a society. Given the importance of closely held firms in the United States and Europe, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States argues that partnership law should trouble itself less with historical and descriptive arguments about the legal rules and structure of the partnership form and focus much more on the new analytical apparatus of the economics of organizational form as well the fundamental economic learning that informs the debates on limited liability, partnership rules regarding management and control, conflict resolution and fiduciary duties. Introducing and extending the best available theories from law and economics, particularly those from the theory of the firm, This book?s analysis demonstrates that the patterns of European partnership law and its recent history are best understood from an economic and comparative law perspective. By examining the economic theories of the firm and the economics of organization choice, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States conceives partnership-type business forms as contractual entities. The key feature of the modern partnership form is that partners have significant flexibility and power to limit their liability, transfer all of their rights, and to freely exit the firm. Another key feature of partnership law is the insight that lawmakers should provide the rules and enforcement mechanisms to regulate the important relationships within the partnership. This book applies an efficiency test to determine which sets of default rules are likely to resolve the main problems in partnerships. Having identified partnership law with the economic theory of organization, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States then goes to argue that most of partnership law is directed at offering bundles of legal rules for different types of firms. Lawmakers should promote partnership rules that attract investors and can be expected to be efficient if they allow entrepreneurs to freely select the bundle of rules that best match their priorities. In a modern vision of partnership law, lawmakers promote economic welfare through creating non-mandatory rules that allow multiple businesses to switch to a favourable business form without significant costs. Jurisdictions plagued by falling incorporations and low levels of small and medium business activity, should abandon the mandatory and standardized framework and the `lock in? effect that it promotes, and focus on the mechanisms of legal evolution and rules that tend to mimic the market. This innovation work will have ramifications felt across European jurisdictions, and will be debated by a large audience of policymakers and academic lawyers involved in law reform. Moreover, the book will receive serious attention from students of law and economics, as well as practising lawyers involved in resolving complex issues of organizational law. Review (s) ?Vermeulen?s work makes a significant contribution to the dialogue between legal scholars and policy makers from Europe and the United States on the matter of business entity law reform. The volume is ambitious in scope, thoughtful in approach, and accurate in result. It shows a well-read and nuanced view of the recent American partnership law reform debates. He moves with assurance between different systems of law and analysis, and has a confident sense of what his diverse readers need to know to come to the ultimate discussion with a common sense of the issues and alternatives at hand. Vermeulen?s work should serve as a starting point for a robust discussion among scholars and policy makers.?