Fourth-generation War and Other Myths


Book Description

In an era of broad and perhaps profound change, new theories and concepts are to be welcomed rather than shunned. However, before they are fully embraced, they need to be tested rigorously, for the cost of implementing a false theory and developing operational and strategic concepts around it can be greater than remaining wedded to an older, but sounder one. The theory of Fourth Generation War (4GW) is a perfect example. Were we to embrace this theory, a loose collection of ideas that does not hold up to close scrutiny, the price we might pay in a future conflict could be high indeed. In this monograph, Dr. Echevarria II provides a critique of the theory of 4GW, examining its faulty assumptions and the problems in its logic. He argues that the proponents of 4GW undermine their own credibility by subscribing to this bankrupt theory. If their aim is truly to create positive change, then they- and we - would be better off jettisoning the theory and retaining the traditional concept of insurgency, while modifying it to include the greater mobility and access afforded by globalization.




Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths


Book Description

Fourth Generation War (4GW) emerged in the late 1980s, but has become popular due to recent twists in the war in Iraq and terrorist attacks worldwide. Despite reinventing itself several times, the theory has several fundamental flaws that need to be exposed before they can cause harm to U.S. operational and strategic thinking. A critique of 4GW is both fortuitous and important because it also provides us an opportunity to attack other unfounded assumptions that could influence U.S. strategy and military doctrine. In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver, and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks-political, economic, social, military to convince an opponent's decisionmakers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly. The notion of 4GW first appeared in the late 1980s as a vague sort of "out of the box" thinking, and it entertained every popular conjecture about future warfare. However, instead of examining the way terrorists belonging to Hamas or Hezbollah (or now Al Qaeda) actually behave, it misleadingly pushed the storm-trooper ideal as the terrorist of tomorrow. Instead of looking at the probability that such terrorists would improvise with respect to the weapons they used-box cutters, aircraft, and improvised explosive devices-it posited high-tech "wonder" weapons. The theory went through a second incarnation when the notion of nontrinitarian war came into vogue; but it failed to examine that notion critically. The theory also is founded on myths about the so-called Westphalian system and the theory of blitzkrieg. The theory of 4GW reinvented itself once again after September 11, 2001 (9/11), when its proponents claimed that Al Qaeda was waging a 4GW against the United States. Rather than thinking critically about future warfare, the theory's proponents became more concerned with demonstrating that they had predicted the future. While their recommendations are often rooted in common sense, they are undermined by being tethered to an empty theory. What we are really seeing in the war on terror, and the campaign in Iraq and elsewhere, is that the increased "dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and finance" brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access worldwide. At this point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more than the state, but states still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies. We would do well to abandon the theory of 4GW altogether, since it sheds very little, if any, light on this phenomenon.







War Before Civilization


Book Description

The myth of the peace-loving "noble savage" is persistent and pernicious. Indeed, for the last fifty years, most popular and scholarly works have agreed that prehistoric warfare was rare, harmless, unimportant, and, like smallpox, a disease of civilized societies alone. Prehistoric warfare, according to this view, was little more than a ritualized game, where casualties were limited and the effects of aggression relatively mild. Lawrence Keeley's groundbreaking War Before Civilization offers a devastating rebuttal to such comfortable myths and debunks the notion that warfare was introduced to primitive societies through contact with civilization (an idea he denounces as "the pacification of the past"). Building on much fascinating archeological and historical research and offering an astute comparison of warfare in civilized and prehistoric societies, from modern European states to the Plains Indians of North America, War Before Civilization convincingly demonstrates that prehistoric warfare was in fact more deadly, more frequent, and more ruthless than modern war. To support this point, Keeley provides a wide-ranging look at warfare and brutality in the prehistoric world. He reveals, for instance, that prehistorical tactics favoring raids and ambushes, as opposed to formal battles, often yielded a high death-rate; that adult males falling into the hands of their enemies were almost universally killed; and that surprise raids seldom spared even women and children. Keeley cites evidence of ancient massacres in many areas of the world, including the discovery in South Dakota of a prehistoric mass grave containing the remains of over 500 scalped and mutilated men, women, and children (a slaughter that took place a century and a half before the arrival of Columbus). In addition, Keeley surveys the prevalence of looting, destruction, and trophy-taking in all kinds of warfare and again finds little moral distinction between ancient warriors and civilized armies. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, he examines the evidence of cannibalism among some preliterate peoples. Keeley is a seasoned writer and his book is packed with vivid, eye-opening details (for instance, that the homicide rate of prehistoric Illinois villagers may have exceeded that of the modern United States by some 70 times). But he also goes beyond grisly facts to address the larger moral and philosophical issues raised by his work. What are the causes of war? Are human beings inherently violent? How can we ensure peace in our own time? Challenging some of our most dearly held beliefs, Keeley's conclusions are bound to stir controversy.




Fourth-Generation Warfare


Book Description

The concept of Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW) goes beyond the narrow military concept of war. Conflicts are no longer centralized, due to the ever-changing principles of warfare today. On one hand, the state is confronted with militarized militias and terrorist groups; on the other, the media is being utilized to serve the agendas of those organizations and militias. These methods are combined to systematically weaken the opposition and divide public opinion. Not only do these tactics aim to destroy an opponent’s military capabilities, they also aim to foster unrest and create instability in societies. Amid the expansion of transnational networks, new actors have emerged, able to project their influence beyond conventional borders through the use of modern communications and advanced technologies. In light of these developments, the need to study 4GW is critical. Given the significance of the issue, the papers presented examine the concept in detail, in the context of the widespread unrest, in regional and international arenas, that has fuelled instability in some Arab states. Throughout the chapters of this book, experts in the field address the changing face of war and examine the theoretical and strategic dimensions of 4GW, focusing on its tactics, techniques and procedures. The book also discusses 4GW trajectories and future warfare, and the extent to which the ethics of war and international treaties will be respected amid the changes in conflict to come.




Russia, the West, and the Ukraine Crisis


Book Description

This book examines the causes and consequences of the Ukraine crisis, with a special focus on Russia’s relations with the West. Towards that end, it brings together international relations scholars and area specialists. Issues covered include: the evolution of EU–Russia and US–Russia relations, the role of strategic culture and ontological insecurities in the formation of Russian foreign policy, the role of hybrid warfare in Russian military policy, the geopolitical drivers of Russia’s Ukraine policy, and a discussion of the decision-making dynamics that led to Russia’s intervention in eastern Ukraine. The contributors employ different theoretical approaches and offer partly complementary and partly competing analyses. In so doing, this book seeks to stimulate dialogue between different positions and advance our understanding of a topic that will shape the European security order for many years to come. This book was originally published as a special issue of Contemporary Politics.




Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy


Book Description

By consulting the work of well-known and obscure al-Qaeda theoreticians, Michael W. S. Ryan finds jihadist terrorism strategy has more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam. Encouraging strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist military operations, Ryan builds an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and constructs a compelling counternarrative to the West's supposed "war on Islam." Ryan examines the Salafist roots of al-Qaeda ideology and the contributions of its most famous founders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a political-military context. He also reads the Arabic-language works of lesser known theoreticians who have played an instrumental role in framing al-Qaeda's so-called war of the oppressed. These authors readily cite the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and the mastermind of the Vietnam War, General Giap. They also incorporate the arguments of American theorists writing on "fourth-generation warfare." Through these texts, readers experience events as insiders see them, and by concentrating on the activities and pronouncements of al-Qaeda's thought leaders, especially in Yemen, they discern the direct link between al-Qaeda's tactics and trends in anti-U.S. terrorism. Ryan shows al-Qaeda's political-military strategy to be a revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad, adding invaluable dimensions to the operational, psychological, and informational strategies already deployed by America's military in the region.




The Metaphysics of Terror


Book Description

This groundbreaking study aims to provide a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of terror, in particular the political reactions to it, such as public anxiety and pre-emptive wars, and to re-articulate the understanding of metaphysics through a consideration of its political implications. The book reveals that the key feature of terror is "potentiality," that is, terror is always about "what could happen" as opposed to "what is likely to happen." This notion helps broaden the scope of the investigation, as the argument spans the ontology, political psychology, political cosmology, and political theology of terror. Each chapter begins with an empirical discussion, examining such topics as the political practices in reaction to terror, the politics of fear, warfare, sovereignty, and the debates about the state of exception in relations to anti-terrorism laws. This unique examination of our political reality uncovers the axiom of terrorism, namely its "potentiality." Going beyond the scope of terrorism studies, it explains the philosophical underpinnings of terror without compromising on the empirical facts drawn from policymaking, jurisprudence and related fields.




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