HC 281 - Help to Buy equity loans


Book Description

The Department for Communities & Local Government introduced the Help to Buy equity loan scheme in April 2013, with the objectives of increasing demand for new homes, making mortgage finance more accessible and affordable and encouraging developers to build more new homes. Under the Scheme, the Department makes equity loans to buyers financing up to 20% of the purchase price of newly-built properties that cost £600,000 or less, which supplements the buyers' own deposit of, normally, at least 5%. Buyers then raise a repayment mortgage of, typically, 75% of the property's value. The equity loan is interest-free for the first five years, and is paid back within 25 years, or when borrowers redeem their mortgage, for example when they sell their home. The Department initially aimed to spend up to £3.7 billion to help 74,000 households buy a new home by 2015-16. In the 2014 Budget the Government decided to extend the Scheme to March 2020, and was providing an extra £6 billion to support the purchase of a further 120,000 homes. The Scheme is administered by the Homes and Communities Agency, through its network of Help to Buy agents. The Committee has set out a number of recommendations for the Department & Agency, including: (i) Maintain downward pressure on the Scheme's costs; (ii) Follow the guidance in the HM Treasury Green Book, assessing a range of alternative options and presenting this analysis in its business case; (iii) Set out how they will protect the taxpayer and ensure they have the skills and capacity both to monitor and manage the loan portfolios; (iv) Develop a robust methodology to assess the Scheme's impact on both demand for, and supply of, new homes; (v) Assess the Scheme's effectiveness in different local and regional housing markets; (vi) Carry out a wider and integrated evaluation, assessing the combined impact of its major interventions in the housing market.




HC 973 - Care Services for People with Learning Disabilities and Challenging Behaviour


Book Description

The Winterbourne View scandal in 2011 exposed the horrific abuse of people with learning difficulties and challenging behaviour in a private mental health hospital. Concerns were also raised about a number of other institutions. As a result, the Government committed to discharging those individuals for whom it was appropriate back into their homes and communities. However, since then, too many children and adults have continued to go into mental health hospitals, and to stay there unnecessarily, because of the lack of community alternatives. The number of people with learning disabilities remaining in hospital has not fallen, and has remained broadly the same at around 3,200. It was refreshing that NHS England took responsibility for this lack of progress and has now committed to develop a closure programme for large NHS mental health hospitals, along with a transition plan for the people with learning disabilities within these hospitals, from 2016-17. Discharges from hospital are being delayed because funding does not follow the individual when they are discharged into the community. This acts as a financial disincentive for local commissioners who have to bear the costs and responsibility for planning and commissioning community services. Delaying discharge has the effect of institutionalising people, making their reintegration into the community more difficult. Some local authorities' reluctance to accept and fund individuals in the community will be exacerbated by current financial constraints. The Department should set out its proposals for 'dowry-type' payments from NHS England to meet the costs of supporting people discharged from hospital.




HC 808 - Implementing Reforms to Civil Legal Aid


Book Description

The Ministry of Justice is on track to make a significant and rapid reduction to the amount that it spends on civil legal aid. However, it introduced major changes on the basis of no evidence in many areas, and without making good use of the evidence that it did have in other areas. It has been slow to fill the considerable gaps in its understanding, and has not properly assessed the full impact of the reforms. Almost two years after the reforms, the Ministry is still playing catch up: it does not know if those still eligible are able to access legal aid; and it does not understand the link between the price it pays for legal aid and the quality of advice being given. Moreover, the Ministry's approach to implementing the reforms has inhibited access to mediation for family law cases which can be a cost-effective alternative to court for resolving disputes. Amazingly, it failed to foresee that removing legal aid funding for solicitors would reduce the number of referrals to family mediation. Perhaps most worryingly of all, it does not understand, and has shown little interest in, the knock-on costs of its reforms across the public sector. It therefore does not know whether the projected £300 million spending reduction in its own budget is outweighed by additional costs elsewhere. The Department therefore does not know whether the savings in the civil legal aid budget represent value for money




HC 811 - Financial Support for Students at Alternative Higher Education Providers


Book Description

Approximately 140 institutions offering higher education are termed 'alternative providers'. These alternative providers comprise a diverse range of organisations ranging from private companies to charitable institutions. They do not receive government grants directly but do access public funding through student loans which are used to pay their fees. Following the announcement of higher education reforms in 2011, and the associated increase in tuition fee loans, there has been substantial and rapid growth in the sector. Between 2010/11 and 2013/14, the number of students claiming support for courses at alternative providers rose from 7,000 to 53,000. Over the same period, the total amount of public money paid to students at alternative providers, through tuition fee loans and maintenance loans and grants, has risen from around £50 million to around £675 million. The Department has overall responsibility for oversight of publicly-funded higher education, including alternative providers with publicly-funded students. The Department did not learn from previous Government experience, furthermore, it has been slow to react to warning signs. The rapid expansion in numbers was concentrated in five colleges that accounted for 50% of the expansion. 20% of students receiving funding were not registered for a qualification and drop-out rates were very high in some institutions. There was also evidence from whistleblowers that proficiency in English language was not tested, that some institutions were recruiting students on the streets, and that students claiming funding were not attending colleges.




HC 833 - Financial Sustainability of Local Authorities 2014


Book Description

The Department for Communities and Local Government does not have a good enough understanding of the impact of funding cuts, either on local authorities' finances or on services. It is unclear whether the Department is exercising a cross government leadership role with respect to local government. It relies on data on spending and has little information on service levels, service quality, and financial sustainability. HM Treasury should better support the Department by ensuring compliance with its requests for information at future spending reviews. While the Department has identified that local authorities will need to change the way they deliver services to remain financially sustainable, it is unclear if it is providing sufficient leadership to ensure they can implement service transformation programmes successfully. Furthermore, if funding reductions were to continue following the next spending review, we question whether the Department would be in a position to provide assurance that all local authorities could maintain the full range of their statutory services. Overall, as pressure from cuts grows, so do the risks to local authorities' finances and their provision of services. The depth and quality of the Department's insight into these issues needs to keep pace with these changes, something it has struggled to achieve so far.




HC 892 - The Effective Management of Tax Reliefs


Book Description

Tax and tax reliefs are plainly different and require different accountability arrangements. Put simply tax is where you get money in through taxation and a tax relief is where you make a conscious decision to forgo that income. Some reliefs are structural parts of the system to ensure a more progressive system or avoid double taxation. But other reliefs, costing some £100 billion a year, are designed to deliver a policy objective that could be met instead through spending programmes. HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) do not keep track of those tax reliefs intended to influence behaviour. They do not adequately report to Parliament or the public on whether reliefs are working as intended and what they cost and whether they represent good value for money. While HMRC is accountable for implementing and monitoring all tax reliefs, its statements about the extent of its responsibilities are inconsistent with its actual practices. HMRC accepts it has a role to assess, evaluate and monitor reliefs, but is unable or unwilling to define or to categorise reliefs by their purpose. While HMRC accepts the need for reporting the costs of tax reliefs, it does not see the merit in assessing the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of reliefs, or considering their cost effectiveness alongside that of alternative policy instruments such as spending programmes. HMRC does not generally assess the effectiveness of reliefs with specific objectives although in a few instances it does consider their impact on taxpayer behaviour. HMRC's failure to articulate a set of principles to guide its management and reporting of tax reliefs is a serious omission which it now needs to rectify.




HC 705 - Managing and Replacing the Aspire Project


Book Description

Most of HM Revenue and Customs' (HMRC's) major tax collection systems are provided under one contract, the Aspire contract. While this has provided stability over the last ten years HMRC has not managed the costs of the contract well. It has cost some £7.9 billion over this period and generated profits for the suppliers of some £1.2 billion. When the current contract ends in 2017 HMRC intends, in accordance with government IT procurement policy, to move from the current single contract to a new model with many short-duration contracts with multiple suppliers. However, HMRC has made little progress in defining its needs and has still not presented a business case to government. Once funding is agreed, it will have only two years to recruit the skills and procure the services it will need. Moreover, HMRC's record in managing the Aspire contract and other IT contractors gives the Committee little confidence that HMRC can successfully achieve this transition or that it can manage the proposed model effectively to maximise value for money. HMRC also demonstrates little appreciation of the scale of the challenge it faces or the substantial risks to tax collection if the transition fails. Failure to collect taxes efficiently would create havoc with the public finances.




HC 457 - The Work Programme


Book Description

The Department for Work and Pensions is responsible for the Work Programme, which aims to help people who have been out of work for long periods to find and keep jobs. Specifically the Work Programme aims to increase employment, reduce the time that people spend on benefit, and to improve support for the hardest-to-help - those participants whose barriers to employment are, relatively, greater than others on the programme. The Department assigns people to one of nine payment groups depending on characteristics such as age and the benefit each person is claiming. The Department pays prime contractors to provide support to people to get them into long-term employment using a payment-by-results approach. The amount the Department pays a prime contractor depends on its success in getting people into sustained work and the payment group of the individual. The Department has 40 contracts with 18 prime contractors. Either two or three prime contractors operate in 18 different geographic areas across England, Scotland, and Wales. Prime contractors may subcontract some or all of the support they provide. The Department will stop referring people to the Work Programme in March 2016, although payments to prime contractors will continue until March 2020. Between June 2011 and March 2016, the Department expects to refer 2.1 million people to the Work Programme and forecasts total payments to prime contractors of £2.8 billion.




HC 456 - Local Government Funding: Assurance to Parliament


Book Description

The Department for Communities and Local Government has increased flexibility for local government spending. Local authorities are now more able to use government funding according to local priorities. However, the Department cannot be sure that the local accountability system is ensuring that local authorities are achieving value for money with their funding. There is a particular gap in assurance for £2.8 billion of 'targeted' grants, where departments expect local authorities to spend funding on a specific activity, but do not then monitor whether they do. This gap includes grants targeted at local welfare provision and transport improvement schemes. Additionally, the Department is placing an increasing onus on residents and councillors to scrutinise local authority decisions, but there is a risk that the quality and accessibility of data is insufficient, while councillors may not always have the skills or time to fulfil this role. Where departments now fund local services through cross-border and multi-agency organisations, such as Local Enterprise Partnerships and Health and Wellbeing Boards, they need to introduce clear systems and rules around both the transparency and accountability of money spent by joint bodies.




HC 406 - Infrastructure Investment: The Impact on Consumer Bills


Book Description

HM Treasury has identified more than £375 billion of planned investment in economic infrastructure that the UK needs to replace ageing assets, replace assets which don't comply with EU regulation, help meet policy commitments such as climate change targets, support economic growth, and meet the long-term needs of a growing population. Around two-thirds of this investment is expected to be financed and delivered by private companies but paid for by consumers through utility bills and user charges, such as rail fares. Economic regulators set the frameworks within which private companies deliver this infrastructure and they have legal duties to protect consumers by, for example, promoting competition, acting to prevent and address market abuses, and in some cases setting the prices consumers can be charged. Energy and water bills have risen considerably faster than incomes in recent years, and high levels of new investment in infrastructure mean that bills and charges are likely to continue to rise significantly. Furthermore, poorer households spend more of their incomes on household bills relative to richer households, meaning that funding infrastructure through bills is more regressive than doing so through taxation. Currently, consumers rely solely on Government and regulators to protect their interests. However no one in Government is taking responsibility for assessing the overall impact of this investment on consumer bills and whether consumers will be able to afford to pay. This is a particular concern given that the poorest households are hit hardest by increases in bills.