Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance


Book Description

A theoretical and empirical examination of why political institutions and organizations matter in economic growth.




Development Centre Studies Institutional Efficiency and its Determinants The Role of Political Factors in Economic Growth


Book Description

New Institutional Economics (NIE) takes a multidisciplinary approach to understanding economic phenomena like growth, efficiency and income distribution. The authors of this book attempt to provide an integrated methodology, hitherto lacking in NIE ...







Democracy and Development


Book Description

Examines impact of political regimes on economic development between 1950 and 1990.




Democracy, Governance, and Growth


Book Description

Demonstrates the importance of governance and social institutions to economic performance




Why Nations Fail


Book Description

Brilliant and engagingly written, Why Nations Fail answers the question that has stumped the experts for centuries: Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are? Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence? Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions—with no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories. Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including: - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and overwhelm the West? - Are America’s best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority? - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson’s breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions? Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at—and understand—the world.




Economic and Political Institutions and Development


Book Description

This book focuses on the role of economic and political institutions in economic development. The book offers fresh perspectives on the issues facing less-developed countries and the elements influencing their outcomes. The text includes chapters on democracy, property rights, and economic freedom, and uses diverse methodology such as case studies, spacial econometrics, and cross-country analysis. The volume features the work of prominent scholars in the area of institutional analysis such as Mohammed Akacem, Christopher Coyne, and Andrew Young as well as a number of junior scholars. This book will be useful for researchers and students interested in economic development and institutional analysis in general, in addition to individuals with a specific focus on countries or regions such as Iraq or sub-Saharan Africa.




Institutions and Market Economies


Book Description

This book is a timely reminder of the more fundamental determinants of capital accumulation and innovation. It provides a mixture of conceptual, empirical, historical and methodological approaches to the relationship between institutions, institutional change and economic development.




Institutional Efficiency and Its Determinants


Book Description

This publication discusses the impact of institutions on economic development and the determinants that shape institutional quality, using a new institutional economics (NIE) model based on a multidisciplinary approach to understanding issues including growth, efficiency and income distribution. Using the experience of Argentina under the Menem government as a case study, a methodology is developed and applied to test theoretical hypotheses regarding the concept of institutional quality and how delineation between economic and political institutions work in practice. It also considers systems of democracy and autocracy, and the impact of traditional, legal and cultural frameworks on institutional efficiency.




One Road to Riches?


Book Description

Building effective state institutions before introducing democracy is widely presumed to improve different development outcomes. Conversely, proponents of this “stateness-first” argument anticipate that democratization before state building yields poor development outcomes. In this Element, we discuss several strong assumptions that (different versions of) this argument rests upon and critically evaluate the existing evidence base. In extension, we specify various observable implications. We then subject the stateness-first argument to multiple tests, focusing on economic growth as an outcome. First, we conduct historical case studies of two countries with different institutional sequencing histories, Denmark and Greece, and assess the stateness-first argument (e.g., by using a synthetic control approach). Thereafter, we draw on an extensive global sample of about 180 countries, measured across 1789–2019 and leverage panel regressions, preparametric matching, and sequence analysis to test a number of observable implications. Overall, we find little evidence to support the stateness-first argument.