Investors' Differential Reaction to Positive Versus Negative Earnings Surprises


Book Description

Archival studies document an asymmetrically strong market reaction to positive vis-agrave;-vis negative earnings surprises. This finding appears inconsistent with the well-known effect of loss aversion and remains unexplained. I contend that this reaction pattern can arise when investors' earnings expectations do not coincide with analyst forecasts. Numerous studies document optimistic biases in analyst forecasts. If investors perceive optimistic biases in analyst forecasts, their earnings expectations will be lower than analyst forecasts. Because the contrast between the obtained and the expected outcome determines the degree of perceived surprise, an investor expectation which is below the analyst forecast results in a larger (smaller) perceived earnings surprise than reported when the surprise is positive (negative). Investors' lower expectations relative to analyst forecasts therefore result in a stronger reaction to positive than to negative reported earnings surprises of equivalent magnitude. In a controlled experiment, I replicate the asymmetrically strong reaction to positive reported earnings surprises, and trace this reaction pattern to investors' perceptions of these surprises. I further show that when earnings surprises are measured based on investors' perception of those surprises, the differential reaction pattern reverses: investors react asymmetrically strong to negative vis-agrave;-vis positive perceived earnings surprises, consistent with loss aversion. My findings carry implications for investors and accounting researchers.




Differential Persistence of Extremely Negative and Positive Earnings Surprises


Book Description

Consistent with prior studies, this study shows that extremely negative and extremely positive earnings surprises in the fourth quarter have lower levels of persistence than those in the first through third fiscal quarters. Furthermore, extremely negative earnings surprises in the fourth fiscal quarter have lower levels of persistence than extremely positive earnings surprises in that quarter.Similar to the patterns of persistence, the post-earnings-announcement drift in prices is declining through the four quarters of the fiscal year, with the smallest drift occurring after the announcement of the fourth fiscal quarter. The drift after the fourth quarter is virtually nonexistent for extremely negative earnings surprises and smaller than extremely positive surprises, in line with the differential persistence of these surprises. The combined evidence in the study is consistent with investors who under-react to extreme earnings surprises because they seek further information. When the new information confirms the initial surprise, prices move in the same direction, creating a drift. The results of the study are robust to earnings surprises based on time-series properties of earnings or analyst forecasts.




Informed Trading Before Positive Vs. Negative Earnings Surprises


Book Description

This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around the announcements of positive or negative earnings surprises. Using Korean data over the period of 2001-2010, we find that information asymmetry is larger before negative earnings surprises (earnings shock) among investors and that the trading volume decreases only before earnings shock announcements due to the severe information asymmetry. We also find that institutions sell their stocks prior to earnings shock announcements whereas individual and foreign investors do not anticipate bad news. Finally, we find that institutional trade imbalance is positively related to the post-announcement abnormal returns of negative events. This study complements and extends prior literature on informed trading around earnings announcements by documenting evidence that domestic institutions exploit their superior information around particularly earnings shock announcements.




Expecting to Be Surprised


Book Description

It has been well-documented that prices respond quickly, if not completely, to the information in quarterly earnings announcements. In this paper we show that after conditioning on past earnings surprises, companies that meet analyst expectations have positive (negative) returns following a prior negative (positive) surprise. We attribute this price response to investors expecting to be surprised, in that they expect past earnings surprises to continue into the future. As meeting expectations is a reversal of the surprise trend, the investors react to this new information by reversing the price trend. The price response to meeting earnings forecasts appears to be due to investor overreaction, with subsequent returns undoing the overreaction.




Informed Trading Before Positive Vs. Negative Earnings Surprises


Book Description

This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions have informational advantage before negative earnings surprises but not before positive earnings surprises since the positive news tend to leak to market before the event. Using unique Korean data over the period of 2001-2010, we find that trading volume decreases only before the negative event due to information asymmetry among investors. We also find that institutions sell the stock before the negative earnings surprises but individual investors do not anticipate the bad news, and that trade imbalance by the institutions is positively related to the announcement abnormal returns of the negative events. The evidence is consistent with our conjecture that the domestic institutions exploit their superior information around the negative earnings surprises. Our results also show that foreign investors do not have any informational advantage compared to local investors on the upcoming earnings news.




Investor Overreaction to Earnings Surprises and Post-Earnings-Announcement Reversals


Book Description

Prior literature suggests that the market underreacts to the positive correlation in a typical firm's seasonal earnings changes, which leads to a post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) in prices. We examine the market reaction for a distinct set of firms whose seasonal earnings changes are uncorrelated and show that the market incorrectly assumes that the earnings changes of these firms are positively correlated. We also document that positive (negative) seasonal earnings changes in the current quarter are associated with negative (positive) abnormal returns in the following quarter. Thus, we observe a reversal of abnormal returns, consistent with a systematic overreaction to earnings, rather than the previously documented PEAD. Additional analysis indicates that financial analysts similarly overestimate the autocorrelation of these firms, although to a lesser extent. We also find that the magnitude of overestimation and the subsequent price reversal are inversely related to the richness of the information environment. Our results challenge the notion that investors recognize but consistently underestimate earnings correlation and provide a new perspective on the inability of prices to fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings.




Anomalous Price Behavior Following Earnings Surprises


Book Description

Behavioral Finance aims to explain empirical anomalies by introducing investor psychology as a determinant of asset pricing. Two kinds of anomalies, namely underreaction and overreaction, have been established by an impressive record of empirical work. While underreaction defines a slow adjustment of prices to corporate events or announcements, overreaction deals with extreme stock price reactions to previous information or past performance.This study investigates current and past earnings surprises for listed US companies over the period 1983-1999. It provides evidence that investors exhibit long-term overreaction to past, highly unexpected, earnings surprises. Investors tend to overestimate (underestimate) future earnings after extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises. As, on average, these extreme past surprises are not confirmed by subsequent earnings figures, they are followed by a correction of the initial overreaction at the date of the subsequent earnings announcement. Moreover, the longer the similar earnings surprise series, the higher the subsequent correction, suggesting that representativeness may cause this overreaction phenomenon.







Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock Returns


Book Description

It is well-established that the realized returns of ?growth? stocks have been low relative to other stocks. We show that this phenomenon is explained by a large and asymmetric response to negative earnings surprises for growth stocks. After controlling for this effect, there is no longer evidence of a stock return differential between growth stocks and other stocks. Our evidence is more consistent with investors having naively optimistic expectations about the prospects of growth stocks (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994) than with the existence of unidentified risk factors that are lower for growth stocks (e.g., Fama and French, 1992).




Responses in Divergence of Opinion to Earnings Announcement


Book Description

The basic asset pricing model is developed under the presumption of homogeneous beliefs; However, Miller (1977) puts forward heterogeneous beliefs along with other early studies. His appealing theoretical verbal model suggests that rather than reflecting the average expectation of all market participants, stock prices reflect the valuation set by the most optimistic investors due to the differences of opinion and short-sales constraints. He predicts the convergence of divergent opinions over time "primarily because the passage of time often resolves certain uncertainties about the future of a company" (Miller 1977, p. 1155). Among the prior empirical studies which provide mixed evidence of Miller hypothesis, the most recent study by Berkman et al. (2009) endeavors to document the negative relationship between excess returns and differences of opinion in a three-day window around earnings announcements when there are binding short-sales constraints. Yet to date there has been little empirical research investigating how divergent opinions affect asset prices of foreign stocks. This dissertation takes a step in this direction. Using the American Depositary Receipts sample, we adopt an event study methodology and use multivariate regressions to examine the host-market response in divergent opinions to the earnings announcements. Overlooked by prior literature, asymmetric reactions to good and bad earnings surprises are allowed in the study. Country-level factors from home market are introduced with firms-characteristic factors to capture the cross-sectional excess returns in the presence of belief dispersion and host-market short-sales constraints. Our sample contains 553 ADRs with 13378 firm-quarter observations from 52 countries. Results from regression analysis show that consistent with Miller hypothesis, quarterly earnings announcements indeed help reduce opinion divergence in ADRs by documenting the negative relation between differences of opinions and excess quarterly earnings announcement returns. Our findings are robust when controlling the financial leverage, illiquidity, analyst forecasts, post-earnings announcement drift and price momentum. Moreover, we find investors do process information asymmetrically based on good and bad earnings shocks when use TURN as the DIVOPN proxy. We observe the price divergence when good earnings are released. Non-news group and bad news group experience the same price convergence. However, we do not find the positive relation between host-market short-sales constraints and excess earnings announcement period returns, even conditioning on home-market short-sales restriction. Last, we include the enforcement of insider trading law, legal origin, investor protection, rating on accounting standard and short-selling feasibility from home market into our baseline model. These home-market country-level factors do not account for our findings.