Book Description

It is widely accepted that three-decade sway of the third wave of democratization in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) has brought relative political peace, stability, good governance, institutional reforms and the rule of law to many states. Today, countries such as Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Zambia are classified as pioneers of democracy in the 21st century SSA (McDonald, 2013). Likewise, Ghanas transition from authoritarian political regime to electoral democracy since 1992 has witnessed seven consecutive general elections and three democratic and peaceful transitions of power from one democratically elected political party to another. This is remarkable, especially in a continent where elections often plunge states into civil unrest, protracted conflicts and wars. This suggests that individual electorates and political elites desire for peace and development in a democratic society is a major factor for Ghanas electoral democratic consolidation. Despite this, Ghanas competitive electoral politics is confronted with the phenomena of ethnicity, clientelism and tensions which have attracted a number of scholarships into its dynamics and challenges. It is argued that the electoral fortunes of Ghana over the last three decades are manifestations of clientelism, ethnic, swing and performance votes (Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis (2017). Out of the 10 regions of Ghana, four have been established as swing regions which determine presidential electoral victory, whereas the rest continue to vote along with other persuasions such as ethnic, clientelist and performance. Ghanas electoral swings are the Brong Ahafo, Central, Greater Accra and the Western regions. Therefore the central idea in Ghanas political economy is centred on voters who are not ideologically attached to any political party, so-called swing voters, and therefore attract policy favours and redistribution by the elites during electoral competitions for victories (Robinson & Torvik 2009). According to the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA, 2015), Ghana presents the best case where there is consensus on its electoral system thereby making the process predictable while the results are not, reflecting meaningful contestation for political power. Having endured decades of military takeovers and military rule, Ghanaians appear determined to make a break with authoritarian rule (OSISA, 2015). Inasmuch as periodic competitive elections are mainstay of Ghanas democratic governance through representation, political participation, ensuring accountability and peacefully regulating access to political power; the feature of patron-client and ethnic politics present considerable popular experience as malpractice; and that public attitudes in Ghana are similar to those in countries where elections have been much more problematic (Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis 2016). However, across the political divide, there is growing consensus that one counterbalance to ethnic and clientelist votes is the emergence of swing or shift votes. It is generally observed that irrespective of how competitive elections are fought along clientelist or ethnic lines, swing votes cap electoral victories at the end. One important question underlying this study is what factors influence swing regions in Ghanas electoral democracy: clientelist, ethnic or performance votes? Within the Ghanaian context, it is widely argued that the constitutional arrangement of winner takes all makes the political stakes very high to the extent that politicians and political parties find it rational to induce political support along ethnic, clientelist and regional lines to entice voters who are relatively uncertain about who they will cast their ballot for during voting. The purpose of the current study was to gain a complete understanding of the factors that influence swings in Ghanas electoral democracy using its 2012 and 2016 electoral data.