Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Author : American Bar Association
Publisher : American Bar Association
Page : 212 pages
File Size : 30,73 MB
Release : 2007
Category : Law
ISBN : 9781590318393
Author : American Bar Association
Publisher : American Bar Association
Page : 212 pages
File Size : 30,73 MB
Release : 2007
Category : Law
ISBN : 9781590318393
Author : Arthur T. Vanderbilt
Publisher :
Page : 794 pages
File Size : 25,95 MB
Release : 1949
Category : Administrative law
ISBN :
Author : United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Magistrate Judges Division
Publisher :
Page : 80 pages
File Size : 43,29 MB
Release : 1993
Category : Government publications
ISBN :
Author : Evan Haynes
Publisher : The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
Page : 328 pages
File Size : 32,64 MB
Release : 2005
Category : Judges
ISBN : 1584774835
Haynes, Evan. The Selection and Tenure of Judges. [Newark]: The National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1944. xix, 308 pp. Reprint available January, 2005 by the Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-483-5. Cloth. $85. * With an introduction by Roscoe Pound. Haynes offers a comprehensive overview of the factors that determine judicial selection in the United States. It is also a useful history of the subject from the colonial era to 1943. Written with input from Pound, Haynes offers a sociological analysis enriched with an impressive body of statistical data. He examines such factors as class and region affiliation, and whether elected judges are more liberal than their tenured colleagues. He also compares American practices to those in Great Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Scandinavia and Latin America. Warmly received when it was first published, it is recommended by Willard Hurst in The Growth of American Law: The Lawmakers (see p. 454).
Author : Alexander Hamilton
Publisher : Read Books Ltd
Page : 420 pages
File Size : 41,25 MB
Release : 2018-08-20
Category : History
ISBN : 1528785878
Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.
Author : David Kosař
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 487 pages
File Size : 16,45 MB
Release : 2016-04
Category : Law
ISBN : 1107112125
This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.
Author : Richard A. Posner
Publisher : Harvard University Press
Page : 399 pages
File Size : 44,71 MB
Release : 2010-05-01
Category : Law
ISBN : 0674033833
A distinguished and experienced appellate court judge, Richard A. Posner offers in this new book a unique and, to orthodox legal thinkers, a startling perspective on how judges and justices decide cases. When conventional legal materials enable judges to ascertain the true facts of a case and apply clear pre-existing legal rules to them, Posner argues, they do so straightforwardly; that is the domain of legalist reasoning. However, in non-routine cases, the conventional materials run out and judges are on their own, navigating uncharted seas with equipment consisting of experience, emotions, and often unconscious beliefs. In doing so, they take on a legislative role, though one that is confined by internal and external constraints, such as professional ethics, opinions of respected colleagues, and limitations imposed by other branches of government on freewheeling judicial discretion. Occasional legislators, judges are motivated by political considerations in a broad and sometimes a narrow sense of that term. In that open area, most American judges are legal pragmatists. Legal pragmatism is forward-looking and policy-based. It focuses on the consequences of a decision in both the short and the long term, rather than on its antecedent logic. Legal pragmatism so understood is really just a form of ordinary practical reasoning, rather than some special kind of legal reasoning. Supreme Court justices are uniquely free from the constraints on ordinary judges and uniquely tempted to engage in legislative forms of adjudication. More than any other court, the Supreme Court is best understood as a political court.
Author : Emmett Macfarlane
Publisher : UBC Press
Page : 266 pages
File Size : 10,35 MB
Release : 2013
Category : History
ISBN : 077482350X
In Governing from the Bench, Emmett Macfarlane draws on interviews with current and former justices, law clerks, and other staff members of the court to shed light on the institution’s internal environment and decision-making processes. He explores the complex role of the Supreme Court as an institution; exposes the rules, conventions, and norms that shape and constrain its justices’ behavior; and situates the court in its broader governmental and societal context, as it relates to the elected branches of government, the media, and the public.
Author :
Publisher : BRILL
Page : 321 pages
File Size : 50,74 MB
Release : 2004-05-01
Category : Law
ISBN : 9047413717
Traditional separation of powers theories assumed that governmental despotism will be prevented by dividing the branches of government which will check one another. Modern governments function with unexpected complicity among these branches. Sometimes one of the branches becomes overwhelming. Other governmental structures, however, tend to mitigate these tendencies to domination. Among other structures courts have achieved considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional political branches of power. They tend to maintain considerable distance from political parties in the name of professionalism and expertise. The conditions and criteria of independence are not clear, and even less clear are the conditions of institutional integrity. Independence (including depolitization) of public institutions is of particular practical relevance in the post-Communist countries where political partisanship penetrated institutions under the single party system. Institutional integrity, particularly in the context of administration of justice, became a precondition for accession to the European Union. Given this practical challenge the present volume is centered around three key areas of institutional integrity, primarily within the administration of justice: First, in a broader theoretical-interdisciplinary context the criteria of institutional independence are discussed. The second major issue is the relation of neutralized institutions to branches of government with reference to accountability. Thirdly, comparative experience regarding judicial independence is discussed to determine techniques to enhance integrity.
Author : Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Publisher : Harvard University Press
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 24,34 MB
Release : 2012-02-27
Category : Law
ISBN : 9780674055483
In the United States, almost 90 percent of state judges have to run in popular elections to remain on the bench. In the past decade, this peculiarly American institution has produced vicious multi-million-dollar political election campaigns and high-profile allegations of judicial bias and misconduct. The People’s Courts traces the history of judicial elections and Americans’ quest for an independent judiciary—one that would ensure fairness for all before the law—from the colonial era to the present. In the aftermath of economic disaster, nineteenth-century reformers embraced popular elections as a way to make politically appointed judges less susceptible to partisan patronage and more independent of the legislative and executive branches of government. This effort to reinforce the separation of powers and limit government succeeded in many ways, but it created new threats to judicial independence and provoked further calls for reform. Merit selection emerged as the most promising means of reducing partisan and financial influence from judicial selection. It too, however, proved vulnerable to pressure from party politics and special interest groups. Yet, as Shugerman concludes, it still has more potential for protecting judicial independence than either political appointment or popular election. The People’s Courts shows how Americans have been deeply committed to judicial independence, but that commitment has also been manipulated by special interests. By understanding our history of judicial selection, we can better protect and preserve the independence of judges from political and partisan influence.