Book Description

As the editors are quick to point out, monism is not a particular theory or even a unique school of thought. However, monistic intuitions or doctrines are grounded in many different ways of philosophizing. For instance, one may argue that there is ultimately only one thing, or one kind of thing, or that there is only one set of true beliefs, one truth, one type of action, one sort of meaning, one way of analyzing, explaining and understanding; or, alternatively, one may pursue the project of the unity of knowledge or even that of the unity of science. Taken in this broad sense, monism is often opposed to varieties of pluralism or numerous versions of dualism, since so much philosophical debate has focused on the question whether there are two different kinds of thing, mind, and malter, or only one. This volume aims to discuss some of these aspects historically and systematically. In doing so, it sheds light on larger issues of unity and diversity, integration and polarity, fusion and separation. Since pluralism and multiculturalism are clearly on the intellectual agenda, this is a welcome, much-needed contribution to concept clarification. The editors have wisely chosen to present issues related to monism as an ongoing aspect in the history of philosophy. There are sprightly contributions that arc noteworthy for literary grace as well as epistemological insight. Included are essays on monism in pre-Socratic philosophy. Democritus on the distinction between universals and particulars. Parmenides and Hegel on monism, monism and dualism in Nietzsche's "Birth of Tragedy, the unity of truth, mindless monism, minimalist monism, and a deft essay on why it is hard to be a monist, if one wantsto be a phenomenlogist.