Book Description
Naturalizing ethics has been a problematic philosophic enterprise. The author attempts a synoptic reconciliation of the sciences with a naturalized conception of morality, beginning with a Quinean refutation of the "naturalistic fallacy" and the "open question argument." We can improve our understanding of the nature of moral theory and its place in moral judgment by treating morality as a natural phenomenon subject to constraints from and ultimately reduced to the cognitive and biological sciences. Treating morality as a mafter of proper biological function, partially fixed by our evolutionary history, and with an emphasis on skillful action in the world ("know how"), sheds light on the underlying native connectionist architecture of moral cognition. The author discusses practical implications, regarding the nature and form of our collective character development institutions and our methods for moral reasoning, that arise from this approach, reaffirming Deweyian and Aristotelian points about the importance of sociability, friendship, and liberal democratic forms of social organization for human flourishing.
