Author : David J. Teece
Publisher :
Page : 334 pages
File Size : 47,84 MB
Release : 1986
Category : Competition
ISBN :
"This study examines the five pipelines for which the DOJ has not so far discovered competition adequate to warrant deregulation (Colonial, Williams, Southern Pacific, Chevron, Calnev) and the additional six pipelines which the DOJ finds too close to call (Texas Eastern, Kaneb, West Shore, Yellowstone, Badger, Wyco)"--P. ii.
Author : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Energy and Power
Publisher :
Page : 296 pages
File Size : 11,26 MB
Release : 1989
Category : Deregulation
ISBN :
Author : United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Publisher :
Page : 194 pages
File Size : 13,70 MB
Release : 1982
Category : Energy policy
ISBN :
Author : United States. Department of Justice. Antitrust Division
Publisher :
Page : 196 pages
File Size : 40,22 MB
Release : 1986
Category : Competition
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 1070 pages
File Size : 42,7 MB
Release : 1992
Category : Energy policy
ISBN :
Author : Charles J. Untiet
Publisher :
Page : 62 pages
File Size : 19,89 MB
Release : 1987
Category : Competition
ISBN :
Author : David J. Teece
Publisher :
Page : 40 pages
File Size : 19,73 MB
Release : 1987
Category : Petroleum industry and trade
ISBN :
Author : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee
Publisher :
Page : 182 pages
File Size : 47,51 MB
Release : 1992
Category : Political Science
ISBN :
Author : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels
Publisher :
Page : 780 pages
File Size : 35,80 MB
Release : 1982
Category : Executive departments
ISBN :
Author : A. Lawrence Kolbe
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 357 pages
File Size : 45,19 MB
Release : 2012-12-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 1461532345
It is common to assert that utility investors are compensated in the allowed rate of return for the risk of large disallowances, such as arise for investments found imprudent or not `used and useful'. However, this book develops a new theory of asymmetric regulatory risk that shows that infallible estimates of the cost of capital are sure to provide downward-biased estimates of the necessary allowed rates of return in the presence of such regulatory risks. The book uses the new theory of regulatory risk to understand recent developments in the risk of natural gas pipelines and other regulated industries.
