Book Description
Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
Author : Anandi Hattiangadi
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 232 pages
File Size : 46,62 MB
Release : 2007-05-31
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
ISBN : 0199219028
Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.
Author : Matthew Chrisman
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
Page : 277 pages
File Size : 13,71 MB
Release : 2016
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
ISBN : 0199363005
This book motivates a novel inferentialist account of the meaning of a core set of normative sentences. Building on a careful truth-conditionalist semantics for 'ought' considered as a modal word, Chrisman argues that ought-sentences mean what they do neither because of how they describe reality nor because of the noncognitive attitudes they express, but because of their inferential role.
Author : Karen Valihora
Publisher : University of Delaware Press
Page : 365 pages
File Size : 34,96 MB
Release : 2010
Category : English literature
ISBN : 0874130824
The word is all over Jane Austen's novels: what ought to be done, what one ought to say, how one ought to feel (versus how one does feel). When Austen's characters employ an ought, the delicate oscillation between first-and third-person perspectives that marks her prose leads the reader to distinguish between what they say, and what they ought, according to a morally idealized, third-person calculus to mean. But what is the context of this ought? This book situates the disinterested, reflective appeal to moral principle invoked ironically or otherwise in Austen's oughts within the history of thought about judgment in the British eighteenth century. Beginning with Shaftesbury's critique of Locke's account of judgment, successive readings explore the emphasis on disinterest in works by David Hume, Adam Smith, Samuel Richardson, and Sir Joshua Reynolds alongside discussions of Jane Austen's major novels.
Author : Julia Staffel
Publisher :
Page : 228 pages
File Size : 44,89 MB
Release : 2019
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0198833717
How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? Julia Staffel breaks new ground in the study of rationality by answering this question and many others. She also explains how it is better to be less irrational, because less irrational degrees of belief are generally more accurate and better at guiding our actions.
Author : Steven J. Jensen
Publisher : CUA Press
Page : 249 pages
File Size : 10,76 MB
Release : 2015-03-26
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 081322733X
Knowing the Natural Law traces the thought of Aquinas from an understanding of human nature to a knowledge of the human good, from there to an account of ought-statements, and finally to choice, which issues in human actions. The much discussed article on the precepts of the natural law (I-II, 94, 2) provides the framework for a natural law rooted in human nature and in speculative knowledge. Practical knowledge is itself threefold: potentially practical knowledge, virtually practical knowledge, and fully practical knowledge.
Author : Catherine Chalier
Publisher : Cornell University Press
Page : 212 pages
File Size : 32,23 MB
Release : 2002
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780801487941
Is it possible to apply a theoretical approach to ethics? The French philosopher Catherine Chalier addresses this question with an unusual combination of traditional ethics and continental philosophy. In a powerful argument for the necessity of moral reflection, Chalier counters the notion that morality can be derived from theoretical knowledge. Chalier analyzes the positions of two great moral philosophers, Kant and Levinas. While both are critical of an ethics founded on knowledge, their criticisms spring from distinctly different points of view. Chalier reexamines their conclusions, pitting Levinas against (and with) Kant, to interrogate the very foundations of moral philosophy and moral imperatives. She provides a clear, systematic comparison of their positions on essential ideas such as free will, happiness, freedom, and evil. Although based on a close and elegant presentation of Kant and Levinas, Chalier's book serves as a context for the development of the author's own reflections on the question "What am I supposed to do?" and its continued importance for contemporary philosophy.
Author : Robert Cunningham
Publisher :
Page : 36 pages
File Size : 21,38 MB
Release : 1838
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Arnold Goldberg
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 172 pages
File Size : 43,84 MB
Release : 2015-05-01
Category : Psychology
ISBN : 1317657969
Psychoanalysis enjoyed an enormous popularity at one time, but has recently fallen out of favor as new psychiatric medications have dominated the treatment of mental illness and a new interest in the brain and neuroscience begins to dominate the theory as to the cause and cure of mental illness. How do we distinguish between the brain, the mind and the self? In his new book, Arnold Goldberg approaches this question from a psychoanalytic perspective, and examines how recent research findings can shed light on it. He repositions psychoanalysis as an interpretive science that is a different activity to most other sciences that are considered empirical. Giving clear coverage of the various psychoanalytic models of the mind and the self, Goldberg examines how these theories fare against neuroscientific evidence, and what implications these have for psychoanalytic clinical practice. The Brain, the Mind and the Self: A psychoanalytic road map sets up evidence-based, robust psychoanalytic theory and practice that will give psychoanalysts, social workers and practicing psychologists a valuable insight into the future of psychoanalysis. Arnold Goldberg, M.D. was born and raised in Chicago and trained at the University of Illinois, Michael Reese Hospital and the Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago. He is recently retired from the Cynthia Oudejans Harris MD chair, and Professor of Psychiatry at Rush Medical Center.
Author : Allan GIBBARD
Publisher : Harvard University Press
Page : 321 pages
File Size : 13,1 MB
Release : 2009-06-30
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 0674037588
Philosophers have long suspected that thought and discourse about what we ought to do differ in some fundamental way from statements about what is. But the difference has proved elusive, in part because the two kinds of statement look alike. Focusing on judgments that express decisions--judgments about what is to be done, all things considered--Allan Gibbard offers a compelling argument for reconsidering, and reconfiguring, the distinctions between normative and descriptive discourse--between questions of "ought" and "is." Gibbard considers how our actions, and our realities, emerge from the thousands of questions and decisions we form for ourselves. The result is a book that investigates the very nature of the questions we ask ourselves when we ask how we should live, and that clarifies the concept of "ought" by understanding the patterns of normative concepts involved in beliefs and decisions. An original and elegant work of metaethics, this book brings a new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues, and will significantly alter the long-standing debate over "objectivity" and "factuality" in ethics. Table of Contents: I. Preliminaries 1. Introduction: A Possibility Proof 2. Intuitionism as Template: Emending Moore II. The Thing to Do 3. Planning and Ruling Out: The "Frege-Geach" Problem 4. Judgment, Disagreement, Negation 5. Supervenience and Constitution 6. Character and Import III. Normative Concepts 7. Ordinary Oughts: Meaning and Motivation 8. Normative Kinds: Patterns of Engagement 9. What to Say about the Thing to Do: The Expressivistic Turn and What it Gains Us IV. Knowing What to Do 10. Explaining with Plans 11. Knowing What to Do 12. Ideal Response Concepts 13. Deep Vindication and Practical Confidence 14. Impasse and Dissent References Index This is a remarkable book. It takes up a central and much-discussed problem - the difference between normative thought (and discourse) and "descriptive" thought (and discourse). It develops a compelling response to that problem with ramifications for much else in philosophy. But perhaps most importantly, it brings new clarity and rigor to the discussion of these tangled issues. It will take some time to come to terms with the details of Gibbard's discussion. It is absolutely clear, however, that the book will reconfigure the debate over objectivity and "factuality" in ethics. --Gideon Rosen, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University Gibbard,/author> writes elegantly, and the theory he develops is innovative, philosophically sophisticated, and challenging. Gibbard defends his theory vigorously and with admirable intellectual honesty. --David Copp, Professor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University
Author : Shira Elqayam
Publisher : Frontiers Media SA
Page : 189 pages
File Size : 35,31 MB
Release : 2016-08-12
Category : Psychology
ISBN : 2889198960
In the study of human thinking, two main research questions can be asked: “Descriptive Q: What is human thinking like? Normative Q: What ought human thinking be like?” For decades, these two questions have dominated the field, and the relationship between them generated many a controversy. Empirical normativist approaches regard the answers to these questions as positively correlated – in essence, human thinking is what it ought to be (although what counts as the ‘ought’ standard is moot). In contemporary theories of reasoning and decision making, this is often associated with a Panglossian framework, an adaptationist approach which regards human thinking as a priori rational. In contrast, prescriptive normativism sees the answers to these two questions as negatively correlated. Normative models are still relevant to human thought, but human behaviour deviates from them quite markedly (with the invited conclusion that humans are often irrational). Prescriptive normativism often results in a Meliorist agenda, which sees rationality as amenable to education. Both empirical and prescriptive normativism can be contrasted with a descriptivist framework for psychology of human thinking. Following Hume’s strict divide between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, descriptivism regards the descriptive and normative research questions as uncorrelated, or dissociated, with only the former question suitable for psychological study of human behaviour. This basic division carries over to the relation between normative (‘ought’) rationality, based on conforming to normative standards; and instrumental (‘is’) rationality, based on achieving one’s goals. Descriptivist approaches regard the two as dissociated, whereas normativist approaches tend to see them as closely linked, with normative arguments defining and justifying instrumental rationality. This research topic brings together diverse contributions to the continuing debate. Featuring contributions from leading researchers in the field, the e-book covers a wide range of subjects, arranged by six sections: The standard picture: Normativist perspectives In defence of soft normativism Exploring normative models Descriptivist perspectives Evolutionary and ecological accounts Empirical reports With a total of some 24 articles from 55 authors, this comprehensive treatment includes theoretical analyses, meta-theoretical critiques, commentaries, and a range of empirical reports. The contents of the Research Topic should appeal to psychologists, linguists, philosophers and cognitive scientists, with research interests in a wide range of domains, from language, through reasoning, judgment and decision making, and moral judgment, to epistemology and theory of mind, philosophical logic, and meta-ethics.