Preparing for Assymetry: As Seen through the Lens of _Joint Vision 2020_
Author :
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 38 pages
File Size : 27,25 MB
Release :
Category :
ISBN : 1428911324
Author :
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 38 pages
File Size : 27,25 MB
Release :
Category :
ISBN : 1428911324
Author : Melissa Applegate
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 31,77 MB
Release : 2022
Category :
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 15,7 MB
Release : 2001
Category :
ISBN :
The U.S. military's joint vision of how it will approach conflict in the future, Joint Vision (JV) 2020, is vulnerable to asymmetry. The tremendous relative military combat power of U.S. forces and our commitment to expanding that lead means that, for potential adversaries, asymmetric approaches will be their only recourse. Asymmetric strategies-intentional or opportunistic-will seek to counter the operational concepts underpinning JV2020. Successful asymmetric approaches could prevent the United States from fighting as designed or even at all. Alternatively, asymmetry may not defeat U.S. forces, but could prevent them from winning. Asymmetry affects the whole force and must be addressed in that context. Reliance on overwhelming offensive military power for warfighting and adopting a defensive strategy against asymmetric approaches will not ensure mastery of the asymmetric domain.
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 39 pages
File Size : 33,30 MB
Release : 2001
Category :
ISBN :
The U.S. military's joint vision of how it will approach conflict in the future, Joint Vision (JV) 2020, is vulnerable to asymmetry. The tremendous relative military combat power of U.S. forces and our commitment to expanding that lead means that, for potential adversaries, asymmetric approaches will be their only recourse. Asymmetric strategies-intentional or opportunistic-will seek to counter the operational concepts underpinning JV2020. Successful asymmetric approaches could prevent the United States from fighting as designed or even at all. Alternatively, asymmetry may not defeat U.S. forces, but could prevent them from winning. Asymmetry affects the whole force and must be addressed in that context. Reliance on overwhelming offensive military power for warfighting and adopting a defensive strategy against asymmetric approaches will not ensure mastery of the asymmetric domain.
Author : Melissa A. Applegate
Publisher :
Page : 44 pages
File Size : 45,58 MB
Release : 2001
Category : Political Science
ISBN :
"Since the mid-1990s, the concept of strategic asymmetry has begun to receive serious attention from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, for instance, stated, "U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use ... asymmetric means to attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home." But while American strategists and defense leaders sense the importance of strategy asymmetry, much analytical work remains to be done before it is fully understood. The author assesses the revisions to Joint Vision 2020, DOD's roadmap to the future, that must be undertaken in order to prepare for asymmetric challenges."--Summary.
Author : Marcus Corbin
Publisher :
Page : 140 pages
File Size : 48,27 MB
Release : 2003
Category : Military readiness
ISBN :
Author :
Publisher :
Page : 694 pages
File Size : 28,51 MB
Release : 2003
Category : Military art and science
ISBN :
Author : Everett Dolman
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 238 pages
File Size : 42,92 MB
Release : 2012-11-12
Category : History
ISBN : 1136608079
A stimulating new inquiry into the fundamental truth of strategy - its purpose, place, utility, and value. This new study is animated by a startling realization: the concept of strategic victory must be summarily discarded. This is not to say that victory has no place in strategy or strategic planning. The outcome of battles and campaigns are variables within the strategist's plan, but victory is a concept that has no meaning there. To the tactical and operational planner, wars are indeed won and lost, and the difference is plain. Success is measurable; failure is obvious. In contrast, the pure strategist understands that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, an ongoing interaction that has no finality. Strategy therefore connects the conduct of war with the intent of politics. It shapes and guides military means in anticipation of a panoply of possible coming events. In the process, strategy changes the context within which events will happen. In this new book we see clearly that the goal of strategy is not to culminate events, to establish finality in the discourse between states, but to continue them; to influence state discourse in such a way that it will go forward on favorable terms. For continue it will. This book will provoke debate and stimulate new thinking across the field and strategic studies.
Author : Pat Proctor
Publisher : University of Missouri Press
Page : 503 pages
File Size : 36,18 MB
Release : 2020-03-09
Category : History
ISBN : 0826274374
Colonel Pat Proctor’s long overdue critique of the Army’s preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era focuses on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies? Or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information-age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Proctor contends that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to the new strategic reality, a decision that saw it struggle through one low-intensity conflict after another—some inconclusive, some tragic—in the 1980s and 1990s, and leaving it largely unprepared when it found itself engaged—seemingly forever—in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first book-length study to connect the failures of these wars to America’s disastrous performance in the war on terror, Proctor’s work serves as an attempt to convince Army leaders to avoid repeating the same mistakes.
Author : Orrin Schwab
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing USA
Page : 213 pages
File Size : 31,50 MB
Release : 2006-08-30
Category : History
ISBN : 0313038252
The Vietnam War was in many ways defined by a civil-military divide, an underlying clash between military and civilian leadership over the conflict's nature, purpose and results. This book explores the reasons for that clash—and the results of it. The relationships between the U.S. military, its supporters, and its opponents during the Vietnam War were both intense and complex. Schwab shows how the ability of the military to prosecute the war was complicated by these relationships, and by a variety of nonmilitary considerations that grew from them. Chief among these was the military's relationship to a civilian state that interpreted strategic value, risks, morality, political costs, and military and political results according to a different calculus. Second was a media that brought the war—and those protesting it—into living rooms across the land. As Schwab demonstrates, Vietnam brought together two leadership groups, each with very different operational and strategic perspectives on the Indochina region. Senior military officers favored conceptualizing the war as a conventional military conflict that required conventional means to victory. Political leaders and critics of the war understood it as an essentially political conflict, with associated political risks and costs. As the war progressed, Schwab argues, the divergence in perspectives, ideologies, and political interests created a large, and ultimately unbridgeable divide between military and civilian leaders. In the end, this clash of cultures defined the Vietnam War and its legacy for the armed forces and for American society as a whole.