Third Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts


Book Description

The IMF Executive Board endorsed in October 2014 the inclusion of key features of enhanced pari passu provisions and collective action clauses (CACs) in new international sovereign bonds.1 Specifically, the Executive Board endorsed the use of (i) a modified pari passu provision that explicitly excludes the obligation to effect ratable payments, and (ii) an enhanced CAC with a menu of voting procedures, including a “single-limb” aggregated voting procedure that enables bonds to be restructured on the basis of a single vote across all affected instruments, a two-limb aggregated voting procedure, and a series-by-series voting procedure.2 Directors supported an active role for the IMF in promoting the inclusion of these clauses in international sovereign bonds.3 The IMFC and the G20 further called on the IMF to promote the use of such clauses and report on their inclusion. Since that time, the IMF has published periodic progress reports on inclusion of the enhanced clauses.4 These reports found that since the Executive Board’s endorsement, substantial progress had been made in incorporating the enhanced clauses, with approximately 85 percent of new international sovereign bond issuances since October 2014 (in nominal principal amount) including such clauses. The reports also found that there was no observable market impact on inclusion of the enhanced clauses. However, the reports noted that the outstanding stock without the enhanced clauses remained significant, with issuers showing little appetite for liability management exercises to accelerate the turnover. This paper provides a further update on the inclusion of the enhanced clauses and on the outstanding stock of international sovereign bonds as of September 30, 2017. Section II reports on the inclusion of these enhanced provisions, finding that the vast majority of issuers are including these clauses, with only a few countries standing out against the market trend. Section II also provides an update on the outstanding stock, indicating that while the percentage of the outstanding stock with the enhanced clauses is increasing, a significant percentage of the stock still does not and little action has been taken by issuers to increase the rate of turnover. Section III briefly reports on the use of different bond structures, and Section IV describes the staff’s ongoing outreach efforts and next steps.




Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts


Book Description

As part of the Fund’s ongoing work on sovereign debt restructuring, in October 2014 the Executive Board endorsed the inclusion of key features of enhanced pari passu provisions and collective action clauses (CACs) in new international sovereign bonds.1 Specifically, the Executive Board endorsed the use of: (i) a modified pari passu clause that explicitly excludes the obligation to effect ratable payments and (ii) an enhanced CAC with a menu of voting procedures, including a “single-limb” voting procedure that enables bonds to be restructured on the basis of a single vote across all affected instruments, a two-limb aggregated voting procedure and a series-by-series voting procedure.




Second Progress Report On Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts


Book Description

endorsed in October 2014 the inclusion of key features of enhanced pari passu provisions and collective action clauses (CACs) in new international sovereign bonds. Specifically, the Executive Board endorsed the use of (i) a modified pari passu provision that explicitly excludes the obligation to effect ratable payments, and (ii) an enhanced CAC with a menu of voting procedures, including a “single-limb” aggregated voting procedure that enables bonds to be restructured on the basis of a single vote across all affected instruments, a two-limb aggregated voting procedure, and a series-by-series voting procedure. Directors supported an active role for the IMF in promoting the inclusion of these clauses in international sovereign bonds. The IMFC and the G20 further called on the IMF to promote the use of such clauses and report on their inclusion. In September 2015, the IMF published a progress report on the inclusion of the enhanced clauses in international sovereign bonds as of end-July 2015. The report found that since the Executive Board’s endorsement, substantial progress had been made in incorporating the enhanced clauses: 41 issuances, representing 60 percent of the nominal principal amount of total issuances, had included the enhanced clauses as of July 31, 2015. The 2015 paper also provided initial observations on the patterns of incorporation, the market impact of inclusion of the enhanced clauses, and an update on the outstanding stock of international sovereign bonds. This paper provides a further update on the inclusion of the enhanced clauses and on the outstanding stock of international sovereign bonds as of October 31, 2016. Section II reports on the inclusion of these enhanced provisions, finding that uptake of the clauses has continued, with only a small minority of new issuances not including them. Section III provides an update on the outstanding stock, which reveals that while an increasing percentage of the outstanding stock includes enhanced clauses, a significant percentage of the stock still does not. Section IV reports on the use of different bond structures, and Section V describes the staff’s ongoing outreach efforts. Section VI briefly reports on other recent developments relevant to the contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring and Section VII concludes with next steps.




Fourth Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contract


Book Description

This paper reports on progress in inclusion of enhanced collective action clauses and modified pari passu clauses as of end-October 2018. The report finds that enhanced CACs have now become the market standard, with only a few issuers standing out from the market trend. Around 88 percent of international sovereign bonds (in aggregate principal amount) issued since October 2014 in the main jurisdictions of New York and England include such clauses. The modified pari passu clause continues to be incorporated as a package with the enhanced CACs, with few exceptions. In line with findings in previous reports, the inclusion of enhanced CACs does not seem to have an observable pricing effect, according to either primary or secondary market data. The outstanding stock of international sovereign bonds without enhanced CACs remains high, with about 39 percent of the outstanding stock including enhanced CACs.




The International Law of Sovereign Debt Dispute Settlement


Book Description

This book fills the normative gap arising from the absence of a multilateral mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring.




Intercreditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring


Book Description

The question of intercreditor equity is one of the most contentious issues in debt restructuring, both historically and today. Intercreditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring maps and establishes the content of these intercreditor equity rules, and analyses how they influence the restructuring process. Through this analysis, Astrid Iversen outlines how creditors can predict their legal rights in the unfortunate event of a debt restructuring and strives to improve our understanding of the boundaries within which a debt restructuring offer must be designed. Iversen also seeks to shed light on the functioning of the legal framework governing sovereign debt more broadly. In this book, she examines whether intercreditor equity rules and the legal framework of sovereign debt are compatible with a debtor state's responsibility to ensure monetary and financial stability and to establish sustainable debt burdens. Iversen also explores how certain intercreditor equity rules constitute an obstacle to sustainable debt restructurings and highlights how the number of different intercreditor equity rules that a sovereign debtor state typically is bound by, as well as the scope of these rules, risk tightening the policy space of debtor states to the extent that it is difficult to design and implement a sustainable debt restructuring. Suitable as an introductory text for readers new to the topic of sovereign debt restructurings, and as an instructive guide for debt management offices, creditors, and their lawyers, this publication provides a comprehensive legal study of intercreditor equity rules in sovereign debt restructuring.




Re-Imagining Sovereign Debt in International Law through the lens of Socio-Economic Rights


Book Description

Re-imagining sovereign debt examines the extent to which sovereign debtors’ contractual obligations may be honoured where the socio-economic rights of their citizens face clear danger of non-realisation. It critiques the foundational legal paradigm that influences and shapes the substance of the sovereign debt regime. In doing this, the author employs legal theory to show the inadequacies of the regime in terms of its failure to embrace the dynamism of sovereign debt which he characterises as a debt with a complex mix of public-private elements, hybridity of norms and multiplicity of interests beyond the two-sided creditor-debtor matrix. By locating socio-economic rights in all critical phases of the regime, the author shows that the recurring circles of debt crises are linked to the continuing influence of the private law paradigm. The book offers a fresh perspective to re-imagine sovereign debt using insights from transnational legal theorists and advocates prioritising socio-economic rights considerations in debt contracting, restructuring and adjudication through a more concrete recognition of creditors’ responsibilities. Re-imagining sovereign debt will interest lawyers, policymakers, diplomats, scholars and researchers interested in the law, history and politics of sovereign debt.




Reforming the Fund's Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors


Book Description

Background: As a follow-up to the May 2013 Executive Board’s discussion of the paper on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework (hereinafter, the “2013 Paper“), this paper proposes a reform to the Fund’s policy on non-toleration of arrears owed to official bilateral creditors (“NTP”) with a view to addressing the major issues related to official sector involvement (OSI) discussed in the 2013 Paper. Unlike the Fund’s lending-into-arrears (“LIA”) policy for private creditors, the NTP prevents Fund lending to countries if they owe unresolved arrears to official bilateral creditors, unless the arrears are covered by a Paris Club agreement or the creditor consents to the Fund providing financing. Nature of the problem: As staff foreshadowed in the 2013 Paper, several aspects of the current NTP present challenges in a changing and increasingly diverse landscape for official bilateral finance. For example, the NTP’s reliance on the practices and conventions of the Paris Club creates challenges in an environment where a growing number of creditors are non-Paris Club members. In particular, the NTP’s dependence on the Paris Club’s comparability of treatment principle to deem away arrears to non-Paris Club bilateral creditors is difficult to justify in circumstances where a Paris Club agreement is not sufficiently representative and the bulk of official bilateral claims are held by non-Paris Club creditors. Further, where there is no Paris Club agreement, the current policy can give individual official bilateral creditors a veto over Fund lending decisions, drawing no distinction between creditors that are contributing to the financing requirements of the program and those that are not, thus leaving the system vulnerable to holdouts. Proposed modification: Staff’s proposal envisages a two-step process: in the first step, all creditors would be encouraged to reach a consensus. While the Paris Club is currently a well-established forum for OSI, the Fund would also recognize agreements among creditors reached in other representative fora, should such fora emerge. If an agreement is reached through the Paris Club and the creditor group so formed represents a significant portion of total official bilateral claims, the Fund would rely on its current practices and deem away arrears to nonparticipating creditors based on the Club’s comparability of treatment principle. Only when an agreement cannot be reached (i) with a representative group of creditors in the Paris Club, or (ii) with each creditor in an alternative grouping or bilaterally, would the Fund consider lending into arrears owed to official bilateral creditors in carefully circumscribed circumstances. The decision to lend in these situations would be subject to a need for prompt Fund assistance, an assessment that the debtor is making good faith efforts to reach an agreement and that the absence of a debt restructuring is due to the unwillingness of the creditor to reach an agreement consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported program, and a judgment on whether the decision to lend could negatively affect the Fund’s ability to mobilize official financing packages in the future. Likely impact: Staff’s proposal will strengthen incentives for collective action among official bilateral creditors in situations where OSI is necessary. The two-step process encourages individual official bilateral creditors to be part of a multilateral agreement, thus reducing the risk that the Fund would be prevented from assisting a member in need because certain official bilateral creditors are seeking more favorable treatment of their claims at the expense of other contributing creditors. Importantly, the policy will continue to protect official bilateral creditors, as any decision to lend into arrears will be subject to the debtor’s good faith efforts, will be applied in a way that preserves the Fund’s ability to mobilize official financing packages in future, and be subject to the Board’s approval. Next steps: If the Board supports the proposed modification, the new policy will apply immediately to all future Fund disbursements (including under existing arrangements) with respect to existing and future arrears owed to official bilateral creditors.




Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010


Book Description

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.




Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Law


Book Description

The book sheds light on the perhaps most important legal conundrum in the context of sovereign debt restructuring: the holdout creditor problem. Absent an international bankruptcy regime for sovereigns, holdout creditors may delay or even thwart the efficient resolution of sovereign debt crises by leveraging contractual provisions and, in an increasing number of cases, by seeking to enforce a debt claim against the sovereign in courts or international tribunals. Following an introduction to sovereign debt and its restructuring, the book provides the first comprehensive analysis of the holdout creditor problem in the context of the two largest sovereign debt restructuring operations in history: the Argentine restructurings of 2005 and 2010 and the 2012 Greek private sector involvement. By reviewing numerous lawsuits and arbitral proceedings initiated against Argentina and Greece across a dozen different jurisdictions, it distils the organizing principles for ongoing and future cases of sovereign debt restructuring and litigation. It highlights the different approaches judges and arbitrators have adopted when dealing with holdout creditors, ranging from the denial of their contractual right to repayment on human rights grounds to leveraging the international financial infrastructure to coerce governments into meeting holdouts’ demands. To this end, it zooms in on the role the governing law plays in sovereign debt restructurings, revisits the contemporary view on sovereign immunity from suit and enforcement in the international debt context, and examines how creditor rights are balanced with the sovereign’s interest in achieving debt sustainability. Finally, it advances a new genealogy of holdouts, distinguishing between official and private sector holdouts and discussing how the proliferation of new types of uncooperative creditors may affect the sovereign debt architecture going forward. While the book is aimed at practitioners and scholars dealing with sovereign debt and its restructuring, it should also provide the general reader with the understanding of the key legal issues facing countries in debt distress. Moreover, by weaving economic, financial, and political considerations into its analysis of holdout creditor litigation and arbitration, the book also speaks to policymakers without a legal background engaged in the field of international finance and economics.