Unique Solutions for Strategic Games


Book Description

This book develops a general solution concept for strategic games which resolves strategic uncertainty completely. The concept is described by a mathematically formulated solution procedure and illustrated by applying it to many interesting examples. A long nontechnical introduction tries to survey and to discuss the more technical parts of the book. The book and especially the introduction provide firm and consistent guidance for scholars of game theory. There are many open problems which could inspire further research efforts.




Games of Strategy


Book Description

A clear, comprehensive introduction to the study of game theory. In the fourth edition, new real-world examples and compelling end-of-chapter exercises engage students with game theory.




Collected Papers


Book Description

Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea", writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study". The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work.




Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria


Book Description

I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.




Frontiers of Game Theory


Book Description

seventeen contributions reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field todayThese seventeen contributions take up the most recent research in game theory, reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field today. They are classified in five general tactical categories - prediction, explanation, investigation, description, and prescription - and wit in these along applied and theoretical divisions. The introduction clearly lays out this framework.




Surveys in Experimental Economics


Book Description

Experimental Economics has experienced a steadily growing interest by economists during the last decade. This may not surprise since laboratory and field experiments obviously provide a further valuable source of empirical evidence of economic behavior besides statistics, econometrics, polls, interviews and simulations. In an overview of the recent developments in Experimental Economics, the present book concentrates on three central themes standing in the actual research focus: bargaining, cooperation and election markets. For each one of these topics the volume presents several state-of-the-art survey articles by experts in the field, accompanied by detailed comments. While the experimental approach sheds new light on the microeconomic standard topics of bargaining and cooperation, the election market approach as a new field may provide better forecasts for political elections - and for soccer World Championships.




Game Equilibrium Models IV


Book Description

The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed.




Game Theory and Economic Behaviour


Book Description

'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.




Advances in Economic Theory: Volume 1


Book Description

This book gives the reader a unique survey of advances in economic theory.




Adjustment Processes for Exchange Economies and Noncooperative Games


Book Description

This monograph is a treatise on adjustment processes. We consider price adjustment processes in exchange economies and strategy adjustment processes in noncooperative games. In the most simple version of an exchange economy, i.e. a pure exchange economy, there exist markets on which prices are determined by the demand and supply created by a finite number of consumers willing to exchange their initial endowments in order to maximize their utilities. An equilibrium situation is attained if, for some price vector, demand equals supply in all markets. Starting from a situation not being an equi librium an adjustment process reaches an equilibrium via adaptations of prices. The advantage of the adjustment processes we will present in this monograph is that they exist and converge under far weaker assumptions than existing processes. The second subject concerns the problem of finding Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. A Nash equilibrium is a situation from which no player can improve his position by unilaterally changing his strategy. We present a new algorithm for finding such equilibria. The sequence of stra tegy vectors generated by the algorithm can be interpreted as the path followed by a strategy adjustment process.