Incomplete International Investment Agreements


Book Description

This timely book is a comprehensive analysis of incomplete International Investment Agreements (IIAs), featuring insights from negotiating experiences in a number of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. It examines problems, causes, and solutions surrounding this phenomenon by employing incomplete contract theory, and opens new avenues in discussing how to correct incomplete IIAs.




Incomplete International Investment Agreements


Book Description

This timely book is a comprehensive analysis of incomplete International Investment Agreements (IIAs), featuring insights from negotiating experiences in a number of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. It examines problems, causes, and solutions surrounding this phenomenon by employing incomplete contract theory and opens new avenues in discussing how to correct incomplete IIAs. Throughout the book, the author challenges the fundamental assumption that most IIAs are concluded in a complete manner and emphasizes the importance of accounting for the fact that IIAs are often concluded without significant investment protection articles and are subject to renegotiation. Park applies various interdisciplinary approaches, including incomplete contract theory and development theory, to illustrate how countries easily postpone their treaty negotiations and are willing to renegotiate to remedy incomplete IIAs. Furthermore, he depicts the reality of treaty negotiation in recent years, helping readers to understand how countries are failing to negotiate complete IIAs and how utilizing an economics approach could analyse and resolve this issue. Offering a useful and practical contribution to the discussion on the resolution of incomplete IIAs, this book will be key reading for academics and researchers within the fields of commercial law, international economic law, trade law and international investment law. It is also a must-read book for both government officers and investment treaty lawyers in all countries involved with Free Trade Agreements.







U.S. International Investment Agreements


Book Description

U.S. International Investment Agreements is the definitive interpretative guide to the United States' bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters. Providing an authoritative look at the development of the BIT program, treatment provisions, expropriation, and other provisions, Kenneth J. Vandevelde draws on his years of investment treaty and agreement expertise as both a former practitioner and a scholar. This unique and well-organized book analyzes the development of U.S. international investment agreement language and strategy within their historical context. It also explains the newest changes to the model negotiating text (US Model BIT 2004) and additional treaties.




The Impact of Investment Treaties on Contracts between Host States and Foreign Investors


Book Description

Foreign investments are usually implemented through contracts between host States and foreign investors. These contracts and international investment treaties represent two different legal instruments that protect foreign direct investment. The co-existence of both instruments under international investment law has generated fundamental problems. By scrutinizing and tracing the increasingly divided jurisprudence on central aspects of treaty interpretation and analyzing the conflicting legal concepts applied by arbitral tribunals, this book represents a comprehensive examination of the complex relationship between the two in the field of investment treaty arbitration.







Keep the Faith


Book Description

The article addresses the consequence of denunciation of international investment agreements for investor rights. It critiques the prevalent point of view that the termination of international investment treaties terminates a standing offer of the state to arbitrate disputes with foreign investors - and as such also terminates the substantive protections included in the treaties containing such a standing offer. The article explains that the prevalent point of view is premised in the law of contracts and analogizes investment protection to offer and acceptance in contract law. The article demonstrates that the analogy is not aptly drawn because the law of contract would analyze similar problems in commercial transactions under the law of third party beneficiaries rather than offer and acceptance. The law of third party beneficiaries vests the rights of investors at the time of reliance rather than at the time of acceptance. The article uses this insight to explore how the triangular relationship between home state, host state and investor is captured in international law. It concludes that treaty commitments made between the host state and the home in an international investment agreement constitutes a unilateral act addressed to foreign investors. As such, they create rights in international investors. These rights may not be arbitrarily withdrawn or frustrated. It is this analysis, rather than the analysis of offer and acceptance that governs the legal consequence for the investor of termination of an international investment treaty inter partes.




Interpreting Investment Treaties as Incomplete Contracts


Book Description

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are incomplete contracts as contracting states leave contractual gaps inadvertently, necessarily or strategically open. When an investment dispute is brought to international arbitration, these gaps must be filled. Investment tribunals thus not only have a dispute settlement function, but are also gap-filling norm-setters. The degree to which this gap-filling role is exercise must depend, however, on the degree of contractual incompleteness. First generation BITs are highly incomplete contracts containing only brief and vague provisions delegating much of the gap-filling to tribunals. Second generation BITs, in contrast, are complex and comprehensive agreements. Their degree of incompleteness is considerably lower with contracting states employing a range of different gap-filling alternatives to courts such as comprehensive contracting or escape clauses all of which warrant judicial restraint and formalism. Second generation BITs can also assist arbitral gap-filling in first generation treaties. As tribunals lack the sophistication to either reach ex ante or ex post efficient norm-setting, they should defer to how contractual gaps are closed by the same contracting parties in second generation BITs rather than devising their own solution.