Combating Collusion in Public Procurement


Book Description

This book offers a clear and structured examination of how joint bidding structures comply with competition rules in Europe. It explains how joint-bids could be considered as agreements aimed at distorting competition, the practice commonly referred to as bid rigging. The book demonstrates how the conclusion of joint-bid agreements could constitute grounds for exclusion from public procurement proceedings under Article 57(4)(d) of Directive 2014/24/EU.




Combatting Corruption and Collusion in Public Procurement


Book Description

'Corruption' in public procurement typically involves procurement decisions taken in favour of preferred bidders in exchange for improper compensation (the acceptance of bribes, for example), while supplier collusion refers to a type of cartel activity, in which firms rig their bids in a tendering process. Although these practices are distinct, they frequently occur together in the public procurement context, reinforcing one another. Combatting Corruption and Collusion in Public Procurement: A Challenge for Governments Worldwide examines the causes of corruption and collusion in the public procurement sphere, its resulting harm, and how states can best try to combat these practices. This book provides a legal, economic, and practical analysis of issues concerning corruption and supplier collusion in public procurement, both generally and in seven diverse and representative jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, the United States, Brazil, Hungary and Poland, Ukraine, and Canada. It encompasses a discussion of both 'generic' cross-jurisdictional issues and specific proposals for individual jurisdictions. It offers practical guidance on building robust regimes for combatting corruption and collusion in public procurement and how to bolster and improve them when they are faltering. The book stresses the need for a multi-faceted and joined-up approach to the problems, emphasizing the importance both of enhanced investment in the effective enforcement of anti-corruption and cartel laws and of increasing the resilience of public procurement systems to corruption and collusion through a range of measures. The relevance of the topic to the social and economic well-being of citizens and the survival of democratic governance is highlighted throughout the book. Pioneering and comprehensive, Combatting Corruption and Collusion in Public Procurement provides a pathbreaking analysis of a range of global issues, making it an essential read for scholars, lawyers, government officials and representatives of international and non-governmental organizations around the world.




Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules


Book Description

Public procurement and competition law are both important fields of EU law and policy, intimately intertwined in the creation of the internal market. Hitherto their close connection has been noted, but not closely examined. This work is the most comprehensive attempt to date to explain the many ways in which these fields, often considered independent of one another, interact and overlap in the creation of the internal market. This process of convergence between competition and public procurement law is particularly apparent in the 2014 Directives on public procurement, which consolidate the principle of competition in terms very close to those advanced by the author in the first edition. This second edition builds upon this approach and continues to ask how competition law principles inform and condition public procurement rules, and whether the latter (in their revised form) are adequate to ensure that competition is not distorted. The second edition also deepens the analysis of the market behaviour of the public buyer from a competition perspective. Proceeding through a careful assessment of the general rules of competition and public procurement, the book constantly tests the efficacy of these rules against a standard of the proper functioning of undistorted competition in the market for public procurement. It also traces the increasing relevance of competition considerations in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and sets out criteria and recommendations to continue influencing the development of EU Economic Law.




The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy


Book Description

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.




Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement


Book Description

ÔThis volume is long overdue. Integrated legal and economic analysis of competition law is crucial given the nature of the sector. However to carry this off successfully, one either needs intensive editorial work to bring different teams together; or one has to rely on the few who master both economic and legal analysis to a tee. Stefan WeishaarÕs analysis not only looks at a stubborn issue in competition law. He does so in three jurisdictions, in detailed yet clear fashion, with clear insight and ditto conclusions. Over and above its relevance to academic analysis, this book can go straight into competition authoritiesÕ decision making, and therefore also in compliance and remediation advice.Õ Ð Geert Van Calster, University of Leuven, Belgium Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement uses a law and economics approach to analyse whether competition and public procurement laws in Europe and Asia deal effectively with bid rigging conspiracies. Stefan Weishaar explores the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of bid rigging cartels. The study sheds light on one of the vital issues for achieving cost-effective public procurement Ð which is itself a critical question in the context of the global financial crisis. The book comprehensively examines whether different laws deal effectively with bid rigging and the ways in which economic theory can be used to mitigate the adverse effects of such cartels. The employed industrial economics and auction theory highlights shortcomings of the law in all three jurisdictions Ð the European Union, China and Japan Ð and seeks to raise the awareness of policymakers as to when extra precautionary measures against bid rigging conspiracies should be taken. Students and researchers who have a keen interest in the relationship between law and economics, competition law and public procurement law will find this topical book invaluable. Practitioners can see how economic theory can be used to identify situations that lend themselves to bid rigging and policymakers will be informed about the shortcomings of existing legislation from a legal and economics perspective and will be inspired by approaches taken in different jurisdictions.




Votes, Drugs, and Violence


Book Description

One of the most surprising developments in Mexico's transition to democracy is the outbreak of criminal wars and large-scale criminal violence. Why did Mexican drug cartels go to war as the country transitioned away from one-party rule? And why have criminal wars proliferated as democracy has consolidated and elections have become more competitive subnationally? In Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley develop a political theory of criminal violence in weak democracies that elucidates how democratic politics and the fragmentation of power fundamentally shape cartels' incentives for war and peace. Drawing on in-depth case studies and statistical analysis spanning more than two decades and multiple levels of government, Trejo and Ley show that electoral competition and partisan conflict were key drivers of the outbreak of Mexico's crime wars, the intensification of violence, and the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society.




Hard Core Cartels


Book Description

Anti-cartel measures seek to prevent violations of competition law such as agreements among competitors to fix prices, restrict product supply or submit collusive tenders. This report examines the harm caused by cartels and the progress made to strengthen methods of investigation and sanctions systems to tackle this problem. It also outlines and identifies the challenges that lie ahead.







Digital Technologies and Public Procurement


Book Description

The digital transformation of the public sector has accelerated. States are experimenting with technology, seeking more streamlined and efficient digital government and public services. However, there are significant concerns about the risks and harms to individual and collective rights under new modes of digital public governance. Several jurisdictions are attempting to regulate digital technologies, especially artificial intelligence, however regulatory effort primarily concentrates on technology use by companies, not by governments. The regulatory gap underpinning public sector digitalisation is growing. As it controls the acquisition of digital technologies, public procurement has emerged as a 'regulatory fix' to govern public sector digitalisation. It seeks to ensure through its contracts that public sector digitalisation is trustworthy, ethical, responsible, transparent, fair, and (cyber) safe. However, in Digital Technologies and Public Procurement: Gatekeeping and Experimentation in Digital Public Governance, Albert Sanchez-Graells argues that procurement cannot perform this gatekeeping role effectively. Through a detailed case study of procurement digitalisation as a site of unregulated technological experimentation, he demonstrates that relying on 'regulation by contract' creates a false sense of security in governing the transition towards digital public governance. This leaves the public sector exposed to the 'policy irresistibility' that surrounds hyped digital technologies. Bringing together insights from political economy, public policy, science, technology, and legal scholarship, this thought-provoking book proposes an alternative regulatory approach and contributes to broader debates of digital constitutionalism and digital technology regulation.




Handbook of Antitrust Economics


Book Description

Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden