Collected Writings of Ian Nish


Book Description

This volume of the Collected Writings of Modern Western Scholars on Japan brings together the work of Ian Nish on international relations affecting Japan, Russia, China and Korea in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.










Coalition Warfare


Book Description

The essays that comprise this volume clearly demonstrate that coalitions have dramatically altered the shape of war. Paul Kennedy's overview of coalitions over the past century shows that, with coalitions firmly established as viable in the minds of strategists, wars have become markedly lengthier, bloodier, and much more expensive. Three of the essays focus on explicitly military aspects of the two world wars: Norman Stone's on the Austro-German Alliance, 1914-18; Ulrich Trumpener's on the German-Ottoman Coalition, 1914-18; and Ian Nish's on the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. J. L. Granatstein pursues a contrasting, though equally enlightening, course, focussing on Hume Wrong, the "functional principle," and the difficulties inherent in Canada's role in the diplomacy of the post-World War II era. In keeping with the immediacy of Granatstein's concerns is John Erickson's lucid presentation of Soviet military philosophy, a matter of crucial and immediate concern. This book will be of interest to military historians, political scientists, and the more general reader intrigued by military history and philosophy. These essays, edited and compiled by Keith Neilson and Roy Prete, who teach in the Department of History at the Royal Military College, Kingston, were presented at the Eighth Royal Military College Military History Symposium.




A History of Modern Indonesia


Book Description

This updated edition examines the rise of fundamentalist Islam in Indonesia and asks why the country's democratic aspirations have yet to be realized.




Operation Matador


Book Description

When Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, Churchill called it the “largest capitulation in British history.” Till today, the myth persists that this was due to the British forces’ being caught off-guard, with their guns facing the wrong direction—towards the sea. This book offers an alternative insight into why Malaya and Singapore were captured by the Japanese. The question of the landward defence of Singapore and Malaya was first raised as early as 1918, eventually taking the form of Operation Matador, the elaborate planning and preparations for which amply demonstrate that the British fully expected the Japanese to attack Singapore from the rear, and had formulated a plan to stop the Japanese at the Kra Isthmus. Yet, when the Japanese forces landed, they found Malaya and Singapore defended by an emasculated fleet, obsolescent aircraft, inadequate artillery and no tanks. The battle for Malaya and Singapore was lost even before the first shot was fired—in the corridors of power at Whitehall. Churchill’s half-hearted support for Operation Matador meant that Malaya was starved of the necessary reinforcements, and the commanders on the spot were expected to “make bricks without straw.” The question that remains: If implemented, might Operation Matador have stopped the Japanese?