Peace in the Making


Book Description

Here, for the first time, is the complete correspondence between Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat as they wrestled with what would become their Nobel Peace Prize winning accomplishment. The letters, together with transcripts of speeches, press conferences, interviews, rare photos and official documents, reveal the personal relationship the two leaders constructed, which was eventually reflected in the treaty they signed. The personalities, the principled issues, the manoeuvrings, the clashes, the compromises and agreements are all revealed in these letters. Covering the period from June 1977 until a day before Sadat's assassination in October 1981, the Begin-Sadat correspondence affords a behind-the-scenes glimpse into the efforts, crises, and agonising decisions these two leaders faced and overcame to achieve peace. Supplemented with photos and the full texts of the Camp David Accords and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, this ground-breaking volume sheds new light on a peace process that succeeded.




The Art of Making Peace


Book Description

This unique volume looks at international peace treaties, at their results, effects and failures. It reflects the outcome of an international conference held in the Peace Palace (The Hague) on the occasion of the Centenary of this institution, which opened its doors on the eve of World War I. The volume offers the reflections of the leading experts attending the conference and the open debate which followed. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919, the mother of all peace treaties, is the first to be critically discussed. How should this treaty be viewed with the knowledge of today? What are the lessons learned in the light of historic developments? Subsequently, the Dayton Agreement, which sealed the end to the bloody conflict in the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995), and the Sudan Agreement, which came into being after lengthy negotiations in 2005, are analysed in the same way. Finally, the situations which arose in relation to the devastating wars between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988) and between Kuwait and Iraq are discussed. As these states could not reach a settlement themselves, the United Nations Security Council imposed the terms of the ceasefire and peaceful cooperation in important and innovative resolutions. The book offers additional perspective by looking at the role of judicial settlement by the International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration, vis-a-vis the instrument of political mediation between states with the help of a third party. Mediation can be very effective, but certain conditions are required for it to be successful, conditions which are not easy to bring about in today’s world. Dispute settlement under international law is and continues to be the core business in the Peace Palace.




Peace Treaties and International Law in European History


Book Description

In the formation of the modern law of nations, peace treaties played a pivotal role. Many basic principles and rules that governed and still govern relations between states were introduced and elaborated in the great peace treaties from the Renaissance onwards. Nevertheless, until recently few scholars have studied these primary sources of the law of nations from a juridical perspective. In this edited collection, specialists from all over Europe, including legal and diplomatic historians, international lawyers and an International Relations theorist, analyse peace treaty practice from the late fifteenth century to the Peace of Versailles of 1919. Important emphasis is given to the doctrinal debate about peace treaties and the influence of older, Roman and medieval concepts on modern practices. This book goes back further in time beyond the epochal Peace of Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 and this broader perspective allows for a reassessment of the role of the sovereign state in the modern international legal order.




A Peace Treaty in the Making


Book Description




A Bitter Peace


Book Description

Demonstrating the centrality of diplomacy in the Vietnam War, Pierre Asselin traces the secret negotiations that led up to the Paris Agreement of 1973, which ended America's involvement but failed to bring peace in Vietnam. Because the two sides signed the agreement under duress, he argues, the peace it promised was doomed to unravel. By January of 1973, the continuing military stalemate and mounting difficulties on the domestic front forced both Washington and Hanoi to conclude that signing a vague and largely unworkable peace agreement was the most expedient way to achieve their most pressing objectives. For Washington, those objectives included the release of American prisoners, military withdrawal without formal capitulation, and preservation of American credibility in the Cold War. Hanoi, on the other hand, sought to secure the removal of American forces, protect the socialist revolution in the North, and improve the prospects for reunification with the South. Using newly available archival sources from Vietnam, the United States, and Canada, Asselin reconstructs the secret negotiations, highlighting the creative roles of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and Saigon in constructing the final settlement.




The Unknown Peace Agreement


Book Description

The “Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States,” signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by the Chiefs of State or Government of all the countries which participated in World War Two in Europe, is the closest document we will ever have to a true “peace treaty” concluding World War II in Europe. In his new book, retired United States Ambassador John Maresca, who led the American participation in the negotiations, explains how this document was quietly negotiated following the reunification of Germany and in view of Soviet interest in normalizing their relations with Europe. With the reunification of Germany which had just taken place it was, for the first time since the end of the war, possible to have a formal agreement that the war was over, and the countries concerned were all gathering for a summit-level signing ceremony in Paris. With Gorbachev interested in more positive relations with Europe, and with the formal reunification of Germany, such an agreement was — for the first time — possible. All the leaders coming to the Paris summit had an interest in a formal conclusion to the War, and this gave impetus for the negotiators in Vienna to draft a document intended to normalize relations among them. The Joint Declaration was negotiated carefully, and privately, among the Ambassadors representing the countries which had participated, in one way or another, in World War Two in Europe, and the resulting document -- the “Joint Declaration” — was signed, at the summit level, at the Elysée Palace in Paris. But it was overshadowed at the time by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe — signed at the same signature event — and has remained un-noticed since then. No one could possibly have foreseen that the USSR would be dissolved about one year later, making it impossible to negotiate a more formal treaty to close World War II in Europe. The “Joint Declaration” thus remains the closest document the world will ever see to a formal “Peace Treaty” concluding World War Two in Europe. It was signed by all the Chiefs of State or Government of all the countries which participated in World War II in Europe.




Making Peace


Book Description

Fifteen minutes before five o'clock on Good Friday, 1998, Senator George Mitchell was informed that his long and difficult quest for an Irish peace accord had succeeded--the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland, and the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, would sign the agreement. Now Mitchell, who served as independent chairman of the peace talks for the length of the process, tells us the inside story of the grueling road to this momentous accord. For more than two years, Mitchell, who was Senate majority leader under Presidents Bush and Clinton, labored to bring together parties whose mutual hostility--after decades of violence and mistrust--seemed insurmountable: Sinn Fein, represented by Gerry Adams; the Catholic moderates, led by John Hume; the majority Protestant party, headed by David Trimble; Ian Paisley's hard-line unionists; and, not least, the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, headed by Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair. The world watched as the tense and dramatic process unfolded, sometimes teetering on the brink of failure. Here, for the first time, we are given a behind-the-scenes view of the principal players--the personalities who shaped the process--and of the contentious, at times vitriolic, proceedings. We learn how, as the deadline approached, extremist violence and factional intransigence almost drove the talks to collapse. And we witness the intensity of the final negotiating session, the interventions of Ahern and Blair, the late-night phone calls from President Clinton, a last-ditch attempt at disruption by Paisley, and ultimately an agreement that, despite subsequent inflammatory acts aimed at destroying it, has set Northern Ireland's future on track toward a more lasting peace.







Making War and Building Peace


Book Description

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.