After The Cold War


Book Description

This is a text on the traditional questions of nuclear deterrence and the unconventional answers suggested by the emerging new world order. These widely-ranging essays by scholars, policymakers and moral philosophers present rival ideas about the morality of alternative means for preserving mutual security as the world moves beyond the Cold War.




Nuclear Strategy and World Order


Book Description

The current U.S. nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war. The Reagan administration strategy rejects minimum deterrence and prepares for a nuclear war that might be protracted and controlled. The strategy reflects the understanding that a combination of counterforce targeting, crises location of urban populations, and ballistic missile defense could make nuclear war purposeful and tolerable. The strategy includes five unwarranted assumptions: (1) the Soviets might decide to launch a limited first strike on the United States or its allies; (2) the USSR is more likely to be deterred by the threat of limited U.S. counterforce reprisals than by the threat of overwhelming, total nuclear retaliation; (3) victory is possible in a superpower nuclear war; (4) a counterforce nuclear strategy can be undertaken without compromising the prospects of vertical and horizontal arms control; and (5) peace can be maintained indefinitely via nuclear deterrence. According to the author, Reagan administration strategy must be reversed, and an alternative strategy should be pursued. The United States needs to seek a comprehensive test ban, renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, and institute additional weapon free zones. (Author/NE)




Return to Cold War


Book Description

The 2014 crisis in Ukraine sent a tottering U.S.-Russian relationship over a cliff - a dangerous descent into deep mistrust, severed ties, and potential confrontation reminiscent of the Cold War period. In this incisive new analysis, leading expert on Soviet and Russian foreign policy, Robert Legvold, explores in detail this qualitatively new phase in a relationship that has alternated between hope and disappointment for much of the past two decades. Tracing the long and tortured path leading to this critical juncture, he contends that the recent deterioration of Russia-U.S. relations deserves to be understood as a return to cold war with great and lasting consequences. In drawing out the commonalities between the original cold war and the current confrontation, Return to Cold War brings a fresh perspective to what is happening between the two countries, its broader significance beyond the immediate issues of the day, and how political leaders in both countries might adjust their approaches in order, as the author urges, to make this new cold war "as short and shallow as possible."




Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence


Book Description

Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.




Nuclear Strategy in the New World Order


Book Description

For 50 years, the US depended on its nuclear arsenal to provide the underpinning to the deterrent aspect of its military strategy. However, on September 11, 2001, three of four hijacked civilian aircraft successfully completed their suicide missions against high value targets in the United States-the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. US military might, to include its overwhelming nuclear arsenal, failed to deter the terrorists who killed nearly 3000 people, most of whom were Americans. Although the US nuclear force structure, policy and strategy have thus far deterred a nuclear attack on the US, it is not properly postured as a viable deterrent against asymmetric attacks. However, given the proper force structure, policy and strategy, the US nuclear arsenal could provide a greater degree of deterrence against such attacks in the future. This paper will first briefly describe the strategy of deterrence and its underpinnings in basic psychology. Second, it will briefly overview the deterrence strategy of the Cold War and highlight the findings of the Nuclear Posture Review that will serve as the foundation of the Bush nuclear strategy. Next, this paper will consider the ethical issues surrounding the use of nuclear weapons, as both a deterrent and a combat weapon. Finally, the paper will analyze US nuclear strategy and make policy recommendations for using nuclear weapons as part of a deterrent strategy against future asymmetric attacks.




The Paradox of Power


Book Description

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.




Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century


Book Description

Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors.




Arms and Influence


Book Description

“This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new introduction to the work shows how Schelling’s framework—conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction—still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.