An Analysis of the Profitability of Major Defense Aerospace Contractors


Book Description

This study is a comparative analysis between the profitability of defense and commercial aerospace business. Corporate data including profit measures and the volume of defense business were collected for a 22 year period from 1961 to 1982. The methodology uses regression analysis with the percentage of defense business and the percentage of capacity utilization within the aerospace industry as the explanatory variables for profit. Finally, a brief analysis of risk is included to provide a framework within which to compare these profit levels. Briefly the findings indicate; that defense contracting has, on the average, been less profitable than commercial; that contractors earn more on defense contracts during periods of increased capacity utilization, and that defense contracting involves higher risk. The author concludes that government acquisition managers must be continuously aware of the implications of these findings for individual contractors as well as for the entire defense industrial base. (Author).







Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation


Book Description

The defense sector is subject to a form of cost-based economic regulation, just as public utilities are. A set of regulations determines the price that defense contractors will receive for their products. This report describes and empirically investigates an extremely simple theory that captures an important aspect of the regulatory problem in defense contracting. The theory describes a critical difference between the regulatory problems in defense and public utilities and suggests why therefore different rules and institutions might be appropriate in each case. It also identifies several implications regarding the structuring of an optimal regulatory policy and sheds light on current policy debates over Department of Defense policy. The author empirically verifies that the incentives posited by the theory exist and are large. The theory is that profit regulation of defense contractors is structured (and necessarily must be structured) so that firms generating valuable new innovations will receive large rewards or prizes. The author attempts to establish the theoretical link between prizes and innovation and then to show that price levels induced by the current rules are large enough to make a theoretical analysis of the role of these prizes important.







Aerospace Profits Vs. Risks


Book Description




DOD Contractor Profitability 1980-1984


Book Description

The purpose of this thesis is to present appropriate comparative data on major DOD contractors and to evaluate their profitability during the period 1980-1984. The study is structured to examine two principal research questions as they apply to a sample of 49 prime DOD contractors. The first examines profitability from the macro level. i.e. the defense industry taken as a whole. The second involves an analysis of several defense contractors at the micro level, i.e. individual firms and specific business segments. The study includes a discussion of the defense perspective of the 1980's, an historical summary of DOD defense policy, a review of profit studies, and a summary of selected financial data. The study's main conclusions are that on the basis of the profitability measures selected and for the period 1980-1984, DOD prime contractors were (1) more profitable than their like-sized commercial oriented competitors and (2) on both an aggregate and segment basis, less exposed to risk.




Government Contracting


Book Description

In response to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR) to determine its adequacy, the validity of its findings, and the appropriateness of its recommendations. GAO found that: (1) DFAIR determined that contract pricing, financing, and profit policies were related and should be examined on an integrated basis; (2) the profitability of defense businesses was comparable to commercial businesses from 1970 to 1980 and from 1983 to the present; (3) although DOD reported that a 1980 change in its profit policy resulted in an unintended 0.5- to 1-percent increase in profit objectives, GAO believes that the increase was larger than 1 percent; (4) DFAIR recommended changes to the weighted guidelines to do away with the unintended increase, but profits would have actually increased 25 percent if DOD had implemented all of the recommendations; (5) achieving comparability between defense and commercial businesses will require more than a 1-percent reduction in profit objectives because actual defense business profits have been substantially greater than those DFAIR calculated; and (6) the recently established DOD interim profit policy, based on DFAIR data and analysis, will not achieve the appropriate profit reductions because it uses as a baseline the flawed data analyses contained in DFAIR.










Government Contracting


Book Description