Corruption and Norms


Book Description

This book focuses on the role of norms in the description, explanation, prediction and combat of corruption. It conceives corruption as a ubiquitous problem, constructed by specific traditions, values, norms and institutions. The chapters concentrate on the relationship between corruption and social as well as legal norms, providing comparative perspectives from different academic disciplines, theoretical and methodological backgrounds, and various country-studies. Due to the nature of social norms that are embedded in personal, local, and organizational contexts, the contributions in the volume focus in particular on the individual and institutional level of analysis (micro and meso-mechanisms). The book will be of interest to students and scholars across the fields of political science, public administration, socio-legal studies and psychology.




Models of Society and Complex Systems


Book Description

Models of Society and Complex Systems introduces readers to a variety of different mathematical tools used for modelling human behaviour and interactions, and the complex social dynamics that drive institutions, conflict, and coordination. What laws govern human affairs? How can we make sense of the complexity of societies and how do individual actions, characteristics, and beliefs interact? Social systems follow regularities which allow us to answer these questions using different mathematical approaches. This book emphasises both theory and application. It systematically introduces mathematical approaches, such as evolutionary and spatial game theory, social network analysis, agent-based modelling, and chaos theory. It provides readers with the necessary theoretical background of each toolset as well as the underlying intuition, while each chapter includes exercises and applications to real-world phenomena. By looking behind the surface of various social occurrences, the reader uncovers the reasons why social systems exhibit both cultural universals and at the same time a diversity of practices and norms to a degree that even surpasses biological variety, or why some riots turn into revolutions while others do not even make it into the news. This book is written for any scholar in the social sciences interested in studying and understanding human behaviour, social dynamics, and the complex systems of society. It does not expect readers to have a particular background apart from some elementary knowledge and affinity for mathematics.







Political Game Theory


Book Description

Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.




Modeling Bounded Rationality


Book Description

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions.In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. The Zeuthen Lecture Book series is sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.




Post Walrasian Macroeconomics


Book Description

Macroeconomics is evolving in an almost dialectic fashion. The latest evolution is the development of a new synthesis that combines insights of new classical, new Keynesian and real business cycle traditions into a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that serves as a foundation for thinking about macro policy. That new synthesis has opened up the door to a new antithesis, which is being driven by advances in computing power and analytic techniques. This new synthesis is coalescing around developments in complexity theory, automated general to specific econometric modeling, agent-based models, and non-linear and statistical dynamical models. This book thus provides the reader with an introduction to what might be called a Post Walrasian research program that is developing as the antithesis of the Walrasian DSGE synthesis.




Robust Mechanism Design


Book Description

Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.




Mathematical Reviews


Book Description




Urban Transportation Networks


Book Description