Zionism


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Self-Determination, Statehood, and the Law of Negotiation


Book Description

From the Madrid Invitation in 1991 to the introduction of the Oslo process in 1993 to the present, a negotiated settlement has remained the dominant leitmotiv of peacemaking between Israel and the Palestinian people. That the parties have chosen negotiations means that either side's failure to comply with its obligation to negotiate can result in an internationally wrongful act and, in response, countermeasures and other responses. This monograph seeks to advance our understanding of the international law of negotiation and use this as a framework for assessing the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, with the Palestinian people's unsuccessful attempt to join the United Nations as a Member State in autumn 2011 and the successful attempt to join the same institution as a non-Member Observer State in November 2012 providing a case study for this. The legal consequences of these applications are not merely of historical interest; they inform the present rights and obligations of Israel and the Palestinian people. This work fills a significant gap in the existing international law scholarship on the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, which neither engages with this means of dispute settlement generally nor does so specifically within the context of the Palestinian people's engagements with international institutions. 'Based on primary research, this book explores materials that were not analyzed before. It treats a highly political issue with scientific objectivity that strikes a balance between various points of view. The book will be an essential reading to all those involved in peace studies, international negotiations and Israeli-Palestinian conflict'. Mutaz M Qafisheh, Associate Professor of International Law, Hebron University. 'A compelling and innovative account of the legal aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: a must read.' Efraim Karsh, King's College London and Bar-Ilan University, author of Palestine Betrayed. 'A superbly imagined and executed study on Palestine that puts the 'negotiation imperative' at the heart of its narrative, fully interrogating the involvement of public international law at each step of the long and layered history that is vigorously brought to life in these pages. A study that also promises texture, nuance, and depth to the legal analysis it offers-and it delivers handsomely on each of these fronts.' -Dino Kritsiotis, Chair of Public International Law & Head of the International Humanitarian Law Unit, University of Nottingham.







United States Foreign Policy 1945-1968


Book Description

Between 1945 and 1968, the possibility of Mutual Assured Destruction led to a host of odd realities, including the creation of an affable cartoon turtle named Bert who taught millions of school children that nuclear war was survivable if they simply learned how to “duck and cover.” Meanwhile, fear of Communism played out against the backdrop of potential Armageddon to provide justification for a variety of covert operations involving regime change, political assassination, and sometimes bizarre plot twists. United States Foreign Policy 1945-1968: The Bomb, Spies, Stories, and Lies takes a fresh look at this complex, often confusing, and frequently farcical period in American and world history.




Palestine Year Book


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Personal Policy Making


Book Description

Without the Canadian mediation between the two world blocs in 1947, UN resolution 181(II) to partition Palestine would likely have failed to secure the two thirds majority necessary for adoption by the General Assembly. In fact, the Canadians were among the main initiators of the partition plan and the establishment of a Jewish state. Tauber demonstrates that this Canadian involvement was not an official government policy, but rather a private initiative of some high-ranking Canadian foreign service officials who believed partition to be the only practicable solution for the Palestine question. Thus, due to humanitarian concerns, these officials followed an independent policy against the express will of their prime minister. The results would forever change the history of the Middle East. Tauber explores this little known aspect of Canadian foreign policy. Canada's under secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, assisted by other foreign service officials, decided on his own accord which policy to follow in this instance. Based upon many original Canadian, British, American, UN, and Israeli documents, this study shows that Pearson's motivation was not the desire to make Canada a middle power involved in international affairs, as some scholars of Canadian international affairs have previously argued. Instead, the impact of the Holocaust drove these officials to break ranks with their superiors at home to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.