Biennial Budgeting


Book Description

Congress has periodically expressed interest in converting the Fed. budget process from an annual to a biennial cycle (BC). However, proposals to move to a BC raise a number of concerns. Both opponents and proponents of a BC have used states' experiences to support their positions. Currently, 23 states have all or part of their budget on a BC. This report studies the BC process of Arizona, Connecticut, and Ohio in detail. It examines how: (1) Arizona and Connecticut implemented their transition from an annual to a BC; (2) each of the 3 states budgets in the off year of its cycle, and (3) each of the states incorporates legislative oversight and program evaluation into its BC. Charts and tables.













Biennial Budgeting


Book Description

Biennial budgeting is a concept that may involve several variations, including two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and other changes in the timing of legislation related to revenue or spending. Biennial budgeting proposals may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for either a two-year period or two succeeding one-year periods in a single measure. This book discusses options, issues and previous Congressional action in biennial budgeting. The book provides background information on the annual character of the current process and a history of proposals to convert to multi-year budgeting; describes three bills that reflect different approaches to biennial budgeting; analyses the potential effects of converting from annual to biennial budgeting; discusses the federal budget process; and examines challenges and proposals for adopting a long-term budget focus.




Biennial Budgeting


Book Description




Budget Issues


Book Description




Biennial Budgeting: Three States' Experiences


Book Description

Members of the Congress periodically have expressed interest in converting the federal budget process from an annual to a biennial cycle. These proposals stem in part from frustration over the amount of time spent on the annual budget and appropriations process and the feeling that budget-related actions are both endless and repetitive. Some in the Congress feel that the time spent on these activities has come at the expense of congressional oversight and authorization responsibilities. A biennial budget cycle has been advocated as a way to advance several objectives: (1) provide more focused time for congressional oversight and authorization activities by streamlining the congressional budget process, (2) shift the allocation of agency officials' time from the preparation of budget documents to improved financial management and analysis of program effectiveness, and (3) provide federal managers and state and local recipients of federal funds more certainty in funding over the longer 2- year period. However, proposals to move to a biennial budget cycle raise a number of concerns. To better understand the states' perspectives, it was requested that the General Accounting Office study the biennial budget processes of Arizona, Connecticut, and Ohio in detail. Arizona and Connecticut were selected because they are the only two states that have converted to biennial budgeting in the last 10 years. Ohio was included because among the five states with the highest general fund expenditures, it is the only one that has both a biennial budget process and a legislature that meets annually. In addition, Ohio has been cited as a successful model by advocates of biennial budgeting.




Biennial Budgeting


Book Description

Proponents of biennial budgeting have generally advanced three arguments-that a two-year budget cycle would (1) reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual review of routine matters; (2) reserve the second session of each Congress for improved congressional oversight and program review; and (3) allow better long-term planning by the agencies that spend federal funds at the federal, state, or local level.




The Impact of Shifting from an Annual Federal Budget Cycle to a Biennial Budget Cycle


Book Description

This paper uses a public choice framework to consider the impact of Congressional adoption of a biennial federal budget. The introductory chapters detail the evolution of the current Congressional annual budget and explain how budgetary institutions affect the power structures inside Congress. The relevant public choice literature on budgetary institutions is also explored. Proponents of biennial budgeting argue that changing to a biennial process will provide several benefits to Congress: reduced discretionary spending through more Congressional control over the process, more time for oversight of programs, and greater transparency. Chapter 3 constructs a model of state spending to examine the relationship between budget periodicity and spending by constructing a model of state spending. In contrast to most of the literature on budget periodicity, this chapter finds a positive relationship between spending and biennial budgets. Chapter 4 conducts two case studies of states that have recently moved from annual budgeting to biennial budgeting to determine how the changes affected the influence and power of Appropriators relative to Authorizers. Anecdotal evidence from Connecticut suggests Appropriators' influence is negatively affected by a move to a two-year budget. Campaign contribution evidence from Arizona confirms that interest groups perceive this reduction in the power of Appropriators and, accordingly, donate less to Appropriators relative to Authorizers following a shift to biennial budgeting. Chapter 5 considers whether timing and transparency problems under an annual budget are technical issues that could be cured by extending the budget period and finds that instead these problems the political realities facing legislators. Thus, changing the budget period will not fix these issues and may exacerbate them. This dissertation finds that moving to a federal biennial budget process would increase the pressure on Congressional budgeters to spend, shift power away from Appropriators, and not solve timing and transparency problems in the federal budget.