Book Description

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Army's assessment of its light infantry division operational concept and organizational design, focusing on the: (1) standards the Army used; (2) deficiencies it identified; (3) solutions it proposed; (4) Army's plans to resolve remaining deficiencies; and (5) implications of the evaluation results for light infantry divisions. GAO found that the Army evaluation: (1) covered combat, combat-support, and combat service-support operations; (2) identified 27 significant deficiencies involving equipment needs, organizational structure, weapons, doctrine, and training; (3) recommended about 4,000 changes to the division's equipment and personnel; (4) did not test the support demands placed on non-divisional units or the capability of newly formed non-divisional units to meet the division's requirements; and (5) did not test the deployment capability of divisions partially or totally composed of reservists. GAO also found that the Army: (1) accepted about 2,000 of the evaluation recommendations and rejected the rest as inappropriate or unrealistic; (2) plans to test the division changes during regular training and testing programs; and (3) is currently unable to equip all five of its light infantry divisions in accordance with the approved design because of equipment shortages.