Economic Development


Book Description

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent agency that works for Congress. The GAO watches over Congress, and investigates how the federal government spends taxpayers dollars. The Comptroller General of the United States is the leader of the GAO, and is appointed to a 15-year term by the U.S. President. The GAO wants to support Congress, while at the same time doing right by the citizens of the United States. They audit, investigate, perform analyses, issue legal decisions and report anything that the government is doing. This is one of their reports.







Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States - Report to President Trump


Book Description

This excellent report was released in October 2018. America's manufacturing and defense industrial base ("the industrial base") supports economic prosperity and global competitiveness, and arms the military with capabilities to defend the nation. Currently, the industrial base faces an unprecedented set of challenges: sequestration and uncertainty of government spending; the decline of critical markets and suppliers; unintended consequences of U.S. Government acquisition behavior; aggressive industrial policies of competitor nations; and the loss of vital skills in the domestic workforce. Combined, these challenges - or macro forces - erode the capabilities of the manufacturing and defense industrial base and threaten the Department of Defense's (DoD) ability to be ready for the "fight tonight," and to retool for great power competition. The following report explains the macro forces impacting the industrial base, identifies primary categories of risk, illustrates impacts within sectors, and provides recommendations for mitigation.I. Executive Summary * II. Introduction * III. Methodology * IV. An Overview of America's Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base * V. Five Macro Forces Driving Risk into America's Industrial Base * VI. Ten Risk Archetypes Threatening America's Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base * VII. A Blueprint for Action * Appendix One: Executive Order 13806 * Appendix Two: Sector Summaries * Appendix Three: Contributing U.S. Government Agencies * Appendix Four: U.S. Government Sources * Appendix Five: Industry Listening Sessions * Appendix Six: Agreements with Foreign GovernmentsTo provide for our national security, America's manufacturing and defense industrial base must be secure, robust, resilient, and ready. To ensure taxpayer dollars are frugally and wisely spent, the defense industrial base must be cost-effective, cost-efficient, highly productive, and not unduly subsidized. In the event of contingencies, the industrial base must possess sufficient surge capabilities. Above all, America's manufacturing and defense industrial base must support economic prosperity, be globally competitive, and have the capabilities and capacity to rapidly innovate and arm our military with the lethality and dominance necessary to prevail in any conflict.All facets of the manufacturing and defense industrial base are currently under threat, at a time when strategic competitors and revisionist powers appear to be growing in strength and capability.




GAO Documents


Book Description

Catalog of reports, decisions and opinions, testimonies and speeches.




Defense Industrial Planning for a Surge in Military Demand


Book Description

Analyzes the capability of the lower tiers (the subcontractors and suppliers) of the industrial base to surge production of defense-related output in time of crisis. Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP) currently used by the Department of Defense (DOD) to measure and plan industrial capability is ineffective. A more productive approach would involve (1) surge demand analysis, (2) lower tier industrial activity overview, and (3) collection and analysis of data on potentially critical industries. This overview indicates that the lower tiers could significantly increase production of defense-related output in a year. Nonferrous forgings, semiconductors, and optical instruments were investigated using a data-gathering instrument that DOD could adopt as the third step in this new approach. In these industries current defense producers could double their defense-related output in a year's time and noncurrent defense producers could undertake some defense production within six months. The most critical determinants of the feasibility of surge are the availability of labor and capital, particularly skilled labor.




Lifeline in Danger


Book Description

Conclusions include: 1) It would be a mistake for the U.S. to seek complete independence for its defense industrial base; 2) Government, industry, and labor all share in the blame for the raging 'adversarial relationship' that exists, but the greater degree of fault is the government's; 3) The problem transcends the Department of Defense and the defense industry; 4) Without stability in the defense acquisition and budgeting process, no real solution is possible; 5) Any solution that works will be expensive; 6) The Defense Industrial Base is not just the prime contractors; 7) Producibility is crucial; 8) The nation needs an 'attitude check'; 9) American industry deserves better support than it has been getting from American government. Recommendations include: 1) A Presidential Commission---on the order of the Packard and Scowcroft Commissions---should be appointed to chart a course; 2) DoD should begin now, before the Commission starts its work, to gather crucial information that does not presently exist; 3) The Commission should re-examine the field of incentives and disincentives in defense production and plan reform of the tangled network of laws and regulations that have led us to the current condition; 4) Avoid hasty legislation; 5) DoD should adopt a more objective stance in its dealings with the defense industry; 6) Prime contractors should nurture the supplier-contractor base.




Manufacturing Technology


Book Description

The U.S. defense industrial base is deteriorating. Long lead times to procure weapon systems, high costs, uncertain quality, and dependence on procurement of electronic components from other countries are symptoms of a decline in the capability of the U.S. defense industrial base. A primary cause of this decline is the failure of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its contractors in the U.S. defense industry to invest sufficiently in manufacturing technology. The lack of investment reflects DOD's history of concentrating its resources and attention on product technology rather than process technology. As we described in our initial report, The Role of the Department of Defense in Supporting Manufacturing Technology Development, existing procurement policies and regulations do not provide sufficient investment incentives to contractors. Therefore, direct funding for some manufacturing technology development will have to be provided by DOD.