Auctions in the Electricity Market


Book Description

Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.




Electricity Auctions


Book Description

Electricity-contract auctions have been getting increased attention as they have emerged as a successful mechanism to procure new generation capacity and. This book presents a comprehensive overview of international experiences in auction design and implementation.




Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation


Book Description

`Electric energy must be treated as a commodity which can be bought, sold, and traded, taking into account its time- and space-varying values and costs.` Spot Pricing of Electricity, Schweppe et al, 1988. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation outlines the application of auction methods for all aspects of power system operation, primarily for a competitive environment. A complete description of the industry structure as well as the various markets now being formed is given. A thorough introduction to auction basics is included to explain how auctions have grown in other industries. Auction methods are compared to classical techniques for power system analysis, operations, and planning. The traditional applications of economic dispatch, optimal power flow and unit commitment are compared to auction mechanisms. Algorithms for auctions using linearized power flow equations, DC power flow equations, and AC power flow equations are included. The bundling of supportive services, known as ancillary services within the United States, is discussed. Extensions to the basic auction algorithms for inclusion of supportive services as well as algorithms for scheduling and bidding on generation for GENCOs or independent power producers are presented. Algorithms for scheduling and contracting with customers are also presented for energy service companies. An introduction to the various commodity and financial market products includes the use of futures and options for GENCOs. The material is useful for students performing research on the new business environment based on competition. Regulators will find information on initial methods of designing and evaluating market systems, and power exchange and financial analysts will find information on the interdependence of markets and power system-based techniques for risk management. This information compares the new business environment solutions with old business environment solutions. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation provides a first introduction to how electricity will be traded as a commodity in the future.




Competitive Electricity Markets


Book Description

After 2 decades, policymakers and regulators agree that electricity market reform, liberalization and privatization remains partly art. Moreover, the international experience suggests that in nearly all cases, initial market reform leads to unintended consequences or introduces new risks, which must be addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms. Competitive Electricity Markets describes the evolution of the market reform process including a number of challenging issues such as infrastructure investment, resource adequacy, capacity and demand participation, market power, distributed generation, renewable energy and global climate change. Sequel to Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective in the same series published in 2006 Contributions from renowned scholars and practitioners on significant electricity market design and implementation issues Covers timely topics on the evolution of electricity market liberalization worldwide







Local Electricity Markets


Book Description

Local Electricity Markets introduces the fundamental characteristics, needs, and constraints shaping the design and implementation of local electricity markets. It addresses current proposed local market models and lessons from their limited practical implementation. The work discusses relevant decision and informatics tools considered important in the implementation of local electricity markets. It also includes a review on management and trading platforms, including commercially available tools. Aspects of local electricity market infrastructure are identified and discussed, including physical and software infrastructure. It discusses the current regulatory frameworks available for local electricity market development internationally. The work concludes with a discussion of barriers and opportunities for local electricity markets in the future. - Delineates key components shaping the design and implementation of local electricity market structure - Provides a coherent view on the enabling infrastructures and technologies that underpin local market expansion - Explores the current regulatory environment for local electricity markets drawn from a global panel of contributors - Exposes future paths toward widespread implementation of local electricity markets using an empirical review of barriers and opportunities - Reviews relevant local electricity market case studies, pilots and demonstrators already deployed and under implementation




Economics of Electricity


Book Description

Explains the economics of electricity at each step of the supply chain: production, transportation and distribution, and retail.




A Practical Guide to E-auctions for Procurement


Book Description

WINNER: 2021 Plume d'Or - Grand Prix ACA-Bruel Award. A Practical Guide to E-Auctions for Procurement provides guidance to procurement professionals on how to realize the potential of e-auctions. Now is the time to optimize your e-negotiation strategy using key insights from the author Jacob Gorm Larsen, who is responsible for one of the most successful and award-winning e-sourcing programs in the world. A Practical Guide to E-Auctions for Procurement presents a proven process for developing an e-auction and e-negotiation strategy, along with a catalogue of change management initiatives for securing buy-in internally in the organization. The different e-auction formats and benefits are explained in detail and demonstrated with practical examples, templates and advice that can be adopted by the reader. Jacob and the team at Maersk are at the forefront when it comes to developing robots that execute e-auctions from end-to-end and are kicking off a transformation that will fundamentally change how we consider e-auctions and negotiations. In addition, with learnings from more than 10,000 e-auctions globally, this is the book for those in procurement looking to implement, deliver and maintain a thriving e-auction program.




Putting Auction Theory to Work


Book Description

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.




Discovering Prices


Book Description

Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.