British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954-1973


Book Description

In 1962 Dean Acheson famously described Britain as having lost an Empire but not yet found a role. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the realms of nuclear weapons. An increasingly marginal world power, successive post-war British governments felt that an independent nuclear deterrent was essential if the country was to remain at the top table of world diplomacy. Focusing on a key twenty-year period, this study explores Britain's role in efforts to bring about a nuclear test ban treaty between 1954 and 1973. Taking a broadly chronological approach, it examines the nature of defence planning, the scientific goals that nuclear tests were designed to secure, Anglo-American relationships, the efficacy of British diplomacy and its contribution to arms control and disarmament. A key theme of the study is to show how the UK managed to balance the conflicting pressures created by its determination to remain a credible nuclear power whilst wanting to pursue disarmament objectives, and how these pressures shifted over the period in question. Based on a wealth of primary sources this book opens up the largely ignored subject of the impact of arms control on the UK nuclear weapons programme. Its appraisal of the relationship between the requirements and developments of the UK nuclear weapons programme against international and domestic pressures for a test ban treaty will be of interest to anyone studying post-war British defence and foreign policy, history of science, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and international relations. It also provides important background information on current events involving nuclear proliferation and disarmament.




British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954-73


Book Description

Focusing on a key twenty year period, this study explores Britain's role in efforts to bring about a nuclear test ban treaty between 1954 and 1973. Taking a broadly chronological approach, it examines the nature of defence planning, Anglo-American relationships, the efficacy of British diplomacy and UK contributions to arms control and disarmament. The appraisal of the relationship between the requirements and developments of the UK nuclear weapons programme against the countervailing international and domestic pressures for a test ban treaty will be of interest to anyone studying post-war British defence and foreign policy, history of science, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation and international relations, or who is looking for background information on current events involving nuclear proliferation and disarmament.




British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban


Book Description

This book provides an overview of how the UK tried to maintain and modernize its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons during 1974-82, whilst also pursuing a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The core question addressed in the book is how a test ban treaty would impact on the reliability and safety of the UK’s nuclear weapons and how this would constrain and limit efforts to secure a comprehensive treaty that would prohibit nuclear testing indefinitely. An added complication lay in the fact that a ban treaty could also prevent or limit the UK’s ability to test new warhead designs to replace its existing tactical nuclear weapons and a new strategic successor system to Polaris. How all of this played out between 1974 and 1982, when the UK announced its decision to acquire Trident and the US decided that a test ban treaty was no longer in its security interests, is discussed. A detailed review, based on the available materials in the UK National Archives, also looks at the aims and objectives of UK nuclear tests in Nevada and on the decisions taken on the Chevaline warhead and its Trident replacement. The book also considers whether there was a far greater threat to the UK nuclear programme from shortages of skilled craftsmen and industrial action at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston than from a test ban treaty. It also looks at whether nuclear defence trumped arms control objectives during this period. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and Cold War History.




United States Nuclear Tests


Book Description

This document lists chronologically and alphabetically by name all nuclear tests and simultaneous detonations conducted by the United States from July 1945 through September 1992. Two nuclear weapons that the United States exploded over Japan ending World War II are not listed. These detonations were not "tests" in the sense that they were conducted to prove that the weapon would work as designed (as was the first test near Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 16, 1945), or to advance nuclear weapon design, or to determine weapons effects, or to verify weapon safety as were the more than one thousand tests that have taken place since June 30,1946. The nuclear weapon (nicknamed "Little Boy") dropped August 6,1945 from a United States Army Air Force B-29 bomber (the Enola Gay) and detonated over Hiroshima, Japan had an energy yield equivalent to that of 15,000 tons of TNT. The nuclear weapon (virtually identical to "Fat Man") exploded in a similar fashion August 9, 1945 over Nagaski, Japan had a yield of 21,000 tons of TNT. Both detonations were intended to end World War II as quickly as possible. Data on United States tests were obtained from, and verified by, the U.S. Department of Energy's three weapons laboratories -- Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California; and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico; and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Additionally, data were obtained from public announcements issued by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and its successors, the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, and the U.S. Department of Energy, respectively.




Secrecy, Public Relations and the British Nuclear Debate


Book Description

This book constitutes an original archival history of government secrecy, public relations and the debate surrounding nuclear weapons in Britain from 1970 to 1983. The book contrasts the secrecy and near-silence of the Heath, Wilson and Callaghan governments on nuclear issues in the 1970s with the increasingly vocal case made for the possession of nuclear weapons by the first Thatcher government following a shift in approach in 1980. This shift occurred against a background of rising Cold War tensions and a growing public nuclear debate in the UK. The book seeks to contextualise and explain this transformation, considering the role of party politics, structures and personalities inside the government, and external influences: notably the role of investigative journalists and think tanks in cracking open official secrecy and demanding justification for Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons, and the peace movement in driving increasingly assertive public relations from 1980. The book draws on material from archives and interviews with key figures involved to provide an original and engaging account. It argues that this process of opening up saw significant disclosure of nuclear policy for the first time, and the most extensive public justification of the British nuclear capability to date, which has shaped public understanding of British nuclear weapons into the twenty-first century. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War studies, nuclear politics and security studies.




British Nuclear Culture


Book Description

The advent of the atomic bomb, the social and cultural impact of nuclear science, and the history of the British nuclear state after 1945 is a complex and contested story. British Nuclear Culture is an important survey that offers a new interpretation of the nuclear century by tracing the tensions between 'official' and 'unofficial' nuclear narratives in British culture. In this book, Jonathan Hogg argues that nuclear culture was a pervasive and persistent aspect of British life, particularly in the years following 1945. This idea is illustrated through detailed analysis of various primary source materials, such as newspaper articles, government files, fictional texts, film, music and oral testimonies. The book introduces unfamiliar sources to students of nuclear and cold war history, and offers in-depth and critical reflections on the expanding historiography in this area of research. Chronologically arranged, British Nuclear Culture reflects upon, and returns to, a number of key themes throughout, including nuclear anxiety, government policy, civil defence, 'nukespeak' and nuclear subjectivity, individual experience, protest and resistance, and the influence of the British nuclear state on everyday life. The book contains illustrations, individual case studies, a select bibliography, a timeline, and a list of helpful online resources for students of nuclear history.




The Surveillance Imperative


Book Description

Surveillance is a key notion for understanding power and control in the modern world, but it has been curiously neglected by historians of science and technology. Using the overarching concept of the "surveillance imperative," this collection of essays offers a new window on the evolution of the environmental sciences during and after the Cold War.




The Sword and the Shield


Book Description

Kristan Stoddart reveals for the first time discussions that took place between the British, French and US governments for nuclear cooperation in the early to mid 1970s. In doing so it sets the scene for the upgrade to Britain's Polaris force codenamed Chevaline and how this could have brought down Harold Wilson's Labour government of 1974-1976.




Britain and Disarmament


Book Description

Since the use of poison gas during the First World War and the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan at the end of the Second World War, nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons have registered high on the fears of governments and individuals alike. Recognising both the particular horror of these weapons, and their potential for inflicting mass death and destruction, much effort has been expended in finding ways to eliminate such weapons on a multi-lateral level. Based on extensive official archives, this book looks at how successive British governments approached the subject of control and disarmament between 1956 and 1975. This period reflects the UK's landmark decision in 1956 to abandon its offensive chemical weapons programme (a decision that was reversed in 1963, but never fully implemented), and ends with the internal travails over the possible use of CR (tear gas) in Northern Ireland. Whilst the issue of nuclear arms control has been much debated, the integration of biological and chemical weapons into the wider disarmament picture is much less well understood, there being no clear statement by the UK authorities for much of the period under review in this book as to whether the country even possessed such weapons or had an active research and development programme. Through a thorough exploration of government records the book addresses fundamental questions relating to the history of NBC weapons programmes, including the military, economic and political pressures that influenced policy; the degree to which the UK was a reluctant or enthusiastic player on the international arms control stage; and the effect of international agreements on Britain's weapons programmes. In exploring these issues, the study provides the first attempt to assess UK NBC arms control policy and practice during the Cold War.




Nuclear Command and Control Norms


Book Description

This book offers a new analytical framework for studying nuclear command and control (C2), based on a comparative study of four nuclear weapons states (NWS). The subject of nuclear operations management has long been shrouded in secrecy, and whilst the importance of nuclear C2 cannot be disputed, there are few academic studies into how and why states develop these systems. This volume includes a comparative study of the development of nuclear C2 by four different NWS (Britain, China, India, and Pakistan) and demonstrates that, despite several differences, there is a central set of factors that remain constant. The analytical framework used in this study identifies key factors that can potentially shape the evolution and stability of nuclear C2. These factors include geostrategic (threat) environment, international norms, leadership, and control of nuclear operations (civil-military control). The book also analyses the interaction among different stakeholders within the nuclear C2 enterprise. It recognises that politicians, the military and scientists all have key but different roles to play, and the way these stakeholders have learned to co-exist with each other is explored. This volume offers a set of dynamics that could form a global norm for nuclear C2, serving as a standard for new entrants into the nuclear club. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, and International Relations in general.