Unelected Power


Book Description

Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.




Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence


Book Description

This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.




Central Bank Independence


Book Description

By engaging in an ethnography of the social text of German, European and USA monetary affairs, this book introduces a new analytical framework that will enable practitioners and academics, particularly within sociology, economics, political economy, and political science, to gain a clear understanding of the role of culture in central banking.




Central Bank Independence and the Future of the Euro


Book Description

Over the past decade central banks have taken on new and expanded roles in an attempt to manage the global financial crisis. Panicos Demetriades, former governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus during the country's bailout in 2013, examines the role of the ECB and its adoption of these new powers.




Monetary Economics


Book Description

Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.




Banking on Reform


Book Description

Banking on Reform examines the political determinants of recent reforms to monetary policy institutions in the industrial democracies. With these reforms, political parties have sought to draw on the political credibility of an independent central bank to cope with electoral consequences of economic internalization and deindustrialization. New Zealand and Italy made the initial efforts to grant their central banks independence. More recently, France, Spain, Britain, and Sweden have reformed their central banks' independence. Additionally, members of the European Union have implemented a single currency, with an independent European central bank to administer monetary policy. Banking on Reform stresses the politics surrounding the choice of these institutions, specifically the motivations of political parties. Where intraparty conflicts have threatened the party's ability to hold office, politicians have adopted an independent central bank. Where political parties have been secluded from the political consequences of economic change, reform has been thwarted or delayed. The drive toward a single currency also reflects these political concerns. By delegating monetary policy to the European level, politicians in the member states removed a potentially divisive issue from the domestic political agenda, allowing parties to rebuild their support constructed on the basis of other issues. William T. Bernhard provides a variety of evidence to support his argument, such as in-depth case accounts of recent central bank reforms in Italy and Britain, the role of the German Bundesbank in the policy process, and the adoption of the single currency in Europe. Additionally, he utilizes quantitative and statistical tests to enhance his argument. This book will appeal to political scientists, economists, and other social scientists interested in the political and institutional consequences of economic globalization. William T. Bernhard is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.




Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics


Book Description

Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.




Central Bank Independence and the Legacy of the German Past


Book Description

The 2008 financial crisis led to more and more frequent political attacks on central banks. The recent spotlight on central bank independence is reminiscent of the fiery debates amongst Germany's political elites in 1949 on the same issue; debates that were sparked by the establishment of West Germany in that year. Simon Mee shows how, with the establishment of West Germany's central bank - today's Deutsche Bundesbank - the country's monetary history became a political football, as central bankers, politicians, industrialists and trade unionists all vied for influence over the legal provisions that set out the remit of the future monetary authority. The author reveals how a specific version of inter-war history, one that stresses the lessons learned from Germany's periods of inflation, was weaponised and attached to a political, contemporary argument for an independent central bank. The book challenges assumptions around the evolution of central bank independence with continued relevance today.




Central Banks' Independence in Historical Perspective


Book Description

Deals with the antonomy of monetary authorities: the case of the US. Federal Reserve System; relations between monetary authorities and government institutions: the case of Germany, France, and Italy.




Central Bank Independence


Book Description