Author : Oliver D. Hart
Publisher :
Page : 72 pages
File Size : 45,33 MB
Release : 1997
Category : Debt
ISBN :
We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract -- specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment -- under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (non-debt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.
Author : Erika Jorgensen
Publisher :
Page : 108 pages
File Size : 44,95 MB
Release : 1988
Category : Bonds
ISBN :
This paper examines the patterns of defaults, renegotiations, and final settlements on foreign borrowing of several Latin American governments in the interwar period. One goal of the paper is to provide a detailed historical account of the borrowing and renegotiation experience of five Latin borrowers (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Peru). Another goal is to provide a quantitative assessment of the amount of debt relief that was implicit in the negotiated settlements of the defaults that were reached in the 1930s and 1940s. In general, the pattern of default and renegotiation resulted in substantial, though not complete, debt relief, in the sense of reducing the present value of debt repayments from the sovereign borrower to the bondholders.
Author : Aikaterini Florou
Publisher : BRILL
Page : 261 pages
File Size : 20,90 MB
Release : 2020-03-02
Category : Law
ISBN : 9004407472
In Contractual Renegotiations and International Investment Arbitration, Aikaterini Florou explores the sensitive issues of renegotiating state contracts and the relationship between those contracts and the overarching international investment treaties. By introducing novel insights from economics, the author deconstructs the contract-treaty interaction, demonstrating that it is not only treaties that impact the underlying contracts, but also that those contracts have an effect on the way the open-textured treaty standards are interpreted. The originality of the argument is combined with an innovative interpretative methodology based on relational contract theory and transaction cost economics. Departing from the traditional emphasis of international lawyers on the text of investment contracts, Florou shows instead that such contracts are first and foremost “economic animals” and the theory of obsolescing bargaining does not paint a full picture of the contract-treaty interaction.
Author : Thomas Russell Lill
Publisher :
Page : 142 pages
File Size : 40,44 MB
Release : 1919
Category : Debts, Public
ISBN :
Author : Jerome E. Roos
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 413 pages
File Size : 22,24 MB
Release : 2019-02-12
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0691184933
How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries—and the dangers this poses to democracy The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece’s short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.
Author : Oliver Hart
Publisher : Clarendon Press
Page : 244 pages
File Size : 36,32 MB
Release : 1995-10-05
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0191521728
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Author : Sebastian Hohmann
Publisher : Graduate Institute Publications
Page : pages
File Size : 15,58 MB
Release : 2012-08-21
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 2940503087
What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default.
Author : J. Luis Guasch
Publisher : World Bank Publications
Page : 212 pages
File Size : 23,42 MB
Release : 2004-01-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780821357927
During the 1990s, infrastructure concessions were hailed as the solution to Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit, by combining private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. This publication examines the design and implementation of over 1,000 examples of concession contracts, in order to identify the problems that have occurred in the process. It goes on to highlight lessons to be learned for the future, in order to realise the potential benefits of infrastructure reform and to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.
Author : Boon-chye Lee
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 156 pages
File Size : 29,93 MB
Release : 2019-09-06
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1000244334
The author considers the risks that the failure of Third World economies pose for highly exposed banks, whose collapse would threaten domestic as well as international financial systems.
Author : Martín Uribe
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 646 pages
File Size : 14,68 MB
Release : 2017-04-04
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0691158770
A cutting-edge graduate-level textbook on the macroeconomics of international trade Combining theoretical models and data in ways unimaginable just a few years ago, open economy macroeconomics has experienced enormous growth over the past several decades. This rigorous and self-contained textbook brings graduate students, scholars, and policymakers to the research frontier and provides the tools and context necessary for new research and policy proposals. Martín Uribe and Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé factor in the discipline's latest developments, including major theoretical advances in incorporating financial and nominal frictions into microfounded dynamic models of the open economy, the availability of macro- and microdata for emerging and developed countries, and a revolution in the tools available to simulate and estimate dynamic stochastic models. The authors begin with a canonical general equilibrium model of an open economy and then build levels of complexity through the coverage of important topics such as international business-cycle analysis, financial frictions as drivers and transmitters of business cycles and global crises, sovereign default, pecuniary externalities, involuntary unemployment, optimal macroprudential policy, and the role of nominal rigidities in shaping optimal exchange-rate policy. Based on courses taught at several universities, Open Economy Macroeconomics is an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners. Detailed exploration of international business-cycle analysis Coverage of financial frictions as drivers and transmitters of business cycles and global crises Extensive investigation of nominal rigidities and their role in shaping optimal exchange-rate policy Other topics include fixed exchange-rate regimes, involuntary unemployment, optimal macroprudential policy, and sovereign default and debt sustainability Chapters include exercises and replication codes
