The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973


Book Description

Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.




Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations 1941-1953


Book Description

These annotated documents give an insight into the relationship between the Soviet Union and Palestine/Israel from 1941 to 1953. Most of the documents appear here for the first time - declassified and published in accordance with a bilateral agreement between Israel and Russia.




Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-1967


Book Description

An |sraeli Ambassador's account of the longest and most tense period in Israeli-Soviet diplomatic relations, from their renewal in 1953 to their severance in 1967. His work analyses the era from the month preceding Stalin's death to the weeks following the Six Day War - one of severance, resumption and then severance again- along two parallel processes.




The Limits of Detente


Book Description

In the first book-length analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of détente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War détente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, Daigle shows, the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. Daigle further argues that as détente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.–Soviet relations.




Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration


Book Description

This is a collection of Soviet documents relating to the struggle for Jewish emigration. They reveal those aspects of the problem which most preoccupied the leadership and the factors which had the greatest impact on the decision-making process.




Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-1967


Book Description

An |sraeli Ambassador's account of the longest and most tense period in Israeli-Soviet diplomatic relations, from their renewal in 1953 to their severance in 1967. His work analyses the era from the month preceding Stalin's death to the weeks following the Six Day War - one of severance, resumption and then severance again- along two parallel processes.




The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War


Book Description

Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.




The Unspoken Alliance


Book Description

Prior to the Six-Day War, Israel was a darling of the international left, vocally opposed to apartheid and devoted to building alliances with black leaders in newly independent African nations. South Africa, for its part, was controlled by a regime of Afrikaner nationalists who had enthusiastically supported Hitler during World War II. But after Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories in 1967, the country found itself estranged from former allies and threatened anew by old enemies. As both states became international pariahs, a covert—and lucrative—military relationship blossomed between these seemingly unlikely allies. Based on extensive archival research and exclusive interviews with former generals and high-level government officials in both countries, The Unspoken Alliance tells a troubling story of Cold War paranoia, moral compromises, and startling secrets.