Economic and Political Aspects of International Cartels
Author : Corwin D. Edwards
Publisher :
Page : 94 pages
File Size : 25,44 MB
Release : 1946
Category : Trusts, Industrial
ISBN :
Author : Corwin D. Edwards
Publisher :
Page : 94 pages
File Size : 25,44 MB
Release : 1946
Category : Trusts, Industrial
ISBN :
Author : United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs
Publisher :
Page : 98 pages
File Size : 22,25 MB
Release : 1944
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Debora L. Spar
Publisher : Cornell University Press
Page : 306 pages
File Size : 41,4 MB
Release : 1994
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780801426582
From these four cases she builds a picture of cooperation that departs significantly from the conventional portrayal and that has wide ramifications for our understanding of cooperation among states as well as among firms.
Author : Ervin Paul Hexner
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 41,33 MB
Release : 1971
Category : Antitrust law
ISBN :
Author : Joseph Emmett Harrington
Publisher : Now Publishers Inc
Page : 120 pages
File Size : 36,43 MB
Release : 2006
Category : Cartels
ISBN : 1933019409
This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel suppliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel's organizational structure.
Author : Gregory Patrick Nowell
Publisher : Cornell University Press
Page : 348 pages
File Size : 47,6 MB
Release : 1994
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780801428784
Author : Guillermo Trejo
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 379 pages
File Size : 34,33 MB
Release : 2020-09-03
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1108899900
One of the most surprising developments in Mexico's transition to democracy is the outbreak of criminal wars and large-scale criminal violence. Why did Mexican drug cartels go to war as the country transitioned away from one-party rule? And why have criminal wars proliferated as democracy has consolidated and elections have become more competitive subnationally? In Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley develop a political theory of criminal violence in weak democracies that elucidates how democratic politics and the fragmentation of power fundamentally shape cartels' incentives for war and peace. Drawing on in-depth case studies and statistical analysis spanning more than two decades and multiple levels of government, Trejo and Ley show that electoral competition and partisan conflict were key drivers of the outbreak of Mexico's crime wars, the intensification of violence, and the expansion of war and violence to the spheres of local politics and civil society.
Author : Luke Garrod
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 303 pages
File Size : 48,50 MB
Release : 2021-11-16
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0262046202
The first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, with detailed case studies. A cartel forms when competitors conspire to limit competition through coordinated actions. Most cartels are composed exclusively of firms that would otherwise be in competition, but in a hub-and-spoke cartel, those competitors (“spokes”) conspire with the assistance of an upstream supplier or a downstream buyer (“hub”). This book provides the first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, explaining their formation and how they operate to create and sustain a collusive environment. Sixteen detailed case studies, including cases brought against toy manufacturer Hasbro and the Apple ebook case, illustrate the economic framework and legal strategies discussed. The authors identify three types of hub-and-spoke cartels: when an upstream firm facilitates downstream firms to coordinate on higher prices; when a downstream intermediary facilitates upstream suppliers to coordinate on higher prices; and when a downstream firm facilitates upstream suppliers to exclude a downstream rival. They devote a chapter to each type, discussing the formation, coordination, enforcement, efficacy, and prosecution of these cartels, and consider general lessons that can be drawn from the case studies. Finally, they present strategies for prosecuting hub-and-spoke collusion. The book is written to be accessible to both economists and lawyers, and is intended for both scholars and practitioners.
Author : Philip Keefer
Publisher : World Bank Publications
Page : 36 pages
File Size : 11,59 MB
Release : 2003
Category : Democracy
ISBN : 0031210104
Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.
Author : J. Samuel Barkin
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 209 pages
File Size : 13,18 MB
Release : 2021-08-12
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1009007580
Sovereignty is the subject of many debates in international relations. Is it the source of state authority or a description of it? What is its history? Is it strengthening or weakening? Is it changing, and how? This book addresses these questions, but focuses on one less frequently addressed: what makes state sovereignty possible? The Sovereignty Cartel argues that sovereignty is built on state collusion – states work together to privilege sovereignty in global politics, because they benefit from sovereignty's exclusivity. This book explores this collusive behavior in international law, international political economy, international security, and migration and citizenship. In all these areas, states accord rights to other states, regardless of relative power, relative wealth, or relative position. Sovereignty, as a (changing) set of property rights for which states collude, accounts for this behavior not as anomaly (as other theories would) but instead as fundamental to the sovereign states system.