Enforceability of Labor Law: Evidence from a Labor Court in Mexico


Book Description

The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial.




Enforceability of Labor Law: Evidence from a Labor Court in Mexico


Book Description

The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial.




Enforceability Of Labor Law


Book Description

Abstract: The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial.




Doing Business 2018


Book Description

Fifteen in a series of annual reports comparing business regulation in 190 economies, Doing Business 2018 measures aspects of regulation affecting 10 areas of everyday business activity: • Starting a business • Dealing with construction permits • Getting electricity • Registering property • Getting credit • Protecting minority investors • Paying taxes • Trading across borders • Enforcing contracts • Resolving insolvency These areas are included in the distance to frontier score and ease of doing business ranking. Doing Business also measures features of labor market regulation, which is not included in these two measures. The report updates all indicators as of June 1, 2017, ranks economies on their overall “ease of doing business†?, and analyzes reforms to business regulation †“ identifying which economies are strengthening their business environment the most. Doing Business illustrates how reforms in business regulations are being used to analyze economic outcomes for domestic entrepreneurs and for the wider economy. It is a flagship product produced in partnership by the World Bank Group that garners worldwide attention on regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship. More than 137 economies have used the Doing Business indicators to shape reform agendas and monitor improvements on the ground. In addition, the Doing Business data has generated over 2,182 articles in peer-reviewed academic journals since its inception. Data Notes; Distance to Frontier and Ease of Doing Business Ranking; and Summaries of Doing Business Reforms in 2016/17 can be downloaded separately from the Doing Business website.







No Growth Without Equity?


Book Description

This work examines the relationship between equity and growth in Mexico. It looks at how specific inequalities in power, wealth and status have created and sustained economic institutions and policies that both tend to perpetuate these inequalities and are sources of inefficiences in the economy.




Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade and Investment Arrangements


Book Description

Nearly half of trade agreements concluded in the past five years included either a labor chapter or labor provision that makes reference to international labor standards and ILO instruments. The evidence so far suggests that labor provisions have been an important tool for raising awareness and improving laws and legislations with respect to workers' rights, increasing stakeholder involvement in negotiation and implementation phases, and developing domestic institutions to better monitor and enforce labor standards. But challenges remain, particularly with respect to sustainability of impacts, coherence, and cooperative efforts. This new report, part of the Studies on Growth with Equity series, gives a full examination of the scope and effectiveness of these labor provisions.




Under-Rewarded Efforts


Book Description

Why has an economy that has done so many things right failed to grow fast? Under-Rewarded Efforts traces Mexico’s disappointing growth to flawed microeconomic policies that have suppressed productivity growth and nullified the expected benefits of the country’s reform efforts. Fast growth will not occur doing more of the same or focusing on issues that may be key bottlenecks to productivity growth elsewhere, but not in Mexico. It will only result from inclusive institutions that effectively protect workers against risks, redistribute towards those in need, and simultaneously align entrepreneurs’ and workers’ incentives to raise productivity.




The Labor Market Story Behind Latin America’s Transformation


Book Description

This semiannual report - a product of the Office of the Chief Economist for the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Region of the World Bank - examines in detail the most significant changes experienced by labor markets in LAC countries between the 1990s and the 2000s, and provides an overview of the economic outlook for the LAC region in the coming months. Chapter 1 starts by briefly analyzing the sources of external risks for LAC and describes the economic prospects for the region. Chapter 2 studies how the recent decade of high growth, increased macroeconomic stability and great improvements in the social agenda was accompanied by a rapid transformation of labor markets in LAC. In particular, it documents the forces behind the sharp decline in wage inequality and studies the consequences of disinflation for labor market adjustments.




Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico


Book Description

Abstract: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.