Book Description
An effective safeguards program for nuclear materials is dependent on the integration of activities in the traditional safeguards elements: physical protection, protective force, and material control and accounting (MC & A). The design and integration of these traditional safeguards elements must be based on a technical analysis performed in characterizing the vulnerabilities and related risks of the facility against a designed-basis threat. Each of these elements requires a near seamless integration with each other, as well as within a site's operations organization. One of the key objectives of an effective nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC & A) program is to address the threat posed by an active or passive 'insider' who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion or theft of special nuclear material (SNM). The function of material accountancy is to detect the loss or unauthorized removal of special nuclear material from the plant or facility in a timely manner. Detection is accomplished by means of measurements and transfer records of material movements and periodic inventories to verify that all material is accounted for. The function of material control is to assure the integrity of the nuclear material and the accountancy data. This paper focuses on the development and implementation of a detailed material control and accounting program plan that considers both regulatory compliance demands and performance standards. Consideration of both of these demands is necessary to reduce exposure to theft and diversion, to reduce regulatory jeopardy, and to minimize to the extent possible adverse impacts with site operations.
