Experiments in N-person Games with Only 1, N-1, and N-person Permissible Coalitions
Author : Richard John Flis
Publisher :
Page : 122 pages
File Size : 20,8 MB
Release : 1985
Category : Game theory
ISBN :
Author : Richard John Flis
Publisher :
Page : 122 pages
File Size : 20,8 MB
Release : 1985
Category : Game theory
ISBN :
Author : Amnon Rapoport
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 442 pages
File Size : 21,83 MB
Release : 2012-12-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9400919921
This book is about the interplay of theory and experimentation on group decision making in economics. The theories that the book subjects to experimental testing mostly come from the theory of games. The decisions investigated in the book mostly concern economic interaction like strict competition. two-person bargaining. and coalition formation. The underlying philosophy of the articles collected in this book is consistent with the opinion of a growing number of economists and psychologists that economic issues cannot be understood fully just by thinking about them. Rather. the interplay between theory and experimentation is critical for the development of economics as an observational science (Smith. 1989). Reports of laboratory experiments in decision making and economics date back more than thirty years (e.g .• Allais. 1953; Davidson. Suppes. and Siegel. 1957; Flood. 1958; Friedman. 1%3; Kalisch. Milnor. Nash. and Nering. 1954; Lieberman. 1%0; Mosteller and Nogee. 1951; Rapoport. Chammah. Dwyer. and Gyr. I %2; Siegel and Fouraker. I %0; Stone. 1958). However. only in the last ten or fifteen years has laboratory experimentation in economics started its steady transformation from an occasional curiosity into a regular means for investigating various economic phenomena and examining the role of economic institutions. Groups of researchers in the USA and abroad have used experimental methods with increasing sophistication to attack economic problems that arise in individual decision making under risk. two-person bargaining.
Author : Michael Maschler
Publisher :
Page : 68 pages
File Size : 31,23 MB
Release : 1962
Category :
ISBN :
Author : XY. Brams
Publisher : Physica
Page : 440 pages
File Size : 11,48 MB
Release : 2013-12-19
Category : Computers
ISBN : 3662415011
Author : James P. Kahan
Publisher : Psychology Press
Page : 385 pages
File Size : 25,50 MB
Release : 2014-04-04
Category : Psychology
ISBN : 1317769198
First published in 1984. In this book, the authors set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how to disburse the gains that result from the coalition members’ joint coordinated efforts. These models arise from the two disciplines of mathematics, in the theory of cooperative n-person games with side payments, and social psychology, in theories of small group behavior in mixed-motive situations. The goal is to explore the various solution concepts that make up this body of theory, and in particular to examine the psychological premises that underlie the various theoretical models.
Author : A. Rapoport
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 181 pages
File Size : 50,6 MB
Release : 2012-12-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 3642483127
The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis.
Author : Robert James Weber
Publisher :
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 32,80 MB
Release : 1969
Category :
ISBN :
Author : Anatol Rapoport
Publisher : Courier Corporation
Page : 337 pages
File Size : 44,13 MB
Release : 2013-06-17
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 0486143678
DIVSequel to Two-Person Game Theory introduces necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), presents basic concepts and models, and provides applications to social situations. /div
Author : Melvin Dresher
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 691 pages
File Size : 16,95 MB
Release : 2016-03-02
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 140088201X
The description for this book, Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52), Volume 52, will be forthcoming.
Author : Robert J. Aumann
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 818 pages
File Size : 46,95 MB
Release : 2000
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780262011556
Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. "When you look closely at one scientific idea", writes Aumann, "you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study". The papers are organized in several categories: general, knot theory, decision theory (utility and subjective probability), strategic games, coalitional games, and mathematical methods. Aumann has written an introduction to each of these groups that briefly describes the content and background of each paper, including the motivation and the research process, and relates it to other work in the collection and to work by others. There is also a citation index that allows readers to trace the considerable body of literature which cites Aumann's own work.