Foreign Relations of the United States
Author : United States. Department of State
Publisher :
Page : 1128 pages
File Size : 37,37 MB
Release : 1969
Category : United States
ISBN :
Author : United States. Department of State
Publisher :
Page : 1128 pages
File Size : 37,37 MB
Release : 1969
Category : United States
ISBN :
Author : James R. Stocker
Publisher : Cornell University Press
Page : 295 pages
File Size : 33,85 MB
Release : 2016-05-01
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1501704141
In Spheres of Intervention, James R. Stocker examines the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon during a transformational period for Lebanon and a time of dynamic changes in US policy toward the Middle East. Drawing on tens of thousands of pages of declassified materials from US archives and a variety of Arabic and other non-English sources, Stocker provides a new interpretation of Lebanon's slide into civil war, as well as insight into the strategy behind US diplomatic initiatives toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period, Stocker argues, Lebanon was often a pawn in the games of larger powers. The stability of Lebanon was an aim of US policy at a time when Israel’s borders with Egypt and Jordan were in active contention. Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the internal political situation in Lebanon became increasingly unstable due to the regional military and political stalemate, the radicalization of the country’s domestic politics, and the appearance of Palestinian militias on Lebanese territory. US officials were more deeply involved in Lebanese affairs than most outside the region realized. After a series of internal crises in 1969, 1970, and 1973, civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975. The conflict reached a temporary halt after a Syrian military intervention the following year, but this was only an end to the first stage of what would be a sixteen-year civil war. During these crises, the US sought to help the Lebanese government in a variety of ways, including providing military aid to the Lebanese military, convincing Arab countries to take measures to help the Lebanese government, mediating Lebanon’s relations with Israel, and even supporting certain militias.
Author : Michael F. Cairo
Publisher : Taylor & Francis
Page : 182 pages
File Size : 30,95 MB
Release : 2022-07-15
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1000618536
Tracing presidential administrations since Lyndon B. Johnson, this book argues that the Trump administration's policy toward Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem is not an aberration but the culmination of over 50 years of American foreign policy. Under the Johnson administration, the United States rhetorically supported the applicability of international law regarding Israeli settlements. However, throughout the 1970s, administrations did little to reverse the construction and expansion of settlements. Moreover, presidents sent mixed signals regarding Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. The Israeli settlement movement received support when Reagan argued that settlements were not illegal. Since then, American presidents have opposed settlement activity to various degrees, but not based on their illegality. Rather, presidents have described them as unwise, unhelpful, or obstacles to peace. Even when presidents have had opportunities to confront Israeli settlements directly, domestic pressure and America's special relationship with Israel have prevented serious action beyond rhetoric and condemnation. This volume will be of interest to scholars and students of the history and politics of American foreign policy, American relations with Israel, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Author : Dr Boaz Vanetik
Publisher : Liverpool University Press
Page : 463 pages
File Size : 21,54 MB
Release : 2013-06-06
Category : History
ISBN : 1782840753
The Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in Israeli society and a national trauma whose wounds have yet to heal some four decades later. In the years following the war many studies addressed the internal and international political background prior to the war, attempting to determine causes and steps by political players and parties in Israel, Egypt and the United States. But to date there has been no comprehensive study based on archival materials and other primary sources. Classified documents from that period have recently become available and it is now possible to examine in depth a crucial period in Middle East history generally and Israeli history in particular. The authors provide a penetrating and insightful viewpoint on the question that lies at the heart of the Israeli polity and military: Was an opportunity missed to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War? The book provides surprising answers to long-standing issues: How did National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, succeed in torpedoing the efforts of the State Department to bring about an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1971?; Would that agreement have allowed Israel to hold on to most of the Sinai Peninsula for many years and at the same time avert the outbreak of the war; Did Golda Meir reject any diplomatic initiative that came up for discussion in the years preceding the war?; Was the White House's Middle East policy throughout 1973 a catalyst for war breaking out?
Author : Jørgen Jensehaugen
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing
Page : 313 pages
File Size : 21,57 MB
Release : 2018-06-07
Category : History
ISBN : 1838608001
The history of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East is marked by numerous stark failures and a few ephemeral successes. Jimmy Carter's short-lived Middle East diplomatic strategy constitutes an exception in vision and approach. In this extensive and long-overdue analysis of Carter's Middle East policy, Jorgen Jensehaugen sheds light on this important and unprecedented chapter in U.S. regional diplomacy. Against all odds, including the rise of Menachem Begin's right-wing government in Israel, Carter broke new ground by demanding the involvement of the Palestinians in Arab-Israeli diplomatic negotiations. This book assesses the president's `comprehensive peace' doctrine, which aimed to encompass all parties of the conflict, and reveals the reasons why his vision ultimately failed. Largely based on analysis of newly-declassified diplomatic files and American, British, Palestinian and Israeli archival sources, this book is the first comprehensive examination of Jimmy Carter's engagement with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At a time when U.S. involvement in the region threatens to exacerbate tensions further, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter provides important new insights into the historical roots of the ongoing unrest. The book will be of value to Middle East and International Relations scholars, and those researching U.S diplomacy and the Carter Administration.
Author : Henry Kissinger
Publisher : Penguin Group
Page : 529 pages
File Size : 20,67 MB
Release : 2024-07-09
Category : Biography & Autobiography
ISBN : 0593489462
The New York Times bestseller Henry Kissinger, consummate diplomat and statesman, examines the strategies of six great twentieth-century figures and brings to life a unifying theory of leadership and diplomacy “An extraordinary book, one that braids together two through lines in the long and distinguished career of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger...In Leadership he presents a fascinating set of historical case studies and political biographies that blend the dance and the dancer, seamlessly.” - James Stavridis, The Wall Street Journal “Leaders,” writes Henry Kissinger in this compelling book, “think and act at the intersection of two axes: the first, between the past and the future; the second, between the abiding values and aspirations of those they lead. They must balance what they know, which is necessarily drawn from the past, with what they intuit about the future, which is inherently conjectural and uncertain. It is this intuitive grasp of direction that enables leaders to set objectives and lay down a strategy.” In Leadership, Kissinger analyses the lives of six extraordinary leaders through the distinctive strategies of statecraft, which he believes they embodied. After the Second World War, Konrad Adenauer brought defeated and morally bankrupt Germany back into the community of nations by what Kissinger calls “the strategy of humility.” Charles de Gaulle set France beside the victorious Allies and renewed its historic grandeur by “the strategy of will.” During the Cold War, Richard Nixon gave geostrategic advantage to the United States by “the strategy of equilibrium.” After twenty-five years of conflict, Anwar Sadat brought a vision of peace to the Middle East by a “strategy of transcendence.” Against the odds, Lee Kuan Yew created a powerhouse city-state, Singapore, by “the strategy of excellence.” And, though Britain was known as “the sick man of Europe” when Margaret Thatcher came to power, she renewed her country’s morale and international position by “the strategy of conviction.” To each of these studies, Kissinger brings historical perception, public experience and—because he knew each of the subjects and participated in many of the events he describes—personal knowledge. Leadership is enriched by insights and judgements that only Kissinger could make and concludes with his reflections on world order and the indispensability of leadership today.
Author : Ray Locker
Publisher : U of Nebraska Press
Page : 539 pages
File Size : 30,11 MB
Release : 2019-05-01
Category : Biography & Autobiography
ISBN : 1640121781
When General Alexander M. Haig Jr. returned to the White House on May 3, 1973, he found the Nixon administration in worse shape than he had imagined. President Richard Nixon, reelected in an overwhelming landslide just six months earlier, had accepted the resignations of his top aides--the chief of staff H. R. Haldeman and the domestic policy chief John Ehrlichman--just three days earlier. Haldeman and Ehrlichman had enforced the president's will and protected him from his rivals and his worst instincts for four years. Without them, Nixon stood alone, backed by a staff that lacked gravitas and confidence as the Watergate scandal snowballed. Nixon needed a savior, someone who would lift his fortunes while keeping his White House from blowing apart. He hoped that savior would be his deputy national security adviser, Alexander Haig, whom he appointed chief of staff. But Haig's goal was not to keep Nixon in office--it was to remove him. In Haig's Coup, Ray Locker uses recently declassified documents to tell the true story of how Haig orchestrated Nixon's demise, resignation, and subsequent pardon. A story of intrigues, cover-ups, and treachery, this incisive history shows how Haig engineered the "soft coup" that ended our long national nightmare and brought Watergate to an end.
Author : David R. Morse
Publisher : McFarland
Page : 215 pages
File Size : 46,97 MB
Release : 2015-06-08
Category : History
ISBN : 1476620776
The 1973 Yom Kippur War marked a turning point in the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel. While previous U.S. administrations had taken a relatively even hand in the Middle East, the action saw American support of Israel become virtually unconditional. A massive airlift of military hardware to Israel brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union closer to conflict. As the war--just two weeks in duration--played out along the Suez Canal, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew was forced to resign amidst bribery allegations. Watergate escalated, resulting in President Nixon's near-breakdown. Despite Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's efforts to supply arms to Israel, he was stymied by resistance in the Department of Defense, which some saw as overly provocative toward the Arabs. Ostensibly a U.S. foreign policy success, the war led directly to the 1974 oil crisis and a permanent rift in U.S.-Arab relations. Drawing on Kissinger's telephone conversations and recently declassified documents, this book tells the story of how the secretary became the chief architect of America's Middle East policy, and how his Cold War strategy played a critical role in the decision to pursue active military involvement.
Author : Thomas Robb
Publisher : Manchester University Press
Page : 348 pages
File Size : 40,68 MB
Release : 2015-11-01
Category : History
ISBN : 1526102269
This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. This is the first monograph-length study that charts the coercive diplomacy of the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford as practised against their British ally in order to persuade Edward Heath’s government to follow a more amenable course throughout the ‘Year of Europe’ and to convince Harold Wilson’s governments to lessen the severity of proposed defence cuts. Such diplomacy proved effective against Heath but rather less so against Wilson. It is argued that relations between the two sides were often strained, indeed, to the extent that the most ‘special’ elements of the relationship, that of intelligence and nuclear co-operation, were suspended. Yet, the relationship also witnessed considerable co-operation. This book offers new perspectives on US and UK policy towards British membership of the European Economic Community; demonstrates how US détente policies created strain in the ‘special relationship’; reveals the temporary shutdown of US-UK intelligence and nuclear co-operation; provides new insights in US-UK defence co-operation, and re-evaluates the US-UK relationship throughout the IMF Crisis.
Author : Alexander Bligh
Publisher : Lexington Books
Page : 313 pages
File Size : 26,43 MB
Release : 2017-03-16
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 0739194720
Israeli Prisoner of War Policies: From the 1949 Armistice to the 2006 Kidnappings examines the development of Israel’s policies toward prisoners of war across multiple conflicts. Taking POWs is an indication of strength and a method of deterrence. However, the conditions leading to the release of POWs are often the result of the asymmetry in diplomatic power between two parties, or, as in the case of Israel, the gap between military might and diplomatic weakness within a single country. Consequently, the issue of POWs and their military and diplomatic significance represents at least two levels of actors’ behavior: what the criteria should be for taking POWs and what mechanism should be employed and what price should be paid in order to secure their release. Studying the prisoner exchange deals involving Israel reveals three eras in the emergence of Israeli POW policy. Israel has had no comprehensive policy or guiding set of directives. The lack of a well-established policy was not only the result of the unstable nature of Israeli politics, but was to a large extent the result of the tendency of most Israeli cabinets to delay critical decisions. Successive Israeli governments have witnessed three distinct periods of conflict requiring unique approaches to POWs: a confrontation with nation states, 1948/49 to the June 1967 War; a mixed challenge posed by national and sub-national players, 1967 to the aftermath of the October 1973 War; and the long battle with sub-national actors, first Palestinians and later Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims. This volume seeks to apply the lessons of Israel’s complex POW policies to conflicts around the world.