Transzendentale Logik


Book Description

Aus dem Inhalt: Die transzendentallogische Funktion des Ich (Klaus Hammacher). - Du formel au transcendental: remarques sur l'itineraire de Husserl et de Fichte (Therese Pentzopoulou-Valalas). - Fichte und das Problem des intelligiblen Fatalismus (Georg Wallwitz). - Die Philosophie in Freiheit setzen: Freiheitsbegriff und Freiheit des Begriffs bei Schelling (Felix Duque).




The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy


Book Description

These essays span a period of fourteen years. The earliest was written in 1960, the latest in 1983. They all represent various attempts to understand the motives and the central concepts of Husserl's transcen dental phenomenology, and to locate the latter in the background of other varieties of transcendental philosophy. Implicitly, they also con tain a defense of transcendental philosophy, and make attempts to respond to the more familiar criticisms against it. It is hoped that they will contribute to a better understanding not only of Husserl's transcen dental phenomenology but also of transcendental philosophy in gener al. The ordering of the essays is not chronological. They are rather divided thematically into three groups. The first group of six essays is concerned with relating Husserlian phenomenology to more contem porary analytic concerns: in fact, the opening essay on Husserl and Frege establishes a certain continuity of concern with my last published book with that title. Of these, Essay 2 was written for an American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division symposium in which the other symposiast was John Searle. The discussion in that symposium concentrated chiefly on the relation between intentionality and causali ty - which led me to write Essay 6, later read as the Gurwitsch Memo rial Lecture at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philos ophy meetings in 1982 at Penn State.




Felt Meanings of the World


Book Description

In a critical dialogue with the metaphysical tradition from Plato to Hegel to contemporary schools of thought, the author convincingly argues that traditional rationalist metaphysics has failed to accomplish its goal of demonstrating the existence of a divine cause and moral purpose of the world. To replace the defective rationalist metaphysics, the author builds a new metaphysics on the idea that moods and affects make manifest the world's felt meanings; he argues that each feature of the world is a felt meaning in the sense that each feature is a source of a feeling-response, if and when it appears. The author asserts that we must synthesize our two ways of knowing - poetic evocations and exact analyses - in order to decide which mood or affect is the appropriate appreciation of any given feature of the world. Smith gives evocative and exact explications of such features as the world's temporality, appearance, and mind-independency, as these features appear in the appropriate recitations.




Formal and transcendental logic


Book Description

called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas-as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modem sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modem times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a na!ivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate a priori possibilities and necessities.




Hume and Husserl


Book Description

To become fully aware of the original and radical character of his transcendental phenomenology Edmund Husserl must be located within the historical tradition of Western philosophy. Although he was not a historian of philosophy, Husserl's his torical reflections convinced him that phenomenology is the necessary culmination of a centuries-old endeavor and the solution to the contemporary crisis in European science and European humanity itself.l This teleological viewpoint re quires the commentator to consider the tradition of Western philosophy from Husserl's own perspective. Husserl maintained that the Cartesian tum to the "Cogito" represents the crucial breakthrough in the historical advance of Western thought toward philosophy as rigorous science. Hence 2 he concentrated almost exclusively on the modem era. Much has been written of Husserl's relationship to Descartes, Kant, and the neo-Kantians. His connections with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume have not been examined as closely despite his fre quent allusions to these British empiricists. Among these thinkers David Hume gained from Husserl the more extensive considera tion. Commentators have pointed out correctly that Husserl always criticized unsparingly Hume's sheer empiricistic approach to the problem of cognition. Such an approach, in Husserl's view, can only result in the "naturalization of consciousness" from which stem that "psychologism" and "sensualism" which lead Hume inevitably into the contradictory impasse of solipsism 3 and skepticism.




Essays on Husserl's Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics


Book Description

Essays on Husserl’s Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics sets out to fill up a lacuna in the present research on Husserl by presenting a precise account of Husserl’s work in the field of logic, of the philosophy of logic and of the philosophy of mathematics. The aim is to provide an in-depth reconstruction and analysis of the discussion between Husserl and his most important interlocutors, and to clarify pivotal ideas of Husserl’s by considering their reception and elaboration by some of his disciples and followers, such as Oskar Becker and Jacob Klein, as well as their influence on some of the most significant logicians and mathematicians of the past century, such as Luitzen E. J. Brouwer, Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel and Hermann Weyl. Most of the papers consider Husserl and another scholar – e.g. Leibniz, Kant, Bolzano, Brentano, Cantor, Frege – and trace out and contextualize lines of influence, points of contact, and points of disagreement. Each essay is written by an expert of the field, and the volume includes contributions both from the analytical tradition and from the phenomenological one.




The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology


Book Description

Many contemporary explanations of conscious human experience, relying either upon neuroscience or appealing to a spiritual soul, fail to provide a complete and coherent theory. These explanations, the author argues, fall short because the underlying explanatory constituent for all experience are not entities, such as the brain or a spiritual soul, but rather relation and the unique way in which human beings form relations. This alternative frontier is developed through examining the phenomenological method of Martin Heidegger and the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce. While both of these thinkers independently provide great insight into the difficulty of accounting for human experience, this volume brings these insights into a new complementary synthesis. This synthesis opens new doors for understanding all aspects of conscious human experience, not just those that can be quantified, and without appealing to a mysterious spiritual principle.




The New Husserl


Book Description

The recent first-time publication of works from Edmund Husserl's later years, especially his Freiburg period, combined with new studies of his method and theories, has stimulated a remarkable shift in perceptions of the scope and significance of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Informed by a deep reading of not just the works published during Husserl's lifetime but also the countless lectures and manuscripts he wrote in his later years, the essays in The New Husserl provide an alternative approach to Husserl by examining his work and his method as a whole and by probing issues, old and new, that occupied him during this exceptionally productive period. The noted Husserl specialist Klaus Held opens the book with two essays, published here in English for the first time, that provide an insightful and lucid introduction to Husserl's central texts. Other prominent Husserl scholars treat his most important and lasting contributions to philosophy, such as the concept of intentionality, the theory of types, time-consciousness, consciousness and subjectivity, the phenomenological method, and the problem of generativity. By inviting readers to discover this "new Husserl," the present collection is likely to shape scholarly discussions of Husserl's thought for some time to come.




Husserl


Book Description

Edmund Husserl, generally regarded as the founding figure of phenomenology, exerted an enormous influence on the course of twentieth and twenty-first century philosophy. This volume collects and translates essays written by important German-speaking commentators on Husserl, ranging from his contemporaries to scholars of today, to make available in English some of the best commentary on Husserl and the phenomenological project. The essays focus on three problematics within phenomenology: the nature and method of phenomenology; intentionality, with its attendant issues of temporality and subjectivity; and intersubjectivity and culture. Several essays also deal with Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology, although in a manner that reveals not only Heidegger’s differences with Husserl but also his reliance on and indebtedness to Husserl’s phenomenology. Taken together, the book shows the continuing influence of Husserl’s thought, demonstrating how such subsequent developments as existentialism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction were defined in part by how they assimilated and departed from Husserlian insights. The course of what has come to be called continental philosophy cannot be described without reference to this assimilation and departure, and among the many successor approaches phenomenology remains a viable avenue for contemporary thought. In addition, problems addressed by Husserl—most notably, intentionality, consciousness, the emotions, and ethics—are of central concern in contemporary non-phenomenological philosophy, and many contemporary thinkers have turned to Husserl for guidance. The essays demonstrate how significant Husserl remains to contemporary philosophy across several traditions and several generations. Includes essays by Rudolf Bernet, Klaus Held, Ludwig Landgrebe, Dieter Lohmar, Verena Mayer and Christopher Erhard, Ullrich Melle, Karl Mertens, Ernst Wolfgang Orth, Jan Patočka, Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, Karl Schuhmann, and Elisabeth Ströker.




Defending Husserl


Book Description

The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl’s non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl’s career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.