Gambling and War


Book Description

In 1914, as Germany mobilized for war, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg remarked to the country’s legislators, “If the iron dice must roll, then God help us.” War has often been compared to a game of dice or a lottery. But just as frequently, war has been compared to a game of pure strategy like chess. In reality, the business of negotiating with adversaries, fighting wars, and ending wars is far more complicated than a game of chess, where each player can see all the pieces on the board and knows the possible moves that they can make. War is far more chaotic and unpredictable. And yet, international bargaining and international conflict is not a simple dice game either, where human beings have no control over the outcome. Justin Conrad bets that war is more like a game of poker. Gambling and War: Risk, Reward, and Chance in International Conflict. brings readers a war college course taught at a Las Vegas casino. To succeed in poker, it is not enough to simply anticipate the actions of other players and try to outsmart them. A successful player must also understand and appreciate the role of randomness. Additionally, players must confront the reality that all human beings are prone to errors in judgment, which causes them to make suboptimal choices under many circumstances. Taken together, these challenges make poker a fascinating and highly unpredictable game, much like the challenges of international conflicts. Any comprehensive analysis of why wars occur and how they are fought must take into account a variety of factors including strategy, human error, and dumb luck. Gambling and War applies lessons learned from poker, blackjack, roulette, and other games of chance to the study of international conflict. Drawing on scholarly insights from a variety of fields, including probability, statistics, political science, psychology, and economics, Conrad offers thoughts on how we can better manage and prevent international conflict, the costliest game of all.




Gambling on War


Book Description

The First World War left a legacy of chaos that is still with us a century later. Why did European leaders resort to war and why did they not end it sooner? Roger L. Ransom sheds new light on this enduring puzzle by employing insights from prospect theory and notions of risk and uncertainty. He reveals how the interplay of confidence, fear, and a propensity to gamble encouraged aggressive behavior by leaders who pursued risky military strategies in hopes of winning the war. The result was a series of military disasters and a war of attrition which gradually exhausted the belligerents without producing any hope of ending the war. Ultimately, he shows that the outcome of the war rested as much on the ability of the Allied powers to muster their superior economic resources to continue the fight as it did on success on the battlefield.




Gambling with Armageddon


Book Description

From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War—how such a crisis arose, and why at the very last possible moment it didn't happen. In this groundbreaking look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, Martin Sherwin not only gives us a riveting sometimes hour-by-hour explanation of the crisis itself, but also explores the origins, scope, and consequences of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the post-World War II world. Mining new sources and materials, and going far beyond the scope of earlier works on this critical face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union—triggered when Khrushchev began installing missiles in Cuba at Castro's behest—Sherwin shows how this volatile event was an integral part of the wider Cold War and was a consequence of nuclear arms. Gambling with Armageddon looks in particular at the original debate in the Truman Administration about using the Atomic Bomb; the way in which President Eisenhower relied on the threat of massive retaliation to project U.S. power in the early Cold War era; and how President Kennedy, though unprepared to deal with the Bay of Pigs debacle, came of age during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here too is a clarifying picture of what was going on in Khrushchev's Soviet Union. Martin Sherwin has spent his career in the study of nuclear weapons and how they have shaped our world. Gambling with Armegeddon is an outstanding capstone to his work thus far.




Jackpot


Book Description

A striking exposé of the insidious business practices that have generated enormous profits for the companies operating within the UK's gambling industry. 'A methodical, sensitive and occasionally harrowing polemic about the gambling industry . . . The book has echoes of Patrick Radden Keefe's award-winning Empire of Pain.' SUNDAY TIMES 'A serious attempt to grapple with the extent of Britain's problem.' THE SPECTATOR 'Persuasive.' FINANCIAL TIMES 'Fascinating.' IRISH TIMES 'Eye-opening.' TELEGRAPH *** 716: the number of gambling logos displayed in a single Premier League football match £421 MILLION: the salary of Bet365's CEO in 2020. £14 BILLION: the annual losses incurred by British gamblers. Over half of the population gambles in the UK every year. How did we get here? What keeps us hooked when the odds are so heavily stacked against us? And who are the real winners and losers? Jackpot dives deep into gambling's seedy underbelly to answer these questions, and many more. From the first National Lottery draw in 1569 to the Wild West of today's online casinos, Guardian reporter Rob Davies follows the money to show who profits - and at what cost.




Order within Anarchy


Book Description

Order within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield.




Everyday Probability and Statistics


Book Description

Probability and statistics impinge on the life of the average person in a variety of ways OCo as is suggested by the title of this book. Very often, information is provided that is factually accurate but intended to present a biased view. This book presents the important results of probability and statistics without making heavy mathematical demands on the reader. It should enable an intelligent reader to properly assess statistical information and to understand that the same information can be presented in different ways.




Winning a Future War


Book Description

"To win in the Pacific during World War II, the U.S. Navy had to transform itself technically, tactically, and strategically. It had to create a fleet capable of the unprecedented feat of fighting and winning far from home, without existing bases, in the face of an enemy with numerous bases fighting in his own waters. Much of the credit for the transformation should go to the war gaming conducted at the U.S. Naval War College. Conversely, as we face further demands for transformation, the inter-war experience at the War College offers valuable guidance as to what works, and why, and how."




Fundamentals of War Gaming


Book Description

Fundamentals of War Gaming provides an in-depth introduction to the basics of military gaming, and offers historical insights into the devewlopment of war gaming methodologies. It covers the evolution of gaming tools such as the ancient adaptations of chess and the development of Kriegspiel to teach military tactics to Prussian officers. The employment of gaming by various military powers, before and during the World Wars, is explored and culminated with the introduction of computer support and simulations in the U.S. Navy.




War and Punishment


Book Description

What makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans maintains, can vary greatly depending on the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare. Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown by their internal enemies. Mixed regimes, which are made up of several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this "gamble for resurrection" as well as other strategies, using rational choice theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany, Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic politics, international politics, and battlefield developments.




Gambling on War


Book Description

The First World War left a legacy of chaos that is still with us a century later. Why did European leaders resort to war and why did they not end it sooner? Roger L. Ransom sheds new light on this enduring puzzle by employing insights from prospect theory and notions of risk and uncertainty. He reveals how the interplay of confidence, fear, and a propensity to gamble encouraged aggressive behavior by leaders who pursued risky military strategies in hopes of winning the war. The result was a series of military disasters and a war of attrition which gradually exhausted the belligerents without producing any hope of ending the war. Ultimately, he shows that the outcome of the war rested as much on the ability of the Allied powers to muster their superior economic resources to continue the fight as it did on success on the battlefield.