Gao-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction


Book Description

GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration




Neutralizing the Nuclear and Radiological Threat


Book Description




Detecting Nuclear Weapons and Radiological Materials


Book Description




Nuclear Detection


Book Description

In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established to enhance and coordinate fed., state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the depts. of DoD, DoE, and State, a global strategy for nuclear detection -- a system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities domestically and abroad. This report examines: (1) DNDO's progress in developing programs to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically; (2) DNDO's role in supporting other agencies' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas; and (3) the amount budgeted by DoD, DoE, and State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection strategy.




The Soviet Biological Weapons Program


Book Description

Russian officials claim today that the USSR never possessed an offensive biological weapons program. In fact, the Soviet government spent billions of rubles and hard currency to fund a hugely expensive weapons program that added nothing to the country’s security. This history is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR’s offensive biological weapons research—its inception in the 1920s, its growth between 1970 and 1990, and its possible remnants in present-day Russia. We learn that the U.S. and U.K. governments never obtained clear evidence of the program’s closure from 1990 to the present day, raising the critical question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be resurrected in Russia in the future. Based on interviews with important Soviet scientists and managers, papers from the Soviet Central Committee, and U.S. and U.K. declassified documents, this book peels back layers of lies, to reveal how and why Soviet leaders decided to develop biological weapons, the scientific resources they dedicated to this task, and the multitude of research institutes that applied themselves to its fulfillment. We learn that Biopreparat, an ostensibly civilian organization, was established to manage a top secret program, code-named Ferment, whose objective was to apply genetic engineering to develop strains of pathogenic agents that had never existed in nature. Leitenberg and Zilinskas consider the performance of the U.S. intelligence community in discovering and assessing these activities, and they examine in detail the crucial years 1985 to 1992, when Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to put an end to the program were thwarted as they were under Yeltsin.







The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense


Book Description

This Congressionally-mandated report identifies areas for further cooperation with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program of the Department of Defense in the specific area of prevention of proliferation of biological weapons. The report reviews relevant U.S. government programs, and particularly the CTR program, and identifies approaches for overcoming obstacles to cooperation and for increasing the long-term impact of the program. It recommends strong support for continuation of the CTR program.




Preventing Nuclear Smuggling


Book Description

Since Sept. 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in the approx. 7 million containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response to this concern, since 2003, the Dept. of Energy (DoE) has deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports through its Megaports Initiative. This report examined: (1) progress DoE has made in implementing the Megaports Initiative, (2) current & expected costs of the Initiative, & (3) challenges DoE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. Includes recommendations. Charts & tables.




Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

Safeguarding nuclear warheads & materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary nat. security concern of the U.S. Since 1993, the DoE & DoD have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material & warheads in Russia & other countries. In 1995, DoE established the Materials Protection, Control, & Accounting program to implement these efforts. The author examined the: (1) progress DoE has made in improving security at nuclear-material sites in Russia & other countries; (2) progress DoE & DoD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites; & (3) efforts DoE & DoD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. Illustrations.