Gao-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

GAO-05-57 Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia




Gao-05-828 Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description

GAO-05-828 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries







Nuclear Nonproliferation


Book Description




Preventing Nuclear Smuggling


Book Description

Since Sept. 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in the approx. 7 million containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response to this concern, since 2003, the Dept. of Energy (DoE) has deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports through its Megaports Initiative. This report examined: (1) progress DoE has made in implementing the Megaports Initiative, (2) current & expected costs of the Initiative, & (3) challenges DoE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports. Includes recommendations. Charts & tables.




Homeland Security


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Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation


Book Description

Originally published in 1983, this book presents both the technical and political information necessary to evaluate the emerging threat to world security posed by recent advances in uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment has played a relatively quiet but important role in the history of efforts by a number of nations to acquire nuclear weapons and by a number of others to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For many years the uranium enrichment industry was dominated by a single method, gaseous diffusion, which was technically complex, extremely capital-intensive, and highly inefficient in its use of energy. As long as this remained true, only the richest and most technically advanced nations could afford to pursue the enrichment route to weapon acquisition. But during the 1970s this situation changed dramatically. Several new and far more accessible enrichment techniques were developed, stimulated largely by the anticipation of a rapidly growing demand for enrichment services by the world-wide nuclear power industry. This proliferation of new techniques, coupled with the subsequent contraction of the commercial market for enriched uranium, has created a situation in which uranium enrichment technology might well become the most important contributor to further nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the issues addressed in this book are: A technical analysis of the most important enrichment techniques in a form that is relevant to analysis of proliferation risks; A detailed projection of the world demand for uranium enrichment services; A summary and critique of present institutional non-proliferation arrangements in the world enrichment industry, and An identification of the states most likely to pursue the enrichment route to acquisition of nuclear weapons.




Terrorism


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Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control: 1st Series Index 2009


Book Description

Although each main-set volume of Terrorism: 1st Series contains its own volume-specific index, this comprehensive Index places all the Index info from the last fifty main-set volumes into one index volume. Furthermore, the volume-specific indexes are only subject indexes, whereas five different indexes appear within this one comprehensive index: the subject index, an index organized according to the title of the document, an index based on the name of the document's author, an index correlated to the document's year, and a subject-by-year index. This one all-encompassing Index thus provides users with multiple ways to conduct research into four years' worth of Terrorism: 1st Series volumes.




Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials


Book Description

In this study, CISAC tackles the technical dimensions of a longstanding controversy: To what extent could existing and plausibly attainable measures for transparency and monitoring make possible the verification of all nuclear weaponsâ€"strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployedâ€"plus the nuclear-explosive components and materials that are their essential ingredients? The committee's assessment of the technical and organizational possibilities suggests a more optimistic conclusion than most of those concerned with these issues might have expected.