House of Commons - Committee of Public Accounts - Integration Across Government And Whole-Place Community Budgets - HC 472


Book Description

For many years Governments have sought to breakdown silo working in departments and ensure better integration across departments to ensure more effective services and better value for money. The Cabinet Office and the Treasury are best placed to support and promote integration across the Government, as they are responsible for coordinating policy and allocating monies. However, they are failing to provide the necessary strategic leadership and are not doing enough to tackle the barriers to integration. These include the lack of good information to identify where the Government could do better by joining services, funding arrangements which make it difficult for bodies to invest in joint working, and the risk that Accounting Officers are reluctant to pool budgets in case they lose control and authority. In contrast, the Whole-Place Community Budgets programme has involved local public bodies and central government working together to develop evidence-based plans for new integrated services. Four local areas have analysed in detail the expected costs and benefits of integration and their findings show clear potential for improving outcomes and reducing costs. The Department for Communities and Local Government, which manages the Whole-Place Community Budgets programme, has provided effective support to date. However, if other central government departments are not committed to Whole-Place Community Budgets it may, like similar initiatives in the past, fail to deliver any significant and lasting change. The programme must be evaluated properly to see whether the early promise translates to real change on the ground and improves value for money.




HC 1141 - The Work of the Committee of Public Accounts 2010-15


Book Description

This report summarises the key areas of the Committee's work over the past five years. It draws out the areas where progress has been made and where their successors might wish to press in future. The Committee has assiduously followed the taxpayer's pound wherever it was spent. Since 2010 they held 276 evidence sessions and published 244 unanimous reports to hold government to account for its performance. 88% of their recommendations were accepted by departments. In many cases they successfully secured substantial changes, for example with the once secret tax avoidance industry. They secured consensus from government and from industry that private providers of public services do have a duty of care to the taxpayer, and in pushing the protection of whistleblowers further up the agenda of all government departments. By drawing attention to mistakes in the Department for Transport's procurement of the West Coast Mainline, more recent procurements for Crossrail, Thameslink and Intercity Express have all benefited from more expert advice and a more appropriate level of challenge from senior staff. After discovery in 2012-13 that 63% of calls to government call centres were to higher rate telephone numbers, the Government accepted our recommendation that telephone lines serving vulnerable and low income groups never be charged above the geographic rate and that 03 numbers should be available for all government telephone lines. They also secured a commitment to close large mental health hospitals.




House of Commons - Committee of Public Accounts: Whole of Government Accounts 2011-12 - HC 667


Book Description

The Whole of Government Accounts for 2011-12 presents the combined financial activities of some 3,000 organisations. It provides vital data on which Government needs to act. Key issues have been identified, such as the £19.4 billion liability for clinical negligence claims. But it is frustrating to see other issues seemingly ignored in long-term policy making and spending decisions. In one year, the public sector was defrauded of over £20 billion and the tax gap rose to £35 billion. The financial liabilities for dealing with nuclear waste also keep growing. There is room for improvement in the document itself and how it is used. Users find it hard to understand, for example, why the Government debt and deficit highlighted in the WGA differ from those reported in the ONS's National Accounts. Also, by changing definitions in its commentary published alongside the WGA, the Treasury makes it difficult to track changes over time. The Treasury's introduction in the commentary of a new concept of so-called 'direct' expenditure leaves out key costs such as the interest paid on the National Debt. The publicly owned and controlled bodies - such as Network Rail and the taxpayer owned banks - are still being excluded, in defiance of normal accounting rules. The usefulness of the WGA is also being limited by the length of time it takes to produce the document and by poor quality data from some of the bodies. The accounts have again been qualified over the completeness, timeliness and accuracy of the information supplied for schools and academies




HC 107 - The Centre of Government


Book Description

A strong and effective centre of government is vital for the effective operation of government as a whole and for ensuring a focus on improved value for money for the taxpayer. However, there is a lack of clarity about the centre's precise role, particularly the respective responsibilities of the Cabinet Office, HM Treasury and the Prime Minister's Office (Number 10), and how they work together as a coherent centre. The centre sometimes intervenes to address issues with high-priority government programmes, but has too often failed to do so effectively or at an early enough stage. In part, this is because the centre does not have a joined-up single view of strategic risks across government, meaning it is often reactive in its response rather than able to anticipate potentially serious problems. There are gaps in key skills at the centre and across departments, such as financial management capability and contracting expertise, which are compounded because government repeatedly fails to learn lessons and share good practice from past experience. The Government announced that the roles of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service will be combined, and there will be a new Chief Executive post at the centre of government. Implementing these changes may provide an opportunity to make progress on the role of the centre




Excess Votes 2012-13 - HC 1068


Book Description

The Committee of Public Accounts scrutinises the reasons behind individual departments exceeding their allocated resources, and reports to the House of Commons on whether it has any objection to the amounts needed to rectify the reported excesses. In 2012-13 two bodies breached their expenditure limits: the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Food Standards Agency. The Ministry of Defence also required a token increase because of a Defence Votes A excess. On the basis of the examination of the reasons why these bodies exceeded their voted, the Committee has no objection to Parliament providing the necessary amounts by means of an Excess Vote. Nevertheless, it expects the Department for Communities and Local Government to set out what actions it has taken to improve their financial management and avoid exceeding their allocated resources in the future. And, as recommended last year, HM Treasury, as the UK's Ministry of Finance, should ensure departments are fully aware of the need to operate within their voted provisions. HM Treasury should continue to regularly monitor the progress departments are making against their Estimates during the year and, where possible, take appropriate action to prevent departments exceeding their provision.




COMPASS: Provision of Asylum Accommodation - HC 1000


Book Description

At any one time the Home Office (the Department) provides accommodation for around 23,000 destitute asylum seekers awaiting the outcome of their application to remain in the UK. The cost of providing this accommodation in 2011-12 was £150 million. In March 2012 the Department decided to introduce a new delivery model involving fewer and bigger housing providers than under previous contracts. There are now six regional contracts (known collectively as COMPASS), delivered by three prime contractors (G4S, Serco and Clearel, each of which has two contracts): these replaced 22 separate contracts with 13 different suppliers from across the private and voluntary sectors and local authorities. Savings of £140 million over seven years are forecast. The decision to rely on fewer, larger contractors was risky and has so far led to delays in providing suitable accommodation. The Department expected this to result in economies of scale. However, it is inconsistent with the Government's wider approach of encouraging more small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) to supply services to government. The transition to the new contracts was poorly managed: the three month mobilisation period for the contracts was very challenging. The Department has incurred additional costs and so is less likely to achieve the expected savings. The standard of the accommodation provided has often been unacceptably poor for a very fragile group of individuals and families and the companies failed to improve quality in a timely manner.




Programmes to Help Families Facing Multiple Challenges - HC 668


Book Description

In this report the Public Accounts Committee examines DCLG and DWP's programmes to help families facing multiple challenges. In 2006, the Government estimated that there were 120,000 families in England facing multiple challenges, such as unemployment and poor housing, crime and antisocial behaviour. The estimated cost to the taxpayer of providing services to support these families is £9 billion a year, of which £8 billion is spent reacting to issues and £1 billion in trying to tackle them. In 2012, DCLG and DWP each introduced separate programmes to help these families. DCLG's Troubled Families programme, with a central government budget of £448 million, aims to 'turn around' all 120,000 families by May 2015. DWP's Families with Multiple Problems programme, with a budget of £200 million, seeks to move 22% of those joining the programme into employment by March 2015. There was no clear rationale for the simultaneous introduction of two separate programmes, which focused on addressing similar issues. The integration of the programmes at the design phase was poor, leading to confusion, and contributing to the low number of referrals to the DWP's programme. But the good practice evident in DCLG's Troubled Families programme, demonstrates how central and local government agencies can work together effectively. Data sharing is critical to identifying the families most in need of the support available. Both departments should publish, alongside details of the programmes' progress against their respective targets, details of the wider benefits and financial savings that they have identified.




Ministry of Justice and National Offender Management Service: Managing the Prison Service - HC 1001


Book Description

The National Offender Management Service (the Agency) is responsible for the prison system in England and Wales which holds around 84,000 prisoners. The prison estate consists of some 130 prisons of varying layout, geographical location, age and state of repair. The main factor behind the Agency's estate strategy, of closing small costly prisons and building new accommodation that is cheaper to run, is the need to make recurring savings. Under the strategy, the Agency had by the end of 2013, closed 13 prisons and built two new prisons. The estate strategy's objectives are to reduce resource costs; create durable, good standard accommodation and provide an estate that better meets offenders' needs, allowing more of them to work and be kept closer to their homes. Against these objectives, the Agency has built new, good quality, accommodation to time and within budget; is on track to achieve cost reductions of £70 million a year; and is starting to match better the geographical spread of prisons to the prison population. Key factors behind this good performance are that senior staff in the Agency have experience and knowledge and have remained in post throughout this period of change. However, the performance of the two new prisons, HMP Oakwood and HMP Thameside, has been poor and disappointing since they opened. They do not give sufficient priority to meeting offenders' rehabilitation needs, nor do they provide enough quality purposeful activity for prisoners. The Agency has also closed some prisons that were performing well.




BBC Digital Media Initiative - HC 985


Book Description

The Public Accounts Committee concludes that the BBC's Digital Media Initiative (DMI) was a complete failure. The DMI was a transformation programme that involved developing new technology for BBC staff to create, share and manage video and audio content and programmes from their desktops. Siemens were contracted to build the DMI system, but the contract was terminated and brought in-house in 2009. But the BBC failed to complete the DMI Programme and in May 2013 cancelled it at a cost to licence fee payers of £98.4 million. The BBC was far too complacent about the DMI's troubled history and the very high risks involved in taking it in-house. The DMI was 18 months behind schedule when the BBC took it in-house from Siemens. The BBC did not obtain independent technical assurance for the system design or ensure that the intended users were sufficiently engaged with the Programme. Poor governance meant that these important weaknesses went unchallenged, even when things started to go badly wrong. Projects like the DMI need to be led by an experienced senior responsible owner who has the skills, authority and determination to see the project through to successful implementation. The BBC needs to report using clear milestones that give the Executive and the Trust an unambiguous and accurate account of progress and any problems. The BBC Executive should apply more rigorous and timely scrutiny to its major projects to limit potential losses and the BBC Trust must be more proactive in chasing and challenging the BBC Executive's performance.




The Rural Broadband Programme - HC 834


Book Description

The Government has failed to deliver meaningful competition in the procurement of its £1.2 billion rural broadband programme, leaving BT effectively in a monopoly position. Despite warnings the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has allowed poor cost transparency and the lack of detailed broadband rollout plans to create conditions whereby alternative suppliers may be crowded out. Whilst BT claims it is making further concessions, this is not impacting on rural communities. Local authorities are still contractually prevented from sharing information to see if they are securing best terms for the public money they spend. Communities can still not access the detailed data they need to understand whether they will be covered by BT's scheme in their area. The lack of transparency on costs and BT's insistence on non-disclosure agreements is symptomatic of BT's exploiting its monopoly position. The Department needs to work urgently with all local authorities to publish detailed mapping of their implementation plans, down to full (7-digit) postcode level. The information should include speed of service, as soon as that is available. The Department should collect, analyse and publish data on deployment costs in the current programme, to inform its consideration of bids from suppliers under the next round of fundingMargaret Hodge was speaking as the Committee published its 50th Report of this Session which, on the basis of evidence from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and BT, examined the roll out of the rural broadband programme