How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other


Book Description

Economic theorists of international environmental cooperation and regime theorists who focus on the environment ask the same two basic research questions: why does international environmental cooperation emerge in some cases, but not in others, and why is cooperation 'wide' and 'deep' in some cases, but not in others? Unfortunately, the two schools of thought do not collaborate much in their respective attempts to answer these and related questions. Instead, mutual neglect is the general rule. This paper tries to show how regime theory can learn from the findings of the economic theory of international environmental cooperation and vice versa and how both can fruitfully learn from each other. An exploitation of mutual learning opportunities is likely to lead to a more comprehensive understanding of international environmental cooperation and can ultimately result in better informed policy advice.




Economic Theories of International Environmental Cooperation


Book Description

Relying on game theory and axiomatic methods to derive a model for fair, efficient policy in tackling environmental problems such as global warming, Helm (economics, Otto-von-Guericke U., Magdeburg, Germany) first takes a normative snapshot of international cooperation efforts from the perspective of fair division theory. Next, he applies self interest-based cooperative, non-cooperative, and repeated game theories. His analysis also considers under-studied threshold effects in natural systems, which may serve either as a common policy goal or incentive for free- riding if thresholds are not universally binding. Figures and tables represent information relating to Kyoto Protocol targets for CO2 emissions, climate change control costs, emissions trading factors, and a transboundary pollution stage game. Based on a doctoral dissertation (Humboldt U. of Berlin, 1999). Annotation copyrighted by Book News Inc., Portland, OR




Regime Consequences


Book Description

Why are some international regimes more effective or more successful than others? This book presents sophisticated studies of regime effectiveness, and a sophisticated analysis of the range of techniques available for the conduct of research in this area. One useful feature of the book is the consideration of broader consequences of regimes as well as their performance in addressing the specific problems that lead to their creation.




The Economics of International Environmental Agreements


Book Description

This title was first published in 2000: Conflicts between developed and developing countries over global environmental problems, and the fact that the co-operation required to solve environmental collective action problems is typically elusive in the world of international relations, suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hop to bring about co-operation in an inherently non-co-operative international setting. In particular, what can economic theory tell us about the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that will protect the world's fragile environmental resources? This book collects work on IEAs which demonstrates the value of rigorous microeconomic and econometric modelling in comprehending the many and varied facets of the design and implementation in IEAs.




International Environmental Treaties and State Behavior


Book Description

Despite the growing recognition of the importance of environmental issues for nation-state security, current research on international environmental security is insufficient. Although scholars in the field of International Relations believe that there is an appropriate role for international relations theory in analyzing global environmental concerns, the existing literature is predominantly descriptive or prescriptive rather than analytical. This study attempts to remedy this problem by conducting an empirical analysis of nation-state behavior in the international environmental realm.




Environmental Policy in an International Perspective


Book Description

The volume contains papers presented at a conference "On the International Dimension of Environmental Policy". It deals with two issues: *international environmental agreements; *environmental policies in open economies. Both issues are hot topics. The debate on how to cope with global climate change has become increasingly heated and controversial, and the relationship between trade and the environment is on the WTO agenda. The book contains review papers in which leading scholars in the field summarise the state of the art and original research extending the state of the art. Most of the papers are theoretically oriented, but some papers also present empirical results, using new econometric methods and new data. The book contains material for those students of economics and researchers who wish to deepen their knowledge in the area of International Environmental Economics, but also for those who endeavour to break new ground in this important field of research.




Economics, Game Theory And International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures


Book Description

The science and management of environmental problems is a vast area, comprising both the natural and social sciences, and the multidisciplinary links often make these issues challenging to comprehend. Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures aims to introduce students to the multidimensional character of international environmental problems in general, and climate change in particular.Ecology, economics, game theory and diplomacy are called upon and brought together in the common framework of a basic mathematical model. Within that framework, and using tools from these four disciplines, the book develops a theory that aims to explain and promote cooperation in international environmental affairs.Other books on the topic tend to be research-oriented volumes of various papers. Instead, this is a book that offers a reasonably-sized synthesis of the multidimensional societal problems of transfrontier pollution, particularly of climate change. It uses mathematical modeling of economic and game theory concepts to examine these environmental issues and demonstrate many results in an accessible fashion. Readers interested in understanding the links between ecology and economics, as well as the connection between economics and institutional decision-making, will find in this text not only answers to many of their queries but also questions for further thinking.




Reforming Law and Economy for a Sustainable Earth


Book Description

Few concerns preoccupy contemporary progressive thought as much as the issue of how to achieve a sustainable human society. The problems impeding this goal include those of how to arrest induced global environmental change (GEC), persistent disagreements about the contribution of economic activities to GEC and further differences in views on how these activities can be reformed in order to reduce the rate of change and thus to mitigate threats to much life on Earth. Reforming Law and Economy for a Sustainable Earth aims to help resolve these problems in two ways. Since addressing GEC will require global coordination, the book first clarifies the conditions necessary to achieve this effectively. Paul Anderson explores these conditions with the aid of a sustained analysis of key concepts in influential disciplines, particularly in social and political theory and law, relating to the transition to a sustainable economy. Second, Anderson tackles the problem of how to arrest GEC by incisively evaluating two leading theoretical positions in terms of their capacity to support the conditions required for effective global coordination. From this basis, the book offers an extensive critique of the idea that global environmental problems can be solved within the framework of global capitalism. It also critically reviews and advances the proposition that global sustainability can be achieved only by changing the capitalist form of organizing the economy. Enriched by a genuinely interdisciplinary approach, the originality of Reforming Law and Economy for a Sustainable Earth lies in the manner it combines a rigorous analysis of the requirements for global sustainability with decisive conclusions as to what are, and what are not, viable means of fulfilling those requirements. The book advances research on sustainability within key disciplines, among them political theory, law and social science, by offering a timely and insightful statement about the global environmental predicament in the 21st century.




How to Explain the Paris Negotiations. Environmental Cooperation in the Light of Behavioral Economics


Book Description

Seminar paper from the year 2017 in the subject Economy - Environment economics, grade: 1,7, University of Porto (Faculdade de Economia), course: Environmental Economics and Sustainable Development, language: English, abstract: One of the biggest challenges of the globalized world is still the establishment and maintenance of international cooperation. The growing interdependency produced by cross-border externalities demand for joint actions in an anarchic world order. The United Nations (UN) or the international economic system, consisting of the World Bank, the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), are some examples of mostly successful supranational forms of cooperation. What those institutions not include is the threat of climate change, which is today’s biggest challenge of international matter. With its Report “Limits to Growth” from the year 1972, The Club of Rome not only put the subject of climate change for the first time on the political and scientific agenda but also raised the public awareness of this problem. From this point on, ongoing efforts were made to commonly regulate emissions and control the sustainability of climate goods. Nevertheless, the first binding agreement on climate change, the Paris Agreement, entered into force 44 years after this report, on the 4th of November 2016. For some political and economic theorists this is no surprise. Following the assumptions of the economic game theory and global governance-approaches, non-cooperative behavior is the consequence of rational decision making. Basic dilemma situations depict the competition about non-excludable goods and foresee the challenges of global climate negotiations. The latest success on the Climate Conference in Paris challenges these assumptions and raises new questions about human cooperative behavior. While this matter has its origins in the neoclassical approach of game theory, behavioral economists started to examine the phenomenon and question the basic assumption of rational choice. “Homo oeconomicus is also a Homo socialis”. Aspects of both facets of human behavior shall be analyzed in this paper, in order to explain the mechanisms of cooperation on climate change. The existing literature focuses mostly on only one of these aspects which leads to an incomplete picture of the decision-making process.