Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks - Weakness of Cyber Defenses Against Cyber Warfare Demonstrated by High-Profile Attacks Against Estonia and Georgia, Multilateral Initiatives, Countermeasures


Book Description

High profile cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia have brought the subject of cyber security from the realm of internet magazines to main stream media outlets. The cyber attacks advanced the perceptions of animosity between the Russian Federation and former Soviet satellites. The cyber attacks that have occurred in the last few years have shown the vulnerabilities of using the internet and the weaknesses of cyber defenses. The international framework, either through regional organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), or through international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), has been inadequate for preventing cyber attacks for political purposes or for bringing cyber criminals to justice. There is little concrete proof of involvement of the Russian Federation government in any cyber attacks. The circumstantial evidence does lead to the perception that the Russian government was behind or supported recent cyber attacks. When countries or organizations stand in opposition to Russia they are likely to receive a cyber attack in order to influence their position. The high likelihood of future cyber attacks, the ease of conducting cyber attacks, and the amount of networks to conduct the attacks make this monograph relevant for study. Government and organizational leaders need to ensure that their cyber defenses are ready to protect private information, internet services, and electrical grids that rely on internet technology to function. Former Soviet satellites, the United States, and international organizations need to strive to increase international co-operation in order to defeat cyber crime. Without a legal international framework cyber criminals will continue to operate in areas where there are no laws or agreements concerning cyber security. Nations can build their own defenses but co-operation and the sharing of technical data will enable a safer internet environment for everyone. The computer user can be the weakest link in an Information Technology (IT) structure. Individuals must ensure that they are following best computer practices in order to accept the responsibility of being the first line of defense against future cyber attacks.




Estonia Two-and-A-Half Years Later


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Hackers have been online since a Cornell graduate student infected MIT's burgeoning network with the first Internet worm on November 2, 1988. But recently cyber attacks on states have proliferated both in numbers and severity. The best-known recent example of such a cyber attack was on April 27, 2007. In a matter of hours, the websites of Estonia's leading banks and newspapers crashed. Government communications were compromised. An enemy had invaded and was assaulting dozens of targets across the country. But this was not the result of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon of mass destruction. Nor was it a classical terrorist attack. A computer network was responsible, with attacks coming from thousands of zombie private computers around the world. And this was just the beginning. Flash forward to August 7, 2008 when immediately prior to the Russian army invading Georgia en masse a cyber attack reportedly crippled the IT systems of the Georgian military including air defense. Georgian command and control was forced to resort to U.S. government and Google accounts while Estonian advisors helped to deflect the ongoing cyber onslaught. These cyber attacks are far from unique. Literally thousands of largely unreported major and minor cyber attacks occur daily. Power utilities in the United States, Polish and South Korean government websites, and UK technology firms have all be hit by cyber attacks in just the past few months. Even school districts in Illinois, Colorado, and Oklahoma have lost millions to fraudulent wire transfers. Responses have been varied, with many nations such as Singapore creating new cyber security authorities responsible for safeguarding IT. Together these episodes exemplify that cyber attacks against states are increasingly common, and increasingly serious. No longer does it take thousands of planes and divisions of soldiers to destroy vital governmental institutions. It can now be done by a relatively small group of knowledgeable persons linking together zombie computers into a clandestine network that may be used to crash nearly any computer system in the world connected to the internet, from air traffic control to sewage treatment plants. The central topic of this article is uncovering in brief what is being, and can be done to counter these attacks, both at the national and international level. The focus is on the last two-and-a-half years since the specter of cyber war fully entered public consciousness on the international scene with the cyber attack on Estonia. The question presented is what progress has been made since that time? In short, the answer is very little. Many nations have found mutual benefit in the status quo strategic ambiguity. National information infrastructures, and the World Wide Web in general, remain acutely vulnerable to cyber attacks. Without concerted multilateral action, such as by coordinating the more than 250 Cyber Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) currently operating around the world while also clarifying the applicable legal regime, this intolerable state of affairs will continue. The structure of the article is as follows. Part I analyzes the threat of cyber attacks to international peace and security. Part II briefly summarizes the current cyber defense policies of the major players, to the extent that information is publicly available, including the United States, Russia, China, and NATO. Part III lays out the current legal regime that may be applied to cyber attacks, highlighting the significant gaps in the system. Finally, Part IV concludes by arguing for the need for a new regime for regulating cyber attacks and proposes new minilateral and multilateral measures that should be taken to more effectively protect information infrastructures from cyber attacks.




Strategic Cyber Security


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Lessons from the Front


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““Lessons From The Front: A Case Study Of Russian Cyber Warfare” looks to capitalize on the lessons learned from the alleged Russian cyber-offensive on Estonian networks in 2007 and the conflict that erupted in South Ossetia in 2008 following prolonged destabilizing efforts on the part of Russia. The goal of this research is to improve the United States Air Force (USAF) outlook in future conflicts by extrapolating the likely cyber-tactics to be utilized by a technically symmetric adversary, and how the USAF can use this knowledge to better protect itself. This research question is answered through the careful analysis and comparison of two disparate conflicts related by their collision with Russian cyber-warfare. Following case study discussion of Estonia and Georgia, the two cases are analyzed and discussed to study the Russian tactics that were used effectively during these conflicts. Based on this research and analysis, the following conclusions were made. A sophisticated cyber-offensive on the USAF will most likely involve the following: Cyber-attacks on target systems will not be limited to states of declared war. The cyber domain will be integrated with Land, Sea, Air, and Space campaigns. Adversary will capitalize on the USAFs tech-dependence by degrading C2 picture. In light of these conclusions, the report recommends the USAF does the following: Pursues an internationally accepted protocol for proportional cyber-responses. Utilizes education programs to develop Airmen that can exploit the inherent weaknesses involved in an integrated cyber-offensive. Maintains responsive DDoS mitigation capabilities and exercises its Airmen in how to operate in a degraded technological state."--Abstract.




International Cyber Incidents


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Strategies for Resolving the Cyber Attribution Challenge


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Technical challenges are not a great hindrance to global cyber security cooperation; rather, a nation's lack of cybersecurity action plans that combine technology, management procedures, organizational structures, law, and human competencies into national security strategies are. Strengthening international partnerships to secure the cyber domain will require understanding the technical, legal, and defense challenges faced by our international partners. Identifying the gaps in international cooperation and their socioeconomic and political bases will provide the knowledge required to support our partners' cybersecurity and contribute to building a cyber environment less hospitable to misuse. It will also help US policy makers to determine the appropriate escalation of diplomatic and defensive responses to irresponsible countries in cyberspace. Further research and discussion will likely enable the timely development of the response framework for US sponsorship of sound global norms to guide global cybersecurity. This will also assist the US defense, diplomatic, and development communities in building consensus, leveraging resources to enhance global cybersecurity, and coordinating US global outreach to those countries most beset by cyber crime and conflict.




At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy


Book Description

We depend on information and information technology (IT) to make many of our day-to-day tasks easier and more convenient. Computers play key roles in transportation, health care, banking, and energy. Businesses use IT for payroll and accounting, inventory and sales, and research and development. Modern military forces use weapons that are increasingly coordinated through computer-based networks. Cybersecurity is vital to protecting all of these functions. Cyberspace is vulnerable to a broad spectrum of hackers, criminals, terrorists, and state actors. Working in cyberspace, these malevolent actors can steal money, intellectual property, or classified information; impersonate law-abiding parties for their own purposes; damage important data; or deny the availability of normally accessible services. Cybersecurity issues arise because of three factors taken together - the presence of malevolent actors in cyberspace, societal reliance on IT for many important functions, and the presence of vulnerabilities in IT systems. What steps can policy makers take to protect our government, businesses, and the public from those would take advantage of system vulnerabilities? At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy offers a wealth of information on practical measures, technical and nontechnical challenges, and potential policy responses. According to this report, cybersecurity is a never-ending battle; threats will evolve as adversaries adopt new tools and techniques to compromise security. Cybersecurity is therefore an ongoing process that needs to evolve as new threats are identified. At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy is a call for action to make cybersecurity a public safety priority. For a number of years, the cybersecurity issue has received increasing public attention; however, most policy focus has been on the short-term costs of improving systems. In its explanation of the fundamentals of cybersecurity and the discussion of potential policy responses, this book will be a resource for policy makers, cybersecurity and IT professionals, and anyone who wants to understand threats to cyberspace.




Offense-Defense Theory Analysis of Russian Cyber Capability


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The Russian Federation is a key state actor in cyberspace; cyber events associated with Russian state and non-state actors have threatened Russia's neighbors, shaped international cyber norms, as well as influenced strategists' understanding of cyber power. This thesis seeks to understand Russian cyber capability through the lens of Robert Jervis's offense-defense theory in order to answer the thesis's central question: Do Russian cyber capabilities reflect an investment in offensive or defensive cyber weapons, and do Russia's cyber technology, doctrine, and policy differentiate its posture as offensive or defensive? To evaluate Russian cyber capability, this thesis considers two factors--technology and geography--concluding that, although the Russian government is modifying its cyber terrain to improve defensiveness, Russia's brandished cyber weapons suggest that it pursues offensive capability. To evaluate Russia's posture differentiation, the thesis examines Russians' understanding of cyber power, Russian information warfare and hybrid warfare doctrines, and the country's international engagements, concluding that, although Russia has historically presented its posture as defensive, it is increasingly difficult to make that distinction. Finally, the thesis evaluates this state-level analysis in the broader context of the international system; Russia's historical aggression and current behavior in cyberspace likely reflects Stephen van Evera's explanatory hypothesis for the causes of war--defensive expansion.