Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09


Book Description

Introduction -- Operational surprise and response -- The contemporary IED experience -- Data sources -- U.S. experience in Iraq -- The U.S. response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Vehicles -- Electronic countermeasures -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Summary assessment -- The Australian experience in Iraq -- The Australian response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Comparative analysis of responses -- Leadership changes -- National interests and equities -- Adequacy of existing capabilities -- Countervailing assessments -- Conventional thinking -- Adequate agility -- Flexible force structure -- Other considerations -- Failure to anticipate and the risk of overreaction -- The focusing power of casualties -- Subsequent experience - Afghanistan -- Conclusions.




Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09


Book Description

The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational-if not strategic-implications. Those implications can necessitate "institutional" responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are "wars of discretion." Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptations considered by John Nagl. The paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response. A case study of this experience illustrates how conventional military establishments recognize and respond to such surprises, with a particular focus on the experience, respectively, of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments. This case study reveals that institutional response is triggered by recognition of the surprise, which then cues organizational, equipment, training and doctrine, research and development, industrial, funding/ budgetary, and policy actions. Because the IED problem has mostly been a phenomenon of the land environment, this examination tends to emphasize the responses of armies, but the lessons have more general application. This paper contends that both the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) could have responded quicker than they did: contemporary defense establishments, it seems, may not cope well with such surprises. Despite this, the DoD demonstrated impressive agility in its response, especially for such a large organization, while the ADO was curiously slow to make the necessary institutional adaptations. In both cases, the role of senior leadership was key to mobilizing an effective response. In a fiscally constrained future that lacks the certainty of bipolar, state-on-state threats, the ability to recognize and respond quickly to operational and strategic surprise may be the decisive characteristic of national defense establishments.




Improvised Explosive Devices


Book Description

This book begins with an account of the evolution of improvised explosive devices using a number of micro case studies to explore how and why actors have initiated IED campaigns; how new and old technologies and expertise have been exploited and how ethical barriers to IED development and deployment have been dealt with. It proceeds to bring the evidence from the case studies together to identify themes and trends in IED development, before looking at what can realistically be done to mitigate the threat of IEDs in the new wars of the twenty first century. The book suggests that the advance and availability of a combination of technological factors, in conjunction with changes in the nature of contemporary conflicts, have led to the emergence of IEDs as the paradigmatic weapons of new wars. However their prevalence in contemporary and future conflicts is not inevitable, but rather depends on the willingness of multiple sets of actors at different levels to build a web of preventative measures to mitigate – if not eradicate – IED development and deployment.







Perspectives on the American Way of War


Book Description

Perspectives on the American Way of War examines salient cases of American experience in irregular warfare, focusing upon the post-World War II era. This book asks why recent misfires have emerged in irregular warfare from an institutional, professional, and academic context which regularly produces evidence that there is in fact no lack of understanding of both irregular challenges and correct responses. Expert contributors explore the reasoning behind the inability to achieve victory, however defined, and argue that what security professionals have failed to fully recognize, even today, is that what is at issue is not warfare suffused with politics but rather the very opposite, politics suffused with warfare. Perspectives on the American Way of War will be of great interest to scholars of war and conflict studies, strategic and military studies, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and terrorism and counterterrorism. The book was originally published as a special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies.




The Human Terrain System


Book Description

The Human Terrain System embedded civilians primarily in brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014 to act as a collection and dispersal mechanism for sociocultural comprehension. Set against the backdrop of the program's evolution, the experiences of these social scientists clarifies the U.S. Army's decision to integrate social scientists at the tactical level in conflict. Based on interviews, program documents, material from Freedom of Information Act requests, and secondary sources, this book finds a series of limiting factors inhibiting social science research at the tactical level, common to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Complexity in integrating civilians into the military decision-making cycle, in creating timely research with a high level of fidelity, and in making granular research that resonated with brigade staff all contributed to inhibiting the overall effect of the Human Terrain System. Yet, while high operational tempo in contested spaces complicates social science research at the tactical level, the author argues that there is a continued requirement for a residual capability to be maintained by the U.S. Army. Related items: Other resources produced by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1609 Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00431-3 Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-046-00274-6 Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force MARNE in Iraq, 2007-2008 can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00522-1 Iraq and Persian Gulf Wars collection can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/iraq-persian-gulf-wars Training Humans for the Human Domain can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01173-7 Paid to Perform: Aligning Total Military Compensation With Talent Management can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/node/49300/edit The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons From The United Kingdom Reserve Model can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01100-1 Afghanistan War collection can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/wars-conflicts/afghanistan-war




Going to War?


Book Description

Going to War? investigates the reasons why countries enter conflicts by considering the depth and complexity of issues surrounding military deployments. Showing how such conditions affect future decisions about the use of force, contributors to this volume study recent experiences with military interventions – such as regional flash points, the global financial crisis, and public weariness – to outline the crucial factors that influence wartime decision-making. Through detailed discussion of threats, capabilities, trends, and the implications of Canada’s and NATO’s military experiences abroad, Going to War? determines that the reasons for warfare have as much to do with domestic concerns as they do with international threats. With essays by defence scientists, established and emerging scholars, and senior military officers from Germany, the United States, and Canada, this volume includes debates on whether the number of military fatalities is being reduced, war’s changing character, and the ways in which the improvised explosive device has and will continue to challenge modern, advanced militaries deployed abroad, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. A sophisticated exercise in foreign and defence policy analysis, Going to War? provides clear and vivid ideas on how to optimize future Western military interventions.




Military Review


Book Description




The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya


Book Description

On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to dead 2,000 civilians, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO's shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a "war of choice" rather than a "war of necessity," NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of "no boots on the ground" might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive -- that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate -- the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi's regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of "Responsibility to Protect." On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi's departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO's Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, not even UN observers. As the regime's security forces had virtually imploded, Libya's security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.




Securing the MRAP


Book Description

Dwight D. Eisenhower once quipped, “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” Military acquisition and procurement—that is, how a nation manages investments, technologies, programs, and support—is critical to wartime success or failure. When unexpected battlefield problems arise, how do the government, the military, and industry work together to ensure effective solutions? During the American counterinsurgent campaign in Iraq, the improvised explosive device emerged as a disruptive and devastating threat. As Humvees, and their occupants, were ripped apart by IEDs, it was clear that new solutions had to be found. These solutions already existed but had not been procured, highlighting the need for more effective marketing to the military by industry. The ultimate successful response—the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle, or MRAP—required years of entrepreneurial marketing by the defense industry. In Securing the MRAP: Lessons Learned in Marketing and Military Procurement, James Hasik explores how these vehicles, which the American military mostly rejected despite the great need for them, eventually came to be adopted as the Pentagon’s top procurement priority. Hasik traces the story of the MRAP from the early 1970s to the future of mine-resistant vehicles on the battlefields of tomorrow. An important contribution to the seemingly disparate fields of marketing and defense policy, Securing the MRAP is an eye-opening revelation to defense industrialists, military officers, and government officials who want to understand how to avoid another IED-Humvee debacle.